The People of the State of New York v. Kent Moo Shand, Defendant. (2026)

By Indictment No. 70961-21, defendant is charged with Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree in connection with the fatal shooting of Keon Gravenhise on March 11, 2021. A jury trial, commenced on February 3, 2025, resulted in a mistrial.

Defendant moves, in limine, for an order admitting expert testimony on the use of force and firearms training. Specifically, defendant seeks to call Jonathan S. Amass, a former NYPD officer and Tactical Review Team Leader in the Force Investigation Division, the unit responsible for investigating incidents involving firearms discharges by officers, as well as deaths in custody or related to police actions. Defendant seeks to have Mr. Amass testify as to the following subjects: (1) the subjective and objective reasonableness of the force used in defense of a third party; (2) firearms safety; and (3) narration and comment on the surveillance video depicting defendant's and Keon Gravenhise's handling of firearms during the encounter.

The People oppose the motion in its entirety. For the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows: The defense may elicit testimony from Mr. Amass on general issues related to firearms safety and how the specific firearm that Mr. Gravenhise possessed, displayed and was recovered by the police is loaded and racked. Defendant can also call Dr. Richard Stripp to testify as to the level of Mr. Gravenhise's intoxication. The remainder of the defendant's requests are denied for the reasons stated herein.

Factual Summary

On March 11, 2021, at approximately 12:20 a.m., defendant Kent Moo Shand fatally shot Keon Gravenhise in front of 1905 Avenue M, Brooklyn, New York. The People assert that the following facts are not in dispute: (1) Gravenhise was intoxicated prior to his death; (2) Gravenhise possessed and displayed a loaded firearm during the events leading to his death; (3) Gravenhise's possession of the firearm was not legal in the State of New York; (4) prior to his death Gravenhise displayed his firearm and threatened to shoot inside 1905 Avenue M; (5) defendant's sister, who was Gravenhise's girlfriend, escorted Gravenhise outside of the location as Gravenhise continued to display a firearm; (6) defendant left the location and retrieved a loaded firearm from his car; (7) defendant's possession of the firearm was not legal in the State of New York; (8) Gravenhise put his firearm away and left the location; (9) Gravenhise returned to the location with his firearm displayed and walked towards defendant's brother; and (10) defendant shot Gravenhise five times in the back. The entire incident described above is captured on video.

Defendant's Proffer

The defense has proffered expert testimony from Mr. Jonathan Amass, a retired NYPD Leuitenant with the NYPD Force Investigation Division/Firearms & Tactics Section, who is now employed with the Force Integrity Consultants, LLC, a firm that provides expert testimony on topics related to "police/security use of force, officer involved shootings and internal investigations." Also attached to the motion in an appendix, although not referenced therein, are the resume.CV of John Spraque, a retired Deputy Chief at the NYPD, who is also employed by Force Integrity Consultants; and Richard Stripp, PhD, who in a report opined on the level of Gravenhise's intoxication on the night of the shooting.

The Court summarizes, from pages 4 to 7 of the defense motion, the defendant's proffer of Mr. Amass' testimony:

1. Gravenhise was intoxicated. This, however, is not disputed by the People, and the People are not opposing the testimony of Richard Stripp, PhD on this subject for which he is the proper expert, not Mr. Amass (see People v. Frazier, 6 AD3d 455 [2nd Dept 2004](error not to allow testimony of intoxication of the victim in a self-defense case).

2. Firearms Safety

3. The first prong of the justification standard: defendant's subjective state of mind prior to the encounter, as well as the objective reasonableness of his actions as described in the motion as follows: "Mr. Shand's senses were heightened when they needed to be which is to say he was keenly observing Mr. Gravenhise's behavior when the firearm was being brandished and at a much lesser state of ready giving Mr. Gravenhise space to leave the scene or change his behavior." Further, that defendant was "showing patience and poise and trying to deescalate the situation, aiming for a peaceful resolution whenever possible. Mr. Shand did everything possible to let Mr. Gravenhise leave the area without ever resorting to threats of deadly physical force."

4. The second prong of the justification standard: whether a reasonable person would have believed that Gravenhise was using deadly physical force as described in the motion as follows: "It is reasonable to believe that Mr. Gravenhise returning to the location after driving away made those present more fearful of ill intent."

5. Whether defendant's brother "would be able to retreat to complete safety."

6. Mr. Mass' "observations" of the video which "suggest" that Granvenhise is right- handed; that he was either ensuring the firearm was cocked or racking the slide of the firearm; as well as testimony that "it is entirely possible Mr. Gravenhise used his dominant hand to rack the slide," a practice that Mr. Amass would testify "does not align with professional firearms training standards." This would include testimony as to "the possibility" as to when the gun "might" have been cocked.

7. The state of the load of Gravenhise's gun when it was recovered and the mechanics of the gun including that the gun fires "single-action only."

In opposition, the People assert that the proposed expert testimony does not relate to any scientific facts and/or knowledge that would aid a jury in making a determination as to the reasonableness of defendant's claim of self-defense. Further, defendant has presented no case law demonstrating the allowance of such testimony in a factually similar case.

