The People of the State of New York v. Jocelyn D., Defendant. (2026)

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of five counts each of Robbery in the First Degree and Robbery in the Second Degree, and one count each of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 23 years with five years of post-release supervision; 15 years with five years of post-release supervision; and three and one-half to seven years, respectively.

The defendant, acting in concert with others, committed five pattern-style robberies of electronic stores in the same neighborhood in Brooklyn over a five-month period of time during which one of the perpetrators would display what appeared to be a firearm to facilitate the taking of large amounts of merchandise. After committing the last robbery, the defendant was apprehended after a high-speed police pursuit and was in possession of stolen property. The Second Department later vacated two of the robbery convictions for one of the incidents indicating that there was insufficient evidence proving defendant's identity as one of the perpetrators (People v Jocelyn D., 113 AD3d 787 [2nd Dept 2014] lv denied People v Jocelyn D., 23 NY3d 1035 [2014]). The remainder of defendant's appeal issues were denied (Id. at 788-789) (sufficient evidence establishing "display" of a firearm; proper limiting of defense attorney's summation; sentence not excessive). Defendant's writ of habeas corpus, on the same grounds as his appeal, was also denied (Jocelyn D., v Recette, 2021 US Dist LEXIS 154969 (EDNY 2021).

Defendant now moves to be resentenced pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, CPL § 440.47 ("DVSJA"), claiming that he was the victim of severe physical and psychological abuse by his domestic partner and that such abuse contributed to the circumstances of the robberies. The People consent to a hearing as "defendant has met the threshold corroboration requirements of CPL § 440.47 (2) (c)" (Aff in Opp at 3) and consent to the use of defendant's first name and last initial in the case captioning.

Before the hearing, defendant moves, in limine, for an order sealing the motion and all attendant papers and closing the courtroom for the entirety of the proceedings. Defendant argues that public access to his case file will cause irreparable harm by disclosing his personal experiences, emotions and traumas. Similarly, defendant argues that the courtroom should be closed during the hearing to protect his privacy interests and the privacy interests of other testifying witnesses. The People oppose the motion asserting there is no statutory authority for the sealing of this case file; that public access to the courtroom is constitutionally required absent extraordinary findings; and that the anonymous captioning sufficiently addresses defendant's privacy interests.

Upon review of the submissions of the parties, the applicable law, and the record, defendant's motions are denied for the reasons set forth herein.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Close the Courtroom

The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant the right to a public trial (US Const, 6th Amend). "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial" (Id.). This right "has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege . . . in a criminal prosecution" (People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 425, 79 N.Y.S.3d 597 [2018], quoting People v Martin, 16 NY3d 607, 611, 925 N.Y.S.2d 400 [2011]). Conversely, the press and public also have a qualified First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial (Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 US 596 [1982]; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v ];(US Const, 1st Amend). "The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, . . ., important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated' "(Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814 [1980] quoting Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 681 [1972]).

Since defendant, here, is the proponent of a closed courtroom for the re-sentencing hearing, his Sixth Amendment Right is not asserted (see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 US 1, 7, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2740 [1986] ("Press-Enterprise II") ("the right asserted is not the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial since the defendant requested a closed preliminary hearing"). Thus, the court must consider herein the rights of the public under the First Amendment (Id.).

Historically, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of an open courtroom:

The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.

(Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US 501, 510, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 [1984] ("Press-Enterprise I"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 488 US 555, 569-571, 100 S. Ct 2814 [1980]). Since there is a strong presumption that trials will be open to the public, a trial court must exercise discretion and only exclude the public when unusual circumstances require it (People v Reid, 40 NY3d 198, 196 N.Y.S.3d 348 [2023] quoting People v Martin, 16 NY3d 607, 611, 925 N.Y.S.2d 400 [2011]).

First, the court must consider whether the proceeding is subject to the Constitutional right of access (Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. 1, 7 [1986] (Press-Enterprise II)). In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court determined that, for the Constitution to be implicated, the trial court must consider whether "the process has historically been open to public" and whether "the public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question" (Id. at 8). This test is well established as the "experience and logic" test (Id.).

Here, defendant seeks to close the courtroom for a post-judgment motion and hearing for re-sentencing pursuant to Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, CPL § 440.47 ("DVSJA"). Defendant argues that, as a post-judgment hearing, both his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as well as the public's First Amendment right to attend the trial, were satisfied at the time of his conviction and sentencing over 17 years ago and thus, the Constitution protections do not apply to this proceeding (Reply at 2).

