JAMEEK GOODWIN v. Stanley Richards, Commissioner, New York City Department of Correction, Respondent. (2026)

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR) §§ 7002(a) and 7002(b)(5) contending that he is "unlawfully and restrained of his liberty at Rose M. Singer Enhanced Supervised Housing Facility on Rikers Island, Bronx County, New York" (Verified Petition, ¶ 2). Petitioner claims that his detention is illegal because the nisi prius court, Judge Melissa Lewis, incorrectly denied his Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 30.30(2)(a) motion for release, after finding that a 38-day period of time was excluded from the speedy trial time chargeable to the People as an adjournment under People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 [1 st Dept 1982]. Petitioner contends that had that period been charged to the People, the People would have exceeded the 90-day time limit imposed on felony offenses thus requiring his release from custody; without that time period, the parties agree that 69 days would have been chargeable to the People at the time.

The court heard argument from the parties on March 23, 2026. Counsel for petitioner filed a further submission regarding the standard for review on March 31, 2026, contending that the question raised is a legal question warranting a de novo review, while the People argue, in a written submission filed on April 6, that Judge Lewis rendered a discretionary determination based on reasonableness and thus that this court should evaluate whether her determination was an abuse of discretion.

CPL § 30.30(2)(a) provides that a defendant charged with a felony offense who is "committed to the custody of the sheriff . . . must be released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just and reasonable," if the People are not "ready for trial" within 90 days of the defendant's commitment. "When making a motion pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) to be released on bail or his [ ] own recognizance, a defendant who has been committed to the custody of the sheriff has the initial burden of demonstrating, by sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time set forth in the statute [citation omitted]. Once a defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed without a declaration of readiness by the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay" (People ex rel Nieves v Molina, 207 AD3d 797, 798 [2d Dept 2022] [citing People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859 [1986], see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349 [1980]; CPL § 30.30[4][a]).¹

"Habeas corpus will lie only when the petitioner is entitled to immediate release" (People ex rel DeFlumer, 212 AD2d 555, 555 [2d Dept 1995]; see also People ex rel Cassar v Margiotta, 150 AD3d 1254, 1256 [2d Dept 2017]; People ex rel Kaplan v Commr of Corr of City of NY, 60 NY2D 648, 649 [1983]), and may not be used to present claims that either could be raised in a pretrial motion, at trial, or on direct appeal (see People ex rel Goss v Smith, 69 NY2d 727 [1987], affirming 116 AD2d 968 [4th Dept 1986]; People ex rel McNair v Bantum, 123 AD2d 800 [2d Dept 1986]).

The denial of a CPL § 30.30 release application is subject to review in a habeas corpus petition because "the defendant has no way to effectively appeal an adverse ruling" (People ex rel Chakwin v Warden, 63 NY2d 120, 125 [1984]). In People ex rel Bullock v Barry, 2002 WL 31720977, *2 (NY County, Nov 13, 2002), the court noted that such a review is analogous to the habeas corpus review of a bail determination, which is also not appealable. "A defendant . . . may obtain the collateral review of the bail conditions set on the ground that there was abuse of discretion by the court which resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of the defendant's liberty" (Bullock, *2). Rather than a de novo review," [t]he scope of the collateral review of a defendant's bail status in a habeas corpus proceeding is limited to a consideration of whether the bail determination was supported by the facts presented in the lower court proceeding" (People ex rel Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497, 501 [1969]). The court in Bullock went on to say, "Logic dictates the same rationale be applied in habeas reviews of speedy trial release violation claims. That is to say, that the habeas review is limited to a determination of the correctness of the calendar or trial court's findings of excludable time which resulted in the denial of the 30.30 release motion" (Id).²

Conclusions of Law

Here, the sole time period in questions is the thirty-eight-day period between December 5, 2025 and January 12, 2026; on December 5, 2025, the court ordered hearings "to resolve issue of fact" relating to petitioner's suppression motion (see February 24, 2026 minutes, p. 9 ; March 23, 2026 minutes, p. 3). In considering this time period in the context of petitioner's CPL § 30.30(2)(a) release motion, Judge Lewis determined that the time is excludable "as the People are entitled to a reasonable period of time following the Court's decision on pretrial motions" and further that "[t]he excludability of this period exists independently of the People's discovery obligations and their readiness status" (February 24, 2026 minutes, p. 9). Judge Lewis found that, pursuant to People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dept 1982), "the period following the Court's decision was a reasonable adjournment for the People to become ready in response to the Court's decision" (February 24, 2026 minutes, p. 9).

In Green, the First Department rejected the contention that the People should have been expected to go forward with hearings on the date that such hearings were ordered, noting that "the People could hardly be expected to be prepared for a hearing even before they were aware that the court was ordering one" (90 AD2d at 705). Indeed, depending on the content of the motion papers, the court may summarily grant or deny the application on the papers alone without conducting a hearing (see People v Taylor, 16 Misc 3d 339, 343-344 (NY County 2007) (Mandelbaum, J). Green has thus been interpreted to stand for the general proposition that the People are entitled to a reasonable period of time to prepare for trial after the court has issued a decision on defense motions, since the People cannot be expected to predict the outcome of the court's decision (see Taylor, 16 Misc 3d at 341).³

Petitioner argues, however, that the so-called Green adjournment does not apply during the period before the Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Readiness is filed because "the case was not adjourned for trial" but for suppression hearing only (Petition, ¶ 14; Reply, ¶ 26). In support of his CPL § 30.30 motion before Judge Lewis, petitioner relied on People v Crawford, Sup Ct, Bronx County March 6, 2025, Indictment No. 72831/2023 (Collins, J), in which the court concluded that an exclusion for a Green adjournment is no longer available in a pre-readiness posture following the enactment of CPL § 245.50 because "[a] court's decision on a suppression motion is not an impediment to the People complying with their discovery obligation under CPL § 245.50, filing a COC, and declaring readiness for trial." Petitioner relies on the same notion here in support of his writ - "[t]the ability of the prosecution to state ready off-calendar in and of itself dispels the idea that following decision on motions, there is an automatically excludable period for the prosecution to prepare for hearings ..." (Petition, ¶ 29).

