The People of the State of New York v. Juan Gomez, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant moves this Court, pro se, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 440.10, for an order vacating the instant judgment of conviction for what appears to be the following reasons: (1) the dismissal of his plea to a misdemeanor offense at the time of sentencing rendered his plea to Aggravated Family Offense, a felony offense, invalid pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(a); (2) the People acted "capriciously" during his sentencing proceedings pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(f); (3) during the plea and sentencing proceedings, improper and prejudicial conduct occurred off-the-record that would have required a reversal of judgment on appeal if it had occurred during trial pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(f); (4) his guilty plea was procured by duress, misrepresentation, or fraud by the court or the People pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(b); (5) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (6) sealed records from his prior cases were improperly used during his parole proceedings while incarcerated (see generally Defendant's Motion [Def. Mot.].).

For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is denied.

Procedural History

On September 29, 2022, defendant was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of Aggravated Family Offense (Penal Law § 240.75(1)) and Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 215.50(3)), stemming from an incident in which he violated an order of protection issued in favor of his former spouse. As part of this negotiated disposition, and pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant agreed to participate in New York County's felony Alternatives to Incarceration Court, and sentencing was adjourned for 12 months so that he could engage in treatment and programming as recommended by the Center for Court Innovation (People's Ex. F, p. 1). Defendant also agreed to abide by a list of conditions set forth in the written agreement and explained by the court, which included the requirement that he lead a law-abiding life throughout his mandate (id. at p. 3). Per the agreement, if defendant met those requirements, he would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to Aggravated Family Offense and be sentenced to a one-year conditional discharge on the second-degree contempt count (id. at p. 3; Plea Minutes, p. 12).¹

On October 6, 2022, seven days after pleading guilty and beginning his mandate, defendant absconded from programming after being dismissed from a residential facility for threatening to harm other residents of the facility (People's Ex. G, at 1). Defendant was returned on a bench warrant on July 7, 2023. He was given a second chance to satisfy the conditions of his mandate and was permitted to participate in a different residential treatment program (Sentencing Minutes, p. 5). Defendant absconded from that program the same day (id.). He was apprehended again five months later. On March 29, 2024, he appeared for sentencing. In accordance with his plea agreement, defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree criminal contempt and was sentenced on the Aggravated Family Offense count to an indeterminate term of one-and-one-half to three years' imprisonment, with full and final orders of protection issued in favor of his former spouse and children (id. at 6-7).

Now, in pro se papers dated May 22, 2025, defendant moves for an order pursuant to CPL § 440.10 to set aside the judgment of conviction in this matter. In his voluminous papers, defendant appears to raise six identifiable grounds for vacatur of his conviction: (1) the dismissal of his plea to a specified misdemeanor offense at the time of sentencing rendered his plea to Aggravated Family Offense invalid pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(a); (2) the People acted "capriciously" during his sentencing proceedings pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(f); (3) during the plea and sentencing proceedings, improper and prejudicial conduct occurred off-the-record that would have required a reversal of judgment on appeal if it had occurred during trial pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(f); (4) his guilty plea was procured by duress, misrepresentation, or fraud by the court or the People pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(b); (5) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (6) sealed records from his prior cases were improperly used during his parole proceedings while incarcerated (see generally Def. Mot.). The People oppose, arguing that defendant is procedurally barred from raising his claims, and that they are, in any event, meritless. Defendant has since filed numerous papers in support of his motion.

For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion is denied.

Conclusions of Law

CPL § 440.30 Procedural Bars

For the following reasons, this court finds that each of defendant's six claims should be denied as procedurally barred pursuant to CPL § 440.30.

CPL § 440.30(4)(b) specifies that a court, in its discretion and upon considering the merits, "may deny [a CPL § 440 motion] without conducting a hearing if . . . the motion is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate all the essential facts." See People v. Wright, 27 NY3d 516, 521 (2016) ("Under CPL 440.30(4)(b), based on this failure to provide sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate the essential facts [of an ineffective assistance claim], County Court was within its province to deny the motion without a hearing."); People v. Smith, 251 AD2d 226, 227-228 (1st Dept. 1998) (the motion court properly denied defendant's CPL § 440.10 motion under CPL § 440.30(4)(b) where his allegations of fraud and ineffective assistance were "wholly conclusory").

