AS TRUSTEE FOR AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC ASSET BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2002 UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED NOVEMBER 2002 v. MONIQUE CLARK BOB WILSON TREE LAWN EXPERTS INC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND FINANCE CLERK OF ROCKLAND COUNTY JOHN DOE JOHN DOE 12 BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS OWNER TRUSTEE FOR THE RCAF REQUISITION TRUST AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE AGGREGATION TRUST (2026)

The papers filed electronically via NYSCEF numbered 66 — 78, 128, 131 & 134 ("Defendant Rubenstein's Motion" or "Motion Sequence No. 2"); 103 — 115, 129, 132 & 136 ("Defendants Clark's Motion" or "Motion Sequence No. 4); 119 — 124, 130, 133 & 135 ("Defendant US Bank's Motion" or "Motion Sequence No. 5"); and, 125 — 127 (Rubenstein Estates' Cross-Motion" or "Motion Sequence No. 6") were read and considered herein. Upon such reading and consideration, the Motions are disposed as follows:

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-mortgagee commenced this action on March 13, 2023 by filing a Summons & Complaint with the Rockland County Clerk's Office, seeking a judgment foreclosing a mortgage dated July 31, 2002 and recorded on September 6, 2002, instrument number 2002-00053684 in the Public Records of the County of Rockland, State of New York ("Mortgage") encumbering the real property located at 12 Lea Court, Pomona, New York 10970 ("subject property") and placing same for sale.

The facts underlying the action are undisputed: on July 31, 2002, Defendants Antoine Clark and Monique Hill f/k/a Monique H. Clark ("Defendants Clark") executed a promissory note ("Note") in favor of Ameriquest for the repayment of $389,760.00 loaned to them. As a security for their performance under the Note, Defendants Clark executed the Mortgage. On December 19, 2014, Defendants Clark executed a loan modification agreement which increased the principal balance to $519,650.00, among other things. Defendants Clark purportedly defaulted on the terms of the Note and Mortgage by failing to make a monthly installment payment due on April 1, 2015, and by failing to make any payment on the Note, as modified, thereafter. As a result, Plaintiff commenced a prior foreclosure action on June 15, 2016 by filing a Summons & Complaint under Rockland County Index No. 032180/2016 ("2016 Foreclosure"), which Complaint accelerated the entire unpaid principal due under the Note. That action was subsequently dismissed on February 24, 2020 following trial due to Plaintiff's failure to prove compliance with RPAPL § 1304.

Thereafter, on or about September 19, 2019, a deed purporting to contain Defendant Antoine Clark's signature was executed, conveying his half-interest in the subject property to Goldberg Properties, LLC ("Goldberg"). Defendant Antoine Clark and Goldberg, through its principal, Oscar Dais, executed a written agreement on or about September 18, 2019 whereby the aforesaid deed would be held in escrow by the Law Offices of Jerrold W. Miles until a short sale or short payoff closed title. Notwithstanding such agreement, the deed was recorded in the Rockland County Clerk's Office on June 3, 2020. On or about August 10, 2021, Oscar Dias, principal of Goldberg, forged the signature of Defendant Monique Clark on a deed in order to convey her half interest in the subject property to Goldberg.

A short sale contract between Defendant Antoine Clark and Richard Steinberg and accompanying documents were executed and delivered to Plaintiff's servicer, PHH Mortgage Services ("PHH"), which, upon reviewing same, issued a short sale approval letter to Defendant Antoine Clark dated August 11, 2021 and accompanying documentation for him to sign (NYSCEF Doc. No. 110). The short sale was consummated on or about September 13, 2021, and the net proceeds of such sale in the amount of $342,460.00 were delivered to PHH on September 15, 2021. On or about September 22, 2021, Defendant Antoine Clark reported to Plaintiff that he was a victim of fraud and requested that the short sale be canceled. On September 28, 2021, PHH identified the fraud and stopped the lien release. On November 19, 2021, PHH returned the short sale proceeds to the remitter. A short sale with Trident Acquisitions, LLC was subsequently approved by Plaintiff but was not consummated. Without the proceeds of a short sale to satisfy the mortgage debt, Plaintiff commenced the instant foreclosure action.

