ANGLADA v. BRADFORD (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lawrence Knipel, J.), dated August 7, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment and denied those branches of the defendant's cross-motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

In October 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property.  After the defendant failed to appear in the action or answer the complaint, the plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment.  The defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer.  In an order dated August 7, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion and denied those branches of the defendant's cross-motion.  The defendant appeals.

“Ordinarily, the affidavit of a process server constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant was validly served” (Aikens v. Kouchnerova, 217 A.D.3d 741, 742, 191 N.Y.S.3d 652 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Rinderman, 190 A.D.3d 885, 886, 136 N.Y.S.3d 755).  “Bare and unsubstantiated denials of receipt of the summons and complaint are insufficient to rebut the presumption of service” (Aikens v. Kouchnerova, 217 A.D.3d at 742, 191 N.Y.S.3d 652;  see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Simpson, 208 A.D.3d 1305, 1307, 175 N.Y.S.3d 312).  “However, a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server's affidavit, and necessitates an evidentiary hearing” (Aikens v. Kouchnerova, 217 A.D.3d at 742, 191 N.Y.S.3d 652 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Archibong, 157 A.D.3d 662, 663, 66 N.Y.S.3d 625).

Here, the defendant's submissions, which consisted of her own affidavit and an unsworn letter from her husband's employer stating that the defendant resided with her husband and children in Anguilla, where her husband worked, as well as evidence that the defendant traveled to Anguilla, were insufficient to rebut the presumption arising from the process server's affidavit of proper service at her residence in Brooklyn (see Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barton, 212 A.D.3d 706, 708, 183 N.Y.S.3d 108;  Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Zabrowsky, 212 A.D.3d 866, 869, 183 N.Y.S.3d 480).

A party may have more than one residence (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Fessler, 231 A.D.3d 896, 899, 220 N.Y.S.3d 775).  Here, although it was alleged that the defendant traveled to Anguilla, and although the defendant alleged that she resided in Anguilla and her husband's employer believed that she resided there, the defendant submitted no evidence that she no longer resided in Brooklyn.  At best, the defendant established that she spent time in Anguilla, which may have been a second residence (see id.).  In view of the foregoing, the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service.

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the order insofar as appealed from.

BARROS, J.P., DOWLING, VENTURA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.