The following three claims are based upon the existence or occurrence of facts that are not supported by sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate the essential facts of those arguments: (1) during the plea and sentencing proceedings, improper and prejudicial conduct occurred off-the-record that would have required a reversal of judgment on appeal if it had occurred during trial pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(f); (2) his guilty plea was procured by duress, misrepresentation, or fraud by the court or the People pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(b); and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel (see generally Def. Mot.). Defendant provides no evidence or sworn allegations of fact in support of any of these claims.

Beginning with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant has not provided any proof that his counsel's performance was deficient, or that the off-the-record conversations he alleges took place were improper or prejudicial. Instead, he relies upon speculation as to what may have been said or done during the bench conference at issue, and his own unhappiness with the outcome of his case. Indeed, not only does he fail to provide any evidence to support his conclusory claim, but he also fails to articulate a specific, cognizable complaint about his attorney's performance. This is insufficient to justify consideration of his arguments. See People v. Ozuna, 7 NY3d 913 (2006) (CPL § 440.10 motion properly denied without a hearing where defendant failed to submit any sworn allegations substantiating claims of improper trial procedure and ineffective assistance); People v. Leiva, 59 AD3d 161 (1st Dept. 2009) (post-judgment motion denied where defendant failed to provide affidavits from defense counsel or any other party shedding light on counsel's strategic decisions).

Defendant has also failed to substantiate his allegations of misconduct by the court and counsel during a bench conference. This argument appears to be rooted entirely in defendant's suppositions—specifically, that the off-the-record conversation constituted some totally unspecified misconduct that would result in reversal if challenged after trial. Given that defendant has not even clarified exactly what he believes was discussed, these related arguments need not—and indeed cannot—be assessed by this or any other court. It is for the same reason that his claims of duress fail—defendant has provided no explanation about exactly what occurred that made him feel compelled to plead guilty here. He has not provided any evidence that would suggest that he felt obligated to plead guilty. Thus, these bare assertions fall at the first hurdle.

Defendant's claim that the dismissal of the second-degree criminal contempt charge invalidates his conviction for Aggravated Family Offense is denied pursuant to CPL §§ 440.30(4)(a) and (d). CPL § 440.30(4)(a) permits a court to, in its discretion, deny a motion without conducting a hearing where "[t]he moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis for the motion." CPL § 440.30(4)(d) permits a court to summarily deny a motion where "[a]n allegation of fact essential to support the motion" is "contradicted by court record or other official document."

It appears that this claim is based on defendant's misreading of Penal Law § 240.75. Penal Law § 240.75 provides that a person is guilty of Aggravated Family Offense when "he [ ] commits a misdemeanor defined in subsection two of this section as a specified offense . . . and [ ] has been convicted of one or more specified offenses within the preceding five years" (emphasis added). Second-degree criminal contempt is one of the specified offenses listed in subdivision two and court records reflect that defendant was convicted of a felony offense in 2017 (within five years of the instant conviction). The language of the first part of the statute does not—as defendant seems to contend—require that a defendant be convicted of a specified misdemeanor, but only that a defendant "commit[ ] a misdemeanor defined in subsection two of this section as a specified offense." Penal Law § 240.75(1). Thus, even though his plea to second-degree criminal contempt was ultimately withdrawn, defendant admitted—on the record—that he violated a valid order of protection issued in favor of his former spouse (Sentencing Minutes, pp. 10-17). Such admission is sufficient to demonstrate that he, in fact, committed one of the specified offenses listed Penal Law § 240.75(2) and thus sufficient to sustain his conviction for Aggravated Family Offense. As such, because his argument does not constitute a legal basis for granting the motion, it is denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(a). Moreover, whereas this argument is contradicted by a court record, it is also denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(d). See People v. Sayles, 17 AD3d 924 (3d Dept. 2005) (The court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying defendant's motion under CPL § 440.30(4)(d) where the minutes reflect that he unequivocally confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily).

