MNM III REALTY ASSOCIATES NY LLC v. BEATRICE HOOD (2026)

In this residential-landlord-tenant action, plaintiff MNM III Realty Associates NY LLC moves under CPLR 3212 for partial summary judgment against defendants, Wayne S. Kreger and Beatrice M. Hood, on MNM III's claim against defendants for unpaid rent or use and occupancy (U&O). Plaintiffs also seek leave to discontinue their other causes of action against defendants; and to dismiss defendants' affirmative defenses. The motion is granted.¹

DISCUSSION

MNM III seeks to collect $5,700 a month in rent or U&O for the premises at issue from November 2021 through September 2022—$62,700, in total. (See NYSCEF No. 27 [ledger].) MNM III relies on an affidavit of its managing member, Matthieu Moulin, which represents that defendants occupied the premises at issue until September 2022, but did not pay rent for any month after October 2021. (See NYSCEF No. 20 at ¶¶ 24, 28-29.) The affidavit attaches various documents, including a filled-out-but-unsigned lease for a February 2021 through January 2022 term, reflecting a monthly rent of $5,700 (see NYSCEF No. 24); checks drawn on a joint account in defendants' names, reflecting monthly payments of $5,700 for February through October 2021 (see NYSCEF No. 25); and a ledger reflecting no payments for November 2021 through September 2022 (see NYSCEF No. 27).

This evidence establishes, prima facie, that defendants owe the amount claimed by MNM III—whether one construes that amount as monthly or holdover rent under the lease, or as U&O for the duration of defendants' unpaid occupancy.

Kreger's opposition papers do not raise a material dispute of fact. Kreger does not contest MNM III's representations either with respect to the length of defendants' occupancy of the premises, or the length of defendants' period of nonpayment. At most, Kreger argues that factual disputes exist about whether the unexecuted 2021 lease is a binding and enforceable agreement between MNM III and defendants. (See NYSCEF No. 32 at 1-2, 4-8.) But the question of the enforceability of the 2021 lease is neither here nor there, because even absent an enforceable lease, defendants would still be liable for U&O for the period in which they occupied the premises without paying MNM III.²

MNM III's evidence, including not only the terms of the unexecuted lease, but also defendants' ensuing monthly payments, establishes prima facie that $5,700 a month is the reasonable fair-market rental value of the premises for U&O purposes. Absent any countervailing evidence—and Kreger provides none—MNM III's showing is sufficient to establish defendants' liability for $62,700 in unpaid U&O.

The only other argument Kreger makes in opposition is that summary judgment is premature under CPLR 3212 (f) because he was not given the chance to finish deposing plaintiff Michel Moulin. This argument is unavailing. It is undisputed that Michel Moulin's deposition was not completed; that the parties agreed the deposition might be resumed at a later date; and that the deposition was not resumed before plaintiffs filed their note of issue in June 2025. But the last conference order prior to filing of the note of issue provided only that defendants reserved the right to seek Michel Moulin's continued deposition (see NYSCEF No. 16 at 1), not that plaintiffs were obligated to produce him for a second deposition session. And once the note of issue was filed, Kreger did not move to vacate on the ground that material outstanding discovery remained. In any event, the topics that Kreger now identifies as subjects for a further deposition session would go only to whether a lease was in place—not to whether defendants owe the sums at issue to MNM III in U&O. This court is not persuaded that it is premature in these circumstances to grant MNM III's request for summary judgment.

Kreger does not contest either plaintiffs' request to dismiss defendants' affirmative defenses, nor their request to discontinue their remaining causes of action. Those requests are granted without opposition.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branches of plaintiff MNM III's motion for summary judgment in its favor against defendants and to dismiss defendants' affirmative defenses are granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiffs' motion to discontinue their remaining causes of action with prejudice is granted without opposition; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff MNM III Realty Associates NY LLC is awarded a money judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, for $62,700, with interest on that sum running at the statutory rate from the reasonable intermediate date of April 15, 2022; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on defendant Kreger by e-filing on NYSCEF; on defendant Hood by certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to her last-known address; and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATE 1/30/2026

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant Kreger is a former attorney. He was disbarred by the Appellate Division, First Department, effective February 4, 2025. (See Matter of Kreger, 235 AD3d 85, 89 [1st Dept 2025].) As a non-attorney, Kreger may not appear on behalf of defendant Hood, as he had prior to his disbarment. Nonetheless, the opposition memorandum of law signed by Kreger recites that it is brought on behalf of both defendants, not just Kreger himself. (See NYSCEF No. 32 at 1 [pdf pagination] [describing the filing as "Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition"] [emphasis added]; id. at 4 [stating that "Defendants Wayne S. Kreger ("Kreger") and Beatrice M. Hood ("Hood") ("Defendants") hereby Oppose the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs . . . as follows"] [capitalization omitted].) Hood did not file any papers herself; nor seek the court's assistance to do so. The motion is therefore technically unopposed as to Hood. Because Kreger's arguments would apply equally to MNM III's claims against her, though, that formal lack of opposition does not affect the court's analysis.This court notes that the email address given by Kreger in his memorandum of law is the same law-related professional email that he had used prior to his disbarment. (Compare NYSCEF No. 6 at 6, with NYSCEF No. 32 at 14 [pdf pagination].) The use of this email address runs contrary to the First Department's directive that as of February 4, 2025, Kreger "refrain from . . . holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law." (Matter of Kreger, 235 AD3d at 89.) Kreger is directed to refrain from any further use of his prior, professional email address.

2.   For this reason, Kreger misplaces his reliance on the fact that defendant Hood's name was not on a lease for the premises. (See NYSCEF No. 32 at 3; NYSCEF No. 33 at 6 ¶ 6.)

Gerald Lebovits, J.