Defendant Rubenstein Estates, LLC s/h/a John Doe #1 ("Defendant Rubenstein") was served through the New York State Secretary of State on July 3, 2023 and filed an Answer on August 18, 2023 containing thirteen affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for the recovery of attorney's fees. Defendants Clark filed an Answer on September 30, 2023 containing five affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for cancelation and discharge of the Mortgage. Defendant US Bank Trust National Association ("Defendant US Bank") sought leave to intervene herein and serve an answer by way of Motion Sequence No. 3, which was granted by Decision & Order dated March 10, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 116).

Defendant Rubenstein now brings the within Motion Sequence No. 2 for an Order (1) granting summary judgment dismissing the action against it; (2) discharging the Mortgage; and (3) canceling the Notice of Pendency filed against the subject property. Defendant Rubenstein also brings Motion Sequence No. 6 for an Order granting leave to amend the caption to substitute Defendant Rubenstein in the place of John Doe #1 nunc pro tunc. Defendants Clark bring Motion Sequence No. 4 for an Order granting summary judgment in their favor, dismissing the complaint against them, and discharging the Mortgage. Defendant US Bank brings Motion Sequence No. 5 seeking identical relief to Defendants Clark and in addition for summary judgment on its counterclaim and the recovery of costs and sanctions against Plaintiff under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1. Plaintiff opposes Motion Sequence Nos. 2, 4 & 5. Motion Sequence No. 6 is unopposed.

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Rubenstein's unopposed Cross-Motion Sequence No. 6 to amend the caption to substitute Rubenstein Estates, LLC in place of John Doe #1 is granted nunc pro tunc to the date of commencement.

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

In support of its Motion Sequence No. 2, Defendant Rubenstein contends as follows in relevant part: that CPLR § 213(4) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on actions to foreclose a mortgage, and that once a debt is accelerated, the limitations for such an action begins to run; that the statute of limitations for foreclosing the Mortgage began to run on June 16, 2016 when Plaintiff commenced the 2016 Action and declared in the Complaint that the entire debt was due and owing; that the statute of limitations expired on January 29, 2023, taking into consideration the 228-day COVID-19 pandemic toll; and that because this action was commenced after such expiration date on March 13, 2023, it is time barred, and its motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action, discharging of the mortgage lien, and canceling the notice of pendency should be granted.

In support of its Motion, Defendants Clark contend as follows in relevant part in addition to the arguments propounded by Defendant Rubenstein: that Defendant Rubenstein is not entitled to the relief requested in its Motion Sequence No. 2, because it is not a party to this action, it has not moved to intervene, and its unauthorized answer to the complaint does not assert a counterclaim for a discharge of the Mortgage; that irrespective of whether Defendant Antoine Clark signed the documents attached to the short sale approval letters or whether same were forged, that execution of such documents did not contain or constitute an express promise to pay the mortgage debt sufficient to reset the statute of limitations under General Obligations Law § 17-105; that the purpose of the agreement to remit the short sale proceeds was not to pay the mortgage debt but to execute a release/satisfaction and a discharge of the property lien similar to the facts underlying Petito v. Piffah, 85 NY2d 1 (1994); and that remittance of the short sale payoff did not constitute a partial payment on the debt sufficient to reset the statute of limitations under General Obligations Law § 17-107, as the short sale disposed of the debt and did not extend it.

In support of its Motion, Defendant US Bank asserts as follows in relevant part in addition to the arguments propounded by Defendants Rubenstein and Clark: that this action is without merit, as Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware that this action was time barred at the time of commencement; and that as a result of the frivolous nature of this action, the Court should issue an award of attorney's fees and costs, and sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.

