VASCHUK v. Law Office of Oleg Smolyar, P.C., nonparty-Respondent. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, nonparty Law Office of Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Robin K. Sheares, J.), dated December 19, 2023.  The order, after a hearing, in effect, granted those branches of the motion of the plaintiff and nonparty Law Office of Oleg Smolyar, P.C., which were for a determination that Law Office of Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., was discharged for cause as the plaintiff's counsel and to quash an attorney charging lien in favor of Law Office of Yuriy Prakhin, P.C.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs to nonparty Law Office of Oleg Smolyar, P.C.

In September 2019, the plaintiff, represented by Law Office of Yuriy Prakhin, P.C. (hereinafter Yuriy Prakhin, P.C.), commenced this action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell on a sidewalk.  In August 2022, the plaintiff discharged Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., and retained Law Office of Oleg Smolyar, P.C. (hereinafter Oleg Smolyar, P.C.), as her attorney in this action.  Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., responded by, among other things, asserting an attorney charging lien in its favor, specifically against an alleged settlement offer that Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., had received on the plaintiff's behalf in the principal sum of $75,000.  Thereafter, the plaintiff and Oleg Smolyar, P.C., moved, inter alia, for a determination that Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., was discharged for cause as the plaintiff's counsel and to quash the attorney charging lien in favor of Yuriy Prahkin, P.C. Following a hearing, in an order dated December 19, 2023, the Supreme Court, in effect, granted those branches of the motion.  Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., appeals.

“A client has an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney” (Perez v. City of New York, 244 A.D.3d 883, 884, 247 N.Y.S.3d 208).  “ ‘An attorney of record who is discharged without cause possesses a charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 which constitutes an equitable ownership of the cause of action and attaches to any recovery’ ” (Maher v. Quality Bus Serv., LLC, 144 A.D.3d 990, 991, 42 N.Y.S.3d 43, quoting D'Ambrosio v. Racanelli, 129 A.D.3d 900, 901, 12 N.Y.S.3d 176;  see Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d 500, 500–501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273).  “ ‘An attorney who is discharged for cause, however, is not entitled to compensation or a lien’ ” (Doviak v. Finkelstein & Partners, LLP, 90 A.D.3d 696, 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d 467, quoting Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d at 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273).  “An attorney may be discharged for cause where he or she has engaged in misconduct, has failed to prosecute the client's case diligently, or has otherwise improperly handled the client's case or committed malpractice” (Coccia v. Liotti, 70 A.D.3d 747, 757, 896 N.Y.S.2d 90;  see Matter of Poltronieri v. Talasco, 11 A.D.2d 694, 695, 204 N.Y.S.2d 613, affd 9 N.Y.2d 797, 215 N.Y.S.2d 509, 175 N.E.2d 167).  However, “ ‘[a]lthough the determination that an attorney was discharged for cause may be based upon either negligence or misconduct’ ” (Tirado–Sottosanyti v. Crowley, 220 A.D.3d 820, 822, 198 N.Y.S.3d 150, quoting Maher v. Quality Bus Serv., LLC, 144 A.D.3d at 992, 42 N.Y.S.3d 43), “a client's ‘dissatisfaction with reasonable strategic choices regarding litigation’ does not ‘as a matter of law, constitute cause for the discharge of an attorney’ ” (Doviak v. Finkelstein & Partners, LLP, 90 A.D.3d at 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d 467, quoting Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d at 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273).

Here, the record demonstrates that Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., failed to diligently prosecute the plaintiff's action by, among other things, intentionally neglecting to conduct discovery, which resulted in the entry of a conditional order of preclusion, and failing to inform the plaintiff that it had negotiated a settlement on her behalf until after Yuriy Prahkin, P.C., was discharged (see Sacarello v. City of New York, 124 A.D.3d 617, 618, 997 N.Y.S.2d 905;  cf.  Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d at 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273).  Given this evidence, and taking into account in a close case that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses (see NYCTL 1998–2 Trust v. DR 226 Holdings LLC, 192 A.D.3d 902, 903, 145 N.Y.S.3d 130;  Matter of Callan & Byrnes, LLP v. Ruth E. Bernstein Law Firm, 48 A.D.3d 459, 460, 853 N.Y.S.2d 560), the Supreme Court properly determined that Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., was discharged for cause as the plaintiff's counsel.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted those branches of the motion of the plaintiff and Oleg Smolyar, P.C., which were for a determination that Yuriy Prakhin, P.C., was discharged for cause as the plaintiff's counsel and to quash the attorney charging lien in favor of Yuriy Prahkin, P.C.

BARROS, J.P., DOWLING, VENTURA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.