The court, herein, does not find that argument availing. It is axiomatic that criminal trials and sentencing have historically been open to the public in New York and that public access to both trials and sentencing plays a significant role in the monitoring of procedure and basic fairness essential to public confidence (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US 501, 510, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 [1984] (Press-Enterprise I); see also eg. United States v Queen, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 99835 *9 (SDNY 2025) (Kaplan, J) ("sentencing proceedings must be held in open court). By way of example, CPL § 380.50(2)(b) requires the sentencing court to "accord the victim the right to make a statement with regard to any matter relevant to the question of sentence" (CPL § 380.50(2)(b)); see People v Hemmings, 2 NY3d 1, 5 [2004]) (statute is significant "because it unequivocally granted victims a right to speak at sentencing").

Moreover, the DVSJA was enacted to allow "incarcerated domestic violence survivors the opportunity to apply for resentencing to obtain relief from [lengthy] prison sentences" (People v Brenda WW., 44 NY3d 594, 597 [2025]). All applicants must be incarcerated and thus, contrary to defendant's argument, the applicants, who are subject to imprisonment based on their convictions, continue to be subject to the criminal process. Further, "[t]he Act expanded judicial discretion at both the initial sentencing stage and through retroactive relief mechanisms" (Id. at 598). Since the statute applies to both "initial sentencing stage" and resentence, the Legislature contemplated active criminal proceedings.

Further, the various factors that the Supreme Court has considered in deciding whether pre-trial proceedings are subject to the constitutional protections of a public trial apply equally here (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210 [1984] (suppression hearing); Press-Enterprise II, 478 US 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735 [1986] (preliminary hearings)). In Waller, the Supreme Court, in finding that a suppression hearing could not be closed to the public, noted that "a suppression hearing often resembles a bench trial: witnesses are sworn in and testify, and of course counsel argue their positions. The outcome frequently depends on a resolution of factual matters" (Waller, at 47). As such, in addition to "ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibility, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury" (Id. at 46).

Similarly here, this DVSJA resentencing hearing has far more attributes of a "trial" than the initial sentencing post-verdict where no testimony was given under oath and no factual findings were made. Further, in Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court, in finding that preliminary hearings must be open to the public, noted that "the absence of a jury, long recognized as an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more significant" (Press-Enterprise II, 478 US 12, 106 S.Ct. 2735 [1986]). This DVSJA statute, enacted as recently as 2019, is still being interpreted and implement in practice by both trial and appellate courts. This is best exemplified by the Court of Appeals' recent decision in April 2026 finding that a defendant's right to a DVSJA hearing cannot be waived as part of plea negotiations (see e.g. People v N.H., 2026 NY LEXIS 554 [2026]). The body of case law providing guidance to attorneys, defendants and trial judges is in its infancy. The statute, by its very nature, conveys upon trial judges broad discretion to resentence. As the prosecution duly notes, closing the courtrooms for DVSJA proceedings based only on the personal and potentially embarrassing nature of the testimony would result in widespread closings of most if not all DVSJA hearings, thus depriving future litigants, defense attorneys and prosecutors with valuable insights, legal arguments and rationales that could be mounted before trial judges.

Further, "[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular case" (Richmond Newspapers v. Va., 448 US 555, 572, 100 S.Ct. 2814 [1980]). The public and the press have the right to understand the nature of these proceedings, observe the types of survival stories that might warrant resentencing and hold prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys accountable for deviations from the norms. To be sure, this right extends to the victims, families and others affected by DVSJA resentencing.

Finally, the court notes that there is no provision in CPL § 440.447 authorizing closure of the courtroom or sealing records associated with the motion (CPL § 440.47). If the Legislature wanted to protect the confidentiality of the applicant's submission upon a motion pursuant to DVSJA and/or to close the proceedings, they could have include such provisions (see eg, Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(g); Matter of State v John T., 163 AD3d 1148, 1149, 79 NYS3d 761 [2018] (either party to Article 10 proceeding may request closure of the courtroom during a trial based upon a showing of good cause). Accordingly, the court finds that the instant post-judgment motion and hearing for re-sentencing pursuant to CPL § 440.47 ("DVSJA") is subject to the public's First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial.

After applying the "experience and logic" test, the court must determine whether defendant has met his burden of proof entitling him to closure of the courtroom (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US 501, 510, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 [1984]; (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 [1986] (Press-Enterprise II)). In Press-Enterprise I, the Supreme Court held that the "presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest" and that the interest must be articulated with specific findings for appellate review (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US 501, 510, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 [1984]). Thereafter, in Waller v Georgia, the Court restated their holding as follows: "the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure" (Waller v Georgia,467 US 39, 46, 104 S. Ct 2210, 2216 [1984]). Therefore, to close the courtroom, defendant must first "advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced (Id.).