In opposition to Defendants Rubenstein, Clark, and US Bank's Motions Sequence Nos. 2, 4 & 5, Plaintiff argues as follows in relevant part: that it would be inequitable to bar Plaintiff's claim, as the parties' course of action following the 2016 Action was shaped by an approved short sale that appeared legitimate at the time through no fault of Plaintiff or PHH; that, specifically, Plaintiff detrimentally relied on the short sale proceeds and ceased enforcement activity on the Note; that it would be manifestly unjust to permit the consequences of criminal conduct by Oscar Dais to inure to the detriment of Plaintiff, who was itself a victim of the fraud; that the statute of limitations was reset by virtue of the short sale approval letter and related documents executed by Defendant Antoine Clark, which documents constituted a writing containing an express promise to pay the mortgage debt within the meaning of GOL § 17-105(1); that the statute of limitations was reset when Plaintiff received the short sale proceeds, which constituted a payment on account of the mortgage indebtedness under General Obligations Law § 17-107; that unlike cases where payment was made pursuant to a settlement agreement, the $342,460.00 was paid directly on account of the mortgage indebtedness by virtue of reference to and in "full and final satisfaction" of the lien and waiver of any remaining balance; that the short sale approval letter issued by PHH did not contain a written disclaimer; that Defendants cannot claim that the short sale payoff was in full satisfaction, because same was returned to the remitter; that because of such a resetting of the statute of limitations in September 2021, this 2023 action is timely, or at the very least, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the statute of limitations was reset; and that the circumstances surrounding the subject property's title, including the forged deed, the criminal prosecution and plea of Oscar Dais, and the unwound short sale, render summary judgment on the counterclaims to discharge the Mortgage inappropriate.

In reply to Plaintiff's opposition, Defendant Rubenstein states as follows in relevant part: that Plaintiff is asking this Court to deem a payment that was returned as a payment that satisfies GOL § 17-107; that a payment that is rejected or returned renders it, as a matter of law, as if it was never made; that Plaintiff should not be permitted to simultaneously argue that the short sale was void due to fraud and that remittance of its proceeds constituted a valid payment sufficient to reset the statute of limitations; and that for a payment to effectively trigger GOL § 17-107, it must be credited toward the underlying debt, which here it cannot since any payment was rescinded.

In reply to Plaintiff's opposition, Defendant US Bank submits as follows in relevant part: that Plaintiff had fourteen months from the return of the short sale proceeds on November 19, 2021 to commence a new action before the statute of limitations expired but did not do so; that Defendant Antoine Clark's signature on the short sale application was found by Plaintiff not to be forged, citing to a letter from PHH to the New York State Department of Financial Services dated December 7, 2021; that there is resultingly no basis for equitable estoppel; that, citing to U.S. Bank NA v. Martin, 144 AD3d 891 (2d Dept 2016), for a payment to restart the statute of limitations under GOL § 17-107, it must be accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder; that pursuant to Compton v. Bowns, 25 NYS 465 (Common Pleas Court of New York 1893) and Brill v. Brandt, 176 Misc 580 (Sup Ct, New York County 1941), a full payment of the debt cannot constitute a promise to pay the remaining balance.

In reply to Plaintiff's opposition, Defendants Clark join in Defendant US Bank's reply and maintain as follows in relevant part: that Plaintiff's reliance on equitable considerations are not applicable here since Plaintiff sat on its rights and failed to commence this action within the statute of limitations; that Plaintiff simultaneously contends that Compton and Brill are inapplicable due to the return of the short sale proceeds but that their remittance serves to restart the statute of limitations under GOL § 17-107; that the short sale approval letter did not contain an express waiver of expiration of the statute of limitations or a promise to pay the outstanding balance of the Note; and that even if the short sale approval letter were referrable to the mortgage debt, it merely serves as an acknowledgement of the debt, not an express promise to repay same.