Defendant's final two claims - that sealed records from his prior cases were improperly used during his parole proceedings while incarcerated and the People acted "capriciously" during the sentencing proceeding - are also denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(a) given that neither claim is a ground constituting a legal basis for a post-judgment Article 440 motion. See generally People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, n.3 (2019) (Generally, CPL § 440.10 relief "is designed as a remedy against injustice when no other avenue of judicial relief is available for certain nonwaivable rights impacted by fundamental errors dehors the record").

Merits

As set forth below, defendant's motion also fails on the merits.

For the reasons already stated, defendant's claim that his conviction for Aggravated Felony Offense is invalid as a result of the withdrawal of the second-degree criminal contempt conviction must fail. Whereas the requirements of the statute were satisfied with defendant's admission to the commission of the conduct constituting one of the specified misdemeanor offenses listed in CPL § 240.75(2) (second-degree criminal contempt)² and his conviction for one of the specified offenses was within five years of the instant conviction, his conviction for Aggravated Felony Offense is lawful.

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is similarly meritless. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove that counsel's performance, viewed in its totality, did not amount to meaningful representation. People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 711-712 (1998); see also People v. Maffei, 35 NY3d 264, 269 (2020). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must "demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations"—i.e., those that would be consistent with the decisions of a "reasonably competent attorney"—for the alleged deficiencies of counsel. Benevento, 91 NY2d at 712 (citing People v. Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 (1988). While prejudice is not required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a lack of prejudice may inform a finding that a defendant received meaningful representation. See People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 (1981).

Defendant has not met his burden in establishing that counsel provided less than meaningful representation. On defendant's behalf, counsel negotiated a lenient plea agreement that, if satisfied, would not only have spared defendant from extended incarceration, but would have also spared him another felony conviction. With counsel's advocacy, defendant was permitted to avail himself of an alternatives-to-incarceration program that, in addition to a favorable disposition, provided him access to beneficial, supportive, and potentially life-changing programming. Moreover, even when defendant violated the terms of his plea agreement, defense counsel made compelling and ultimately successful arguments that secured defendant a second chance at programming, and, upon his second violation, against the imposition of the maximum sentence.

With this outcome in mind, absent evidence to the contrary, the record reflects that counsel's decisions were strategically valid and explicable—if not exemplary. See People v. Vega, 158 AD2d 258 (1st Dept. 1990) (Defendant received effective assistance of counsel where counsel was able to negotiate a "lenient and beneficial" sentence compared to the potential maximum penalty). The generous outcome even after defendant's failure to abide by the agreement further demonstrates that a different outcome—but for counsel's performance—was highly unlikely. See People v. DeShields, 115 Misc 2d 1038, 1043-1044 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 1982) ("In light of defendant's exposure to twenty-five years' imprisonment, his considerable past record, and the nature of the crime, the sentence of probation he received is indeed the best evidence of his lawyer's competence"). Defendant certainly has not proven otherwise.

Simply put, the fact that the instant case concluded with a felony conviction and an incarceratory sentence is the result of defendant's own actions—not his attorney's. Defendant's apparent buyer's remorse is not sufficient to establish that counsel lacked strategic justification for his actions. See People v. Garcia, 149 AD2d 241, 248 (1st Dept. 1989) ("[A] defendant who is unhappy with trial counsel's performance, when that defendant is convicted, cannot because of that fact alone, claim that he or she received 'less than meaningful representation' on the part of such counsel"); People v. Burwell, 56 AD3d 304 (1st Dept. 2008) (A defendant's disappointment in his attorney's inability to get an even more generous outcome does not provide a basis for disturbing a plea, especially where there was already a lenient disposition).