Here, defendant asserts that he will suffer prejudice because his motion contains highly sensitive, personal details of his life and trauma history and that at the hearing "traumatic and intimate details" of his life will be on display. Further, he argues that these details will cause him embarrassment and shame and that witnesses in support of his motion may be deterred from testifying if the hearing is open to the public. Specifically, defendant states that the details of his infant daughter's death and her autopsy report are sensitive in nature and must be protected. He also seeks to limit exposure of details about an inappropriate relationship his partner's daughter had with an adult male when she was a minor and seeks to limit irreparable harm caused to the memory of defendant's deceased domestic partner who orchestrated the alleged abuse against him.

Defendant has not demonstrated that an open hearing poses a substantial probability of prejudice to his ability to receive a fair hearing before this court. The harms asserted—embarrassment, reputational harm to a deceased domestic partner, and possible distress to an adult stepdaughter—do not rise to the constitutionally required showing necessary to justify restricting public access. Courts have long held that even sensitive, emotionally difficult testimony does not alone justify closure, and the record here contains no articulation of individualized findings that meet the legal threshold (see Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court, 457 U.S. 586, 607-08 [1982]) In Globe, the Supreme Court held that the state's dual interests in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment and encouraging such victims to come forward and testify did not justify a mandatory closure rule; and, as such, the Supreme Court struck down as violative of the First Amendment a Massachusetts statute requiring closure of the courtroom for all child sex abuse victims (Id. at 607). The Supreme Court held that closure must be decided on a case-by-case basis but also found that the State offered no "empirical support" for the general claim that minor sex victims will not come forward and testify if closure is not mandated (Id. at 609). Similarly, defendant's argument here, that this court's denial of closure would have a chilling effect on future DVSJA petitioners, is purely speculative.

Further, defendant's possible embarrassment and shame do not override the public's well-established First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. Denying public access to the hearing based on the possibility that defendant's adult stepdaughter may be traumatized and that his deceased domestic partner may suffer reputational harm cannot be justified (See Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Moynihan, 71 NY2d 263 [1988] (trial court's closure of sentencing proceeding of youthful offenders to avoid embarrassment and stigma violated First Amendment)).

Finally, the requirements of Waller v Georgia mandate that any the closure of the courtroom must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest and the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 46, 104 S. Ct 2210, 2216 [1984]). Here, the People have consented to the use of defendant's first name and last initial in the case captioning in an effort to maintain privacy for defendant and as a reasonable alternative to closing the proceeding. Defendant's alternative proposal that the courtroom be closed only for his own testimony is also denied as such closure would, in essence, render null and void the First Amendment right that the victims, public and press have to watch and monitor the proceedings as the defendant's testimony is the main source of defendant's claims for resentencing.

Accordingly, the court denies defendant's motion to close the courtroom.

B. Motion to Seal the Record

Defendant also seeks to seal this motion and all attendant papers asserting, as above, that disclosure would unjustly injure defendant and others by exposing sensitive details of abuse. Defendant relies on the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Hynes v Karassik, which provides that even absent a specific sealing statute, the court has discretionary authority to deem certain court records confidential "when essential to the proper administration of justice (Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659, 664, 419 N.Y.S.2d 942, [1979] (specifically referencing Family Court's authority in adjudication of juveniles). However, the Court cautioned that this power should be rarely exercised and, in fact, the cases cited in Karassik, as well as the facts of Karassik itself, all involved either a statute that specifically permitted sealing or the sealing of records after an acquittal or dismissal of an action (Id.).

As set forth above, there is no provision in CPL § 440.447 authorizing closure of the courtroom or sealing records associated with the motion (CPL § 440.47). As the People assert, when the Legislature intends to impose sealing requirements, it is explicitly stated in the statute (see People v Golo, 26 NY3d 358, 361 [2106]) (the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text); (see eg, Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(g); Matter of State v John T., 163 AD3d 1148, 1149, 79 NYS3d 761 [2018] (either party to Article 10 proceeding may request closure of the courtroom and/or sealing of the record based upon a showing of good cause); CPL § 720.15, § 720.35 (sealing of accusatory instruments from the public in youthful offender cases). Since the DVSJA statute does not convey authority to the court to seal the motion and attendant papers, the court declines to do so in the administration of justice. Rather, as set forth above, the court finds that there is an overriding public interest in resentencing pursuant to the statute that is protected by the First Amendment and those protections extend to submissions on the motion. Finally, the court finds the use of defendant's first name and last initial in the case captioning sufficient to maintain privacy for defendant. Accordingly, defendant's request for sealing is denied.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to seal the motion and attendant papers and close the courtroom for the proceedings is denied.

SO ORDERED:

Date: August 7, 2026

HON. DINEEN ANN RIVIEZZO, J.S.C.

Dineen Ann Riviezzo, J.