DISCUSSION

"Summary judgment is equivalent to a trial and is, therefore, a drastic remedy which should not be granted if there is any doubt as to the existence of any triable issue of fact" (113-114 Owners Corp. v. Gertz, 123 AD2d 850, 851 [2d Dept 1986]). A summary judgment movant must tender evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate that there remains no reasonably disputable triable issue of material fact such that judgment should be directed in its favor as a matter of law (see e.g., Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72 [2003], citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; CPLR § 3212). The failure to do so requires a denial of the motion without regard to the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Lacagnino v. Gonzalez, 306 AD2d 250 [2d Dept 2003]). However, once such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form demonstrating material questions of fact requiring trial. (Gonzalez v. 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124 [2000], citing Alvarez, 68 NY2d 320, and Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, affording the nonmovant all reasonable inferences in their favor and avoiding judgment on issues of credibility (see Jacobsen v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833 [2014]; Torres v. Jeremias, 28 AD2d 484 [2d Dept 2001]).

CPLR § 213(4) imposes a six-year time limit to commence an action seeking to foreclose a mortgage encumbering real property. "With respect to a mortgage payable in installments, separate causes of action accrued for each installment that is not paid, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date each installment becomes due." (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 94 AD3d 980, 982 [2d Dept 2012]) "However, even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt." (id. at 982, citing EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Patella, 279 AD2d 604, 605 [2d Dept 2001]).

Defendants here seek summary judgment dismissing the Complaint on the basis that the statute of limitations for the cause of action to foreclose the Mortgage has expired. It is undisputed that a cause of action to foreclose the Mortgage accrued on June 15, 2016 when Plaintiff commenced the 2016 Action and declared in the complaint of said action that the entire balance owed under the Note is due and owing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 122, pg. 9 of 75). By virtue of CPLR § 213(4) and the 228-day tolling of the statute of limitations imposed by Executive Order No. 202 between March 20, 2020 and November 3, 2020, the statute of limitations for the cause of action to foreclose the Mortgage expired on January 30, 2023 at the latest. Plaintiff commenced this action after the expiration date on March 13, 2023. Accordingly, Defendants have made a prima facie showing that the instant action is time barred.

To avoid summary judgment, it is now incumbent upon Plaintiff to submit evidence that factually rebuts the Defendants' prima facie showing (Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of NY City. Inc. v. Meltzer, 67 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2009]). In opposition to Defendants' Motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff presents three arguments to contest the expiration of the statute of limitations: first, that the short sale approval letter issued by PHH and documents executed in connection with the short sale constituted an express promise to pay the mortgage debt within the ambit of GOL § 17-105(1) so as to reset the statute of limitations from the date of the promise; second, that remittance of the short sale proceeds constituted a payment on account of the mortgage indebtedness under General Obligations Law § 17-107 so as to reset the statute of limitations from the date of the payment; and third, that equity requires that this Court overlook the expiration of the statute of limitations, because Plaintiff detrimentally relied on Defendant Antoine Clark's short sale application, through no fault of Plaintiff or PHH, by ceasing enforcement activity on the Note following the 2016 Action. The Court will take each argument in turn.

Firstly, the short sale approval letter and alleged "related documentation, executed in connection with the transaction," the latter of which notably has only been submitted to this Court by Defendants Clark in blank form, does not contain or constitute a promise to pay the mortgage debt under GOL § 17-105(1) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133, pg. 13 of 21). To qualify as a promise to pay the mortgage debt, the promise must be "made after the accrual of a right of action to foreclose the mortgage by the express terms of a writing signed by the party to be charged is effective, subject to any conditions expressed in the writing, to make the time limited for commencement of the action run from the date of the promise"(14 Fillm Corp. v. Mid-Island Mtge. Corp., 218 AD3d 525, 527 [2d Dept 2023]).