Likewise, defendant's allegations of misconduct by the court and the People are unfounded. Defendant asserts three grounds for relief related to this alleged misconduct: (1) the People acted "capriciously" in asking for the maximum sentence for Aggravated Family Offense; (2) improper, prejudicial conduct occurred in an off-the-record bench conference that would require reversal of his conviction on appeal; and (3) his guilty plea was obtained by fraud or duress. All of these claims fail.

Defendant's assertion that the People behaved capriciously in requesting a two-to-four-year sentence is meritless. The plea agreement establishes that defendant's failure to complete his mandate would result in a sentence on the felony count of "up to two-to-four-years in state prison" (Plea Minutes, at p.4). Thus, the People's request was merely an unsurprising reiteration of what was already specified in the plea agreement and, therefore, not capricious. In any event, the People's request ultimately had no impact on the imposed sentence, given that the court sentenced defendant to a one-and-one-half to three years term of imprisonment (Court File: Uniform Sentence & Commitment Sheet).

Defendant's claims that his guilty plea was obtained by fraud or duress, and that improper and prejudicial conduct occurred in a bench conference that would require reversal on appeal are also meritless and totally unsubstantiated. Nothing in the record reflects that the bench conference at issue was anything other than a routine discussion between the court and the parties, or that the discussion had any bearing on defendant's conviction or sentence. Again, he was sentenced within the range specified at his initial plea, and pursuant to his written plea agreement. There is no indication that the sentence imposed, which was not the maximum sentence, was influenced in any particular way during the bench conference. Similarly, nothing in the record indicates that defendant was coerced or that any promises were made to him in exchange for his guilty plea. In fact, the nature of the agreement was highly generous to him, and had he successfully completed his mandate, the outcome would have been extremely favorable to him, not only sparing him from extended incarceration, but also from incurring a felony conviction at all. With this favorable outcome in mind, defendant has not specified exactly what occurred to make him feel compelled to plead guilty. Nor has he specified exactly what occurred that he believes constituted fraud. These bare allegations appear to be rooted in his own disappointment with the sentence that he ultimately received. They do not, and cannot, justify disturbing his conviction. See People v. Lowrance, 41 NY2d 303 (1977) (there is no basis to vacate a guilty plea where the record does not indicate any duress or coercion influenced the decision to plead guilty).

Finally, defendant's challenge to the procedure followed during his parole hearing is not properly raised in a motion pursuant to CPL § 440.10. Challenges to the procedures and decisions of the Division of Parole should be raised in CPLR Article 78 proceedings. See People ex rel. Mack v. Reid, 113 AD2d 962, 963 (2d Dept. 1985) (proper procedure for challenging parole determinations is to await final administrative determination on the issue and then commence a timely Article 78 proceeding); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470 (2000).

Conclusion

For all of these reasons, defendant's motion to vacate the instant judgment of conviction is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 14, 2026

New York, NY

Ellen Biben, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The agreement further specified that if defendant failed to successfully complete mandatory treatment but did not sustain a new arrest or abscond, the People would ask the court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to Aggravated Family Offense, and he would be sentenced to one year of incarceration for second-degree criminal contempt. However, if defendant absconded or was re-arrested, defendant would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree criminal contempt, and would be sentenced on the felony charge to up to two-to-four years' incarceration (People's Ex. F, at p. 4; Plea Minutes, at pp. 12-13).

2.   The court factually allocuted defendant on the second-degree criminal contempt charge, asking: "it's also charged with respect to count two that you . . . intentionally disobeyed and resisted the lawful process and other mandate of the Court, which was an order of protection, is that true? (Plea Minutes, at pp. 15-16). Defendant replied with an unequivocal "yes" (id. at p. 16). By admitting that he committed the offense of second-degree criminal contempt by violating an order of protection issued following his 2017 conviction, he also admitted that he "commit[ed] a misdemeanor . . . and [he was] convicted of one or more specified offenses in the preceding five years." Penal Law § 240.75(1).

Ellen Biben, J.