James Sproule, appellant, v. LLC (2026)

Submitted—January 30, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

A/

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract and a violation of Labor Law article 6, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J.), dated July 24, 2024.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add Eyal Nahoumovich as a defendant.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and in the exercise in discretion, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add Eyal Nahoumovich as a defendant is granted.

In October 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Gaia Produce, LLC (hereinafter Gaia), and another defendant, to recover damages for breach of contract and a violation of Labor Law article 6, alleging, inter alia, that Gaia was the plaintiff's employer within the meaning of the Labor Law between November 2017 and November 2019 and that Gaia failed to timely pay certain commissions owed to the plaintiff.  In April 2024, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add Eyal Nahoumovich as a defendant.  The proposed amended complaint alleged that Nahoumovich was also the plaintiff's employer within the meaning of the Labor Law during the relevant time period.  In an order dated July 24, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Generally, the decision to allow a party to amend a pleading is a discretionary matter for the trial court” (Anderson v ML Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 242 AD3d 1160, 1161 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Precious Care Mgt., LLC v. Monsey Care, LLC, 221 AD3d 922, 924).  “ ‘Motions for leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted, absent prejudice or surprise directly resulting from the delay in seeking leave, unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit’ ” (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Nissan, 230 AD3d 1105, 1108, quoting Bridgehampton Natl. Bank v. D & G Partners, L.P., 186 AD3d 1310, 1311).  “ ‘The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion’ ” (Mitchell v. Jimenez, 233 AD3d 773, 776, quoting Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Sotomayor, 222 AD3d 702, 703.

“Article 6 of the Labor Law sets forth a comprehensive set of statutory provisions enacted to strengthen and clarify the rights of employees to the payment of wages” (Gutt v North Am. Partners in Anesthesia, LLP, 237 AD3d 1063, 1066 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Costello v. Curan & Ahlers, LLP, 224 AD3d 732, 733).  “Labor Law § 190(3) broadly defines an ‘employer’ as ‘any person, corporation, limited liability company, or association employing any individual in any occupation, industry, trade, business or service’ ” (Costello v. Curan & Ahlers, LLP, 224 AD3d at 734;  see Ammar v. Carbone, 237 AD3d 883, 884).  “Under the ‘economic reality’ test, the relevant factors include whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records” (Ammar v. Carbone, 237 AD3d at 884;  see Shujing Yu v. Mask Pot, Inc., 241 AD3d 726, 728).  The Supreme Court is “also free to consider any other factors it deems relevant to its assessment of the economic realities” (Ammar v. Carbone, 237 AD3d at 885 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the proposed amendment to add Nahoumovich as a defendant was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (cf.id.).  The proposed amended complaint alleged, inter alia, that Nahoumovich was “responsible for ․ hiring and firing,” that he “supervised [the][p]laintiff,” “assign[ed] [the plaintiff] responsibilities concerning negotiating, pricing, and collecting,” that he “was involved in determining the terms and conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment” and “how [the plaintiff's] commissions were calculated,” and that he “overs[aw] commission reports.”  The plaintiff further submitted a transcript of his own deposition testimony regarding those allegations, and that of Nahoumovich, who acknowledged, among other things, that he made certain hiring recommendations, supervised the plaintiff, provided the plaintiff with directives, and set up the commission structure.  The fact that Nahoumovich did not sign the plaintiff's paychecks is not dispositive (see Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F3d 99, 115 [2d Cir];  Barfield v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 537 F3d 132, 144–145 [2d Cir] ).  Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, the plaintiff plausibly alleged that Nahoumovich was an “employer” within the meaning of Labor Law § 190(3) (see Shujing Yu v. Mask Pot, Inc., 241 AD3d at 728;  Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F3d 415, 422–424 [2d Cir];  Barfield v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 537 F3d at 144).

Moreover, Nahoumovich failed to demonstrate prejudice or surprise resulting from the delay in adding him, in his individual capacity, as a defendant (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v David, 242 AD3d 1056, 1058;  see generally United Fairness, Inc. v Town of Woodbury, 113 AD3d 754, 755).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add Nahoumovich as a defendant.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WAN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court