Petitioner thus contends that because Judge Lewis, in his view, erroneously applied the Green exclusion to the time period at issue, this court must conduct a de novo review of his CPL § 30.30 release application. The People disagree, arguing that the standard of review on a habeas petition is limited to whether Judge Lewis abused her discretion in finding that the period of time following the court's decision was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, the analysis is not one or the other; indeed, the question presented has two components — in the first instance, whether, following the enactment of CPL § 245.50, Green may be applied to an adjournment period while the case is in a pre-readiness posture, and if so, whether the application of Green in this case was reasonable under the circumstances.

Upon review of the limited, relevant caselaw, the discovery and speedy trial statutes, and the applicable legislative history, this court agrees with Judge Lewis and those courts that have determined that Green does still apply following the enactment of CPL § 245.50 when a case is in a pre-readiness posture (see eg People v Howard, 83 Misc 3d 1255(A), *5 (Suffolk County July 18, 2024) (Sachs, J); People v Banks, 83 Misc 3d 559 (NY County March 14, 2024) (Beller, J); People v Aikens, 168 NYS3d 679 at *3 (NY Cty Sup Ct 2022) (Kiesel, J); People v Daoud, 85 Misc 3d 1249(A) (NY County March 14, 2024) (Beller, J) (" . . . the court would typically find this adjournment excludable, as the adjournment would, in this court's view, constitute a reasonable time for the People to prepare for trial . . . ").

The amendments to the discovery statute were made separate and apart from the CPL § 30.30 "speedy-trial" requirements. Indeed, the legislature's decision to amend the discovery statute but leave CPL § 30.30 as is, indicates its intention to preserve the parameters and exclusions of CPL § 30.30, notwithstanding the discovery amendments. As Judge Lewis noted, the People's duty to provide discovery continues irrespective of the application of the recognized exclusions of CPL § 30.30(4) (February 24, 2026 minutes, p. 9). Thus, the People remain bound by the requirements of the discovery statute even when certain periods of time are statutorily excluded from their requirement to state ready. Nothing in either statute dictates otherwise. This court therefore finds that the amendments to the discovery statute do not render Green inapplicable to cases that are in a pre-readiness posture.⁴

Thus, having found that Green may be applied to certain, appropriate adjournment periods in the wake of the discovery amendments while a case is in a pre-readiness posture, and having reviewed the minutes of the underlying CPL § 30.30 release application, this court finds that Judge Lewis's application of Green and CPL § 30.30(4) was appropriate (see eg Bullock v Barry, 2002 WL 31720977, *2; People ex rel Farbman v Brann, 197 AD3d 1054 [1st Dept 2021] ["We agree that the motion court (April A. Newbauer, J.) providently exercised its discretion in excluding the initial 31-day adjournment period following the prosecutor's announcement of her intention to move for a protective order as it constituted "a reasonable period of delay from . . . pre-trial motions" within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4)(a)]; People v Torres, 205AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2022] [determining, inter alia, that "the ensuing period, when the People obtained a ruling and filed a second certificate after complying with that ruling, is excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(a), as a 'reasonable period of delay resulting from . . . pretrial motions' "]. Whereas, this court finds that the thirty-eight-day adjournment following the court's decision granting pre-trial hearings was reasonable, this court also finds that Judge Lewis did not abuse her discretion in so finding.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

This opinion constitutes the Decision and Order of this court.

Dated: April 28, 2026

New York, New York

Ellen Biben, JSC

FOOTNOTES

1.   The statutory exclusions apply to both CPL § 30.30 motions for release and indictment dismissal.

2.   Notably, the court in Bullock determined that habeas corpus relief was not available to the petitioner in that case where he had not previously filed a CPL § 30.30(2)(a) release motion (and received an adverse ruling) before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. It then stated, "Even assuming that this Court can properly reach the merits of [the] Petitioner's claim, the court concludes that [the] Petitioner is not being illegally detained because less than ninety days of includable time has elapsed since his commitment to custody;" the court addressed each adjournment in turn (id at *2-3).

3.   Notably, the courts in People v Taylor, 16 Misc 3d 339, People v Asmal- Aucapina, 21 Misc 3d 168 (NY County July 24, 2008) (Mennin, J), and several others, have determined that an adjournment for hearings does not fall under Green but is instead a statutory exclusion under CPL § 30.30(4)(a) as the period of time while a defendant's motion is under consideration by the court since, at that point and until the hearings are conducted, no ultimate conclusion on the motion has been made. "In determining that suppression hearings must be held, however, a court does not decide a defendant's motion but rather holds them in abeyance pending necessary fact-finding" (Taylor, 16 Misc 3d at 342). Taylor also noted, "[t]hat the matter has been adjourned for hearings and trial together, rather than for hearings alone, does not change the analysis" (id at 344 n. 5). Taylor observed, however, that if the People are not ready on the hearing date, the clock begins to run again, as "their nonreadiness[ ] will have prevented the court from rendering its decision on the defendant's motion to suppress, thereby impeding the case from proceeding to trial" (Taylor, at 344; see CPL 710.40[3] [when a suppression motion is made before trial, the trial may not be commenced until determination of the motion]).

4.   To the extent that a court of concomitant jurisdiction takes the opposite view in Crawford, this court disagrees.

Ellen Biben, J.