Although Plaintiff did not submit executed copies of the documents accompanying PHH's short sale approval letter, Defendants Clark, through their attorney, represent that the documents accompanying the short sale approval letter were executed with what appear to be Defendant Antoine Clark's signature (NYSCEF Doc. No. 110, pgs. 5 & 6). Plaintiff does not identify, nor has the Court located, a provision within the short sale approval letter (NYSCEF Doc. No. 110) or the unexecuted documents attached thereto wherein either of Defendants Clark promised to pay the mortgage debt. More significantly, however, Plaintiffs cannot rely on Defendant Antoine Clark's promise to remit the short sale proceeds as a promise to pay the mortgage debt under GOL § 17-105, since Defendant Antoine Clark and Plaintiff effectively agreed to rescind the agreement(s) between them regarding the short sale and the proceeds thereof when Plaintiff agreed to Defendant Antoine Clark's request that it cancel the short sale on September 28, 2021."The effect of rescission is to declare the contract void from its inception and to put or restore the parties to status quo" (NYSCEF Doc. 111, pg. 3 of 4) (Cusack v. American Defense Systems, Inc., 86 AD3d 586, 588 [2d Dept 2011]; see also Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, 231 NY 196, 203 [1921] ["All concede that an agreement may be rescinded by mutual consent and a new agreement made thereafter on any terms to which the parties may assent."]; Strychalski v. Mekus, 54 AD2d 1068, 1068 [4th Dept 1976] ["Thus, while a new agreement cancelling a written contract requires some consideration, the mutual consent of the parties to rescind is ordinarily all the consideration required, since the discharge of one party from the obligation to perform further is sufficient consideration for the discharge of the other party from its obligation to perform"] [internal citations omitted]). This discharged Plaintiff from its obligation to release the mortgage lien, and the parties were returned to the status quo ante when Plaintiff returned the short sale proceeds to the remitter. In addition, Plaintiff issued its approval for a new short sale with Trident Acquisitions, LLC on November 23, 2021.

For the same reason, Plaintiff may not rely on the remittance of the short sale proceeds as a part payment on the amount due and owing on the Note under GOL § 17-107(1) so as to restart the statute of limitations. GOL § 17-107(1) provides in relevant part that, "A payment on account of a mortgage indebtedness is also effective, between persons described in subdivision two of this section, to make the time limited for commencement of an action to foreclose the mortgage run from the date of payment, unless the payment is accompanied by written disclaimer of intention to affect the time limited for foreclosure of the mortgage." The rule that payment on an account serves to toll the statute of limitations is widespread and extends beyond the context of mortgage debts (see Annotation, Payment on account, or claimed to be on account, as removing or tolling statute of limitations, 156 ALR 1082). Significantly, the rule and GOL § 17-107(1) are applicable only to partial payments on the account, the reason being that partial payments indicate an intent to make further payments whereas a full payment does not (id.; Petito, 85 NY2d at 7; In Re Pappalau, 261 App Div 705 [3d Dept 1941] ["In order to hold that a payment is on account so as to toll the Statute of Limitations, the payment must unequivocally be under circumstances to indicate it to be on account of a past debt, with intent to make further future payments"]; Compton v. Bowns, 5 Misc 213, 214 [Ct Common Pleas 1893]). In Compton v. Bowns, this State's Court of Common Pleas explained the limitation to the rule, writing as follows:

"It is elementary law that the effect of part payment in defeating the operation of the Statute of Limitations, depends upon the promise it implies to pay the residue; but if the payment be intended, not as a discharge pro tanto, but as a complete liquidation of the entire demand, how can an engagement to pay more be inferred? The implication of an acknowledgment of the continuance of the debt from an act supposed and designed to extinguish it, and of a promise of further payment from a payment made and intended as final and complete, is a palpable absurdity" (5 Misc at 214).

At bar, irrespective of whether or not the short sale proceeds are on account of the indebtedness, it is undisputed that their remittance to Plaintiff would be "a full and final satisfaction of the mortgage obligation" owed by Defendants Clark (NYSCEF Doc. No. 110, pg. 12). As such, and in addition to the fact that any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Antoine Clark relevant to the short sale and its proceeds was rescinded, the statute of limitations has not been revived by GOL § 17-107(1).

