FRIEDRICH v. Yoel Weisshaus, etc., nonparty-appellant. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for an accounting, nonparty Yoel Weisshaus appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), dated September 29, 2022.  The order denied the motion of nonparty Yoel Weisshaus to vacate two so-ordered stipulations of the same court (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), both dated September 4, 2019, and two orders of the same court (Leon Ruchelsman, J.) dated September 20, 2019, and February 18, 2020.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff and the defendant are sisters.  On November 25, 2010, the parties' parents, as grantors, and the defendant, as trustee, established an irrevocable inter vivos trust, of which the plaintiff is a remainderman.

In 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, inter alia, for an accounting of the trust.  During the course of this action, the parties entered into two separate so-ordered stipulations, both dated September 4, 2019, which addressed certain issues related to, among other things, trust property and the payment of certain attorneys' fees out of trust-held funds.  Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued two orders dated September 20, 2019, and February 18, 2020 (hereinafter together the subject orders), which related to the stipulations.

In August 2020, nonparty Yoel Weisshaus, who is the grandson of the trust's grantors and who claimed also to be a remainderman under the trust, moved to vacate the stipulations and the subject orders.  The plaintiff opposed the motion, contending, among other things, that Weisshaus, who had never sought leave to intervene in this action, lacked standing to seek vacatur of the stipulations and the subject orders.  In an order dated September 29, 2022, the Supreme Court denied Weisshaus's motion.  Weisshaus appeals.

CPLR 5015(a)(4) provides that “[t]he court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of ․ lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order.”  Further, it is axiomatic that a party must have standing or “an interest in the claim at issue ․ that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant's request” in order to participate in an action (Jacob v. Conway, 150 A.D.3d 973, 974, 56 N.Y.S.3d 138 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Kay v. State of New York, 126 A.D.3d 674, 675, 4 N.Y.S.3d 301).  Under the circumstances presented here, Weisshaus, who did not seek leave to intervene in this action, lacked standing to seek vacatur of the stipulations and the subject orders (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Tait, 234 A.D.3d 889, 890, 227 N.Y.S.3d 131).

In any event, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal” (Matter of Boyd v. Liburd, 193 A.D.3d 1046, 1048, 147 N.Y.S.3d 647).  Contrary to Weisshaus's contention, the Supreme Court did not lack jurisdiction to issue the subject orders (see N.Y. Const, art VI, § 7), as the subject orders are related to the subject matter of this action.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied Weisshaus's motion to vacate the stipulations and the subject orders.

CONNOLLY, J.P., WARHIT, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur.