SARAH GOODIS ORENSTEIN v. MARTHA SCOZIN REVOCABLE TRUST (2026)

Plaintiffs move under CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, seeking to enforce a Pennsylvania default judgment that they obtained against defendant for $51,025 (plus interest). The motion is denied.

When dealing with a motion seeking to domesticate a sibling-state judgment, this court's review is limited to ascertaining whether the other state's courts had jurisdiction. (See Cadle Co. v Tri-Angle Assocs., 18 AD3d 100, 103 [1st Dept 2005].) If defendant/judgment-debtor raises a personal-jurisdiction challenge, the judgment creditor has the burden of proving jurisdiction. (See id.) Here, defendant seeks to attack collaterally the underlying judgment by arguing that the Pennsylvania courts lacked personal jurisdiction over her due to invalid service. (See NYSCEF No. 29 at 7-9.)

Plaintiffs allege that they served defendant in the Pennsylvania action by certified mail, return receipt requested (see NYSCEF No. 16 at 4); and provide a Pennsylvania affidavit of service attaching a return receipt (see NYSCEF No. 7 at 3 [pdf pagination].) In opposition, defendant flatly denies signing the return receipt, or authorizing anyone else to sign on her behalf. (See NYSCEF No. 31 at ¶¶ 3-8.)

Plaintiffs attack this denial as conclusory (see NYSCEF No. 34 at 3-4); but it is difficult to see what other information defendant could provide to show that she was not the person who signed the return receipt. Additionally, the return receipt submitted by plaintiffs does not identify who was signing for the mailing; the boxes indicating whether the person signing was the "Addressee" or an "Agent" have not been checked; and the signature on the receipt is something of a squiggle, rather than a full name. (See NYSCEF No. 7 at 3.)

As plaintiffs point out (see NYSCEF No. 34 at 4 & n 1), defendant's affidavit leaves open the possibility that a doorman at her building signed for the mailing and then redelivered it to her (see NYSCEF No. 31 at ¶ 9). But plaintiffs have not established that under Pennsylvania law, service by certified mail, return receipt requested, is valid when the mailing is delivered to (and signed for by) an apartment doorman who has not been previously authorized by the defendant to accept service.¹ Nor have plaintiffs shown that a defendant's actual receipt of service of process would alone be sufficient, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, to support personal jurisdiction. (Cf. Macchia v Russo, 67 NY2d 592, 595 [1986] [holding that actual notice is insufficient under New York law when that notice has been "received by means other than those authorized by statute"].) Thus, on this record, defendant has raised a viable challenge to the validity of service in the underlying action; and plaintiffs have not succeeded in rebutting it.

On reply, plaintiffs argue that defendant waived any challenge to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts over her by actively (but unsuccessfully) litigating in the Pennsylvania courts prior to entry of judgment. (See NYSCEF No. 34 at 2, 4.) This argument, however, is made only on reply. Plaintiffs' opening papers do not mention any effort by defendant to defend the Pennsylvania action before default judgment was entered against her. Moreover, this waiver argument is made solely by counsel in a memorandum of law. Plaintiffs do not provide an affidavit or affirmation on personal knowledge, or prejudgment filings from the Pennsylvania action, to substantiate the statements made in the memorandum.

In these circumstances, plaintiffs have not established as a matter of law that they are entitled to domesticate the Pennsylvania judgment against defendant.²

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that plaintiffs' CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that this motion-action is converted into a plenary action, in which plaintiffs' filings appearing at NYSCEF Nos. 16-24 and 34 are deemed the complaint with exhibits, and defendant's filings appearing at NYSCEF Nos. 25-33 are deemed the answer with exhibits; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear before this court for a telephonic preliminary conference on March 20, 2026.

DATE 3/4/2026

FOOTNOTES

1.   At most, plaintiffs cite a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, that addresses when service by personal delivery may properly be made on a doorman instead of on the defendant directly. (See NYSCEF No. 34 at 4 n 1, citing FMC2, Inc. v Auto Boutique of S. Fla., Inc., 2020 WL 4365597, *1-2 [ED Pa. July 30, 2020].) And even that decision rests in part on the court's crediting of the process server's affidavit that reflected that the doorman had expressly been authorized by defendant to accept service on his behalf, both in general and in that particular instance. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not attempt to make a comparable showing here.

2.   Defendant also argues that the Pennsylvania judgment is not entitled to recognition here because it is not final. (See NYSCEF No. 29 at 6, 10-11.) But the proffered basis for this argument is that the Pennsylvania courts have not fully resolved a pending application by defendant to vacate the default judgment. (See id.) Defendant does not identify authority (whether from Pennsylvania or New York) holding that an otherwise-final judgment is not entitled to recognition in another state as long as an application to vacate that judgment remains pending in the rendering state.

Gerald Lebovits, J.