Lastly, the invocation of equitable estoppel to toll the statute of limitations for the period when the short sale to Steinberg was pending is inappropriate here. "Equitable estoppel is appropriate where the plaintiff is prevented from filing an action within the applicable statute [ ] due to his or her reasonable reliance on deception, fraud or misrepresentations by the defendant" (Putter v. North Shore University Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 552 — 553 [2006]). Although the fraud on the part of third-party Oscar Dais may have undermined the short sale and discounted payoff, same did not prevent Plaintiff from commencing a new action in that Plaintiff had ample time before and after engaging with Defendant Antoine Clark to bring this foreclosure proceeding. The time between dismissal of the 2016 action (February 24, 2020) and the request for approval of a short sale with Richard Steinberg (May 3, 2021) was over one year. The time between Plaintiff confirming the fraud (November 19, 2021) and the expiration of the statute of limitations (January 30, 2023) was also over one year. Accordingly, equitable estoppel is inappropriate as a matter of law (see id. at 553 [deeming equitable estoppel inappropriate in a medical malpractice action where plaintiff, a patient who underwent surgery and contracted hepatitis C therefrom, learned of his condition within a few months of the surgery and was advised by four medical professionals that the disease was contracted in the hospital or during surgery notwithstanding that the hospital advised him that plaintiff's hepatitis C was of unknown origin]).

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendants' prima facie showings, and Defendants' Motions for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint, discharging the mortgage lien, and canceling the notice of pendency are granted. Considering the foregoing arguments advanced by Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff's commencement of this action was not frivolous and declines to grant the branch of Defendant US Bank's Motion for an award of costs or sanctions under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1.

In light of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendant Rubenstein Estates, LLC's unopposed Motion Sequence No. 6 is GRANTED to the extent provided herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant Rubenstein Estates, LLC is substituted for "John Doe # 1" nunc pro tunc to the date of commencement; and it is further

ORDERED, that the caption of the action shall be amended to reflect said substitution without prejudice to any of the proceedings had herein and shall read as follows:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ROCKLAND

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,

AS TRUSTEE FOR, AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE

SECURITIES INC. ASSET-BACKED PASS-

THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-UNDER

THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT

DATED NOVEMBER 1, 2002,

Plaintiff,

against

ANTOINE CLARK; MONIQUE CLARK; BOB

WILSON TREE & LAWN EXPERTS, INC;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O/B/O

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; COMMISSIONER

OF TAXATION AND FINANCE; CLERK OF

ROCKLAND COUNTY; RUBENSTEIN ESTATES,

LLC; "JOHN DOE # 2" through "JOHN DOE # 12,"

the last eleven names being fictitious and unknown to

plaintiff, the persons or parties intended being the

tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any,

having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the

Subject Property described in the Complaint,

Defendants,

U.S. BANK, TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT

SOLELY AS OWNER TRUSTEE FOR THE

RCAF REQUISITION TRUST AS SUCCESSOR IN

INTEREST TO WILMINGTON SAVINGS

FUND SOCIETY, FSB, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY, BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE AGGREGATION

TRUST,

Intervenor — Defendants.

; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant Rubenstein Estates, LLC's Motion Sequence No. 2 is GRANTED to the extent provided herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendants Antoine Clark and Monique Clark's Motion Sequence No. 4 is GRANTED to the extent provided herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant U.S. Bank, Trust National Association's Motion Sequence No. 5 is GRANTED IN PART to the extent provided herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Rockland County Clerk is directed, upon the payment of the proper fees, if any, to cancel and discharge of record a certain Notice of Pendency filed herein on March 13, 2023 and extended on January 21, 2026 against the property known as Section 33.09, Block 2, Lot 3, and said Clerk is directed to enter upon the margin of the record of same a Notice of Cancellation referring to this Decision & Order; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Rockland County Clerk is directed, upon the payment of the proper fees, if any, to cancel and discharge the Mortgage dated July 31, 2002 and recorded on September 6, 2002, instrument number 2002-00053684.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision & Order of this Court.

Dated: June 29, 2026

New City, New York

E N T E R:

HON. DAVID FRIED, A.J.S.C.

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ROCKLAND

David Fried, J.