Discussion

"The admissibility of expert testimony is dependent on whether [it] would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror" (People v Weinstein, 207 AD3d 33, 58 [1st Dept 2022], quoting People v Williams, 20 NY3d 579, 583-584 [2013]; see People v Taylor, 75 NY2d 277, 292 [1990]). "[T]he admissibility and limits of expert testimony lie primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court" (People v Anderson, 36 NY3d 1109, 1111 [2021] citing People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157, 162 [2001]).

The criterion to be applied is "whether the proffered expert testimony would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict" (Id.). Expert testimony, to some degree invades the jury's province (People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 432 [1983] (trial court should have exercised its discretion regarding expert testimony concerning defendant's ability to form intent due to alcohol and drug consumption). "[E]xpert opinion testimony is used in partial substitution for the jury's otherwise exclusive province which is to draw conclusions from the facts. It is a kind of authorized encroachment in that respect" (People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157, 162 [2001] [internal citations omitted]).

This Court of Appeals "has long held that factual determinations about the elements of a crime are the province of the jury, not the judge" (People v Finkelstein, 28 NY3d 345 [2016]; see also People v Inoa, 25 NY3d 466, 472-473 [2015] ("It is, of course, the role of the jury to determine the facts of the case tried before it"); People v Dioguardi, 8 NY2d 260, 274 [1960] ("It is the province of the jury, under clear and complete instructions from the court, to consider and weigh the facts, and to determine the defendants' guilt or innocence of the crime charged"); Justice v Lang, 52 NY 323, 328 [1873] (explaining that the finding of facts from the proof is "within the exclusive province of the jury"). The jury may not be displaced of its fact-finding function by expert testimony unless there is a "reason to suppose that such testimony will elucidate some material aspect of the case that would otherwise resist comprehension by jurors of ordinary training and intelligence" (People v Inoa, 25 NY3d 466, 472 [2015]). Further, "for testimony regarding both the ultimate questions and those of lesser significance, admissibility turns on whether, given the nature of the subject, the facts cannot be stated or described to the jury in such a manner as to enable them to form an accurate judgment thereon, and no better evidence than such opinions is attainable" (People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 432-433 [1983]).

With regard to item No. 1, the level of intoxication of the victim, the defense motion papers do not assert that Mr. Amass has any expertise in this field. Because the defense has attached the resume and report generated by Dr. Stripp, the court presumes that the defense is proffering Dr. Stripp as the witness, to which the People have consented. With regard to item No. 6, by the very language used in the defense motion, this proposed testimony, regarding whether it is "entirely possible" that Granvenhise was right-handed and the "possibility" as to when the gun "might" have been racked, is pure speculation. There is no support for these conclusions, and it would be nothing more than conjuncture on the part of the purported expert to testify when the gun was racked or whether Gravenhise was left or right-handed.

With regard to item Nos. 3, 4 and 5, the testimony involving the expert's opinion as to the objective and subjective reasonableness of the self-defense claim and whether defendant's brother could have safely retreated, these issues are not beyond the ken of the average juror. Rather, the entire incident is on video. The defendant testified as to his subjective beliefs and the facts supporting his claim that his actions were objectively reasonable. "Where there can be no doubt that the jury is capable of comprehending the issues and evaluating the evidence, the opinions of experts which intrude on the province of the jury to draw inferences and conclusions are both unnecessary and improper" (People v. McCart, 157 AD2d 194, 197 [4th Dept 1990]; see also People v Anderson, 36 NY3d 1109, 1110-1111 [2021](trial court properly excluded testimony by an expert witness concerning the science adolescent brain development and behavior proffered to "to assist the jury in determining whether the People had met their burden of disproving justification" because "impulsiveness of adolescents is not a matter beyond the ken of the typical juror"); see also People v Anderson, 180 AD3d 923, 924,120 NYS3d 63, 65 [2d Dept 2020]).

To be sure, jurors regularly apply to the facts that they find to be reliable and credible, the two-prong test for justification set out in NY Penal Law § 35.15. "A defendant is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person only if the defendant reasonably believes that [the] other person is using or about to use deadly physical force (Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]), and only when and to the extent [the defendant] reasonably believes such [force] to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person" (Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; see People v Anderson, 36 NY3d 1109, 1110 [2021]; People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 106 n 5 [1986]). The expert testimony proffered by the defense under item Nos. 3, 4 and 5 would improperly intrude on the jury's role.

Further, with regard to these three issues, the defendant has not provided the court, nor has the court found, a single New York State case from any trial or appellate court in which a defendant, who was not law enforcement personnel, was permitted to call an expert to opine on whether the facts support the defendant's subjective belief and an objective reasonable belief necessary to prevail on a justification defense or the reasonableness of a person's ability to retreat.

Rather, the cases cited by the defense in the context of a self-defense claim by a non-law enforcement defendant, all involve experts testifying about either a psychiatric diagnosis or about the battered woman syndrome, a condition that explains behaviors that the courts have recognized are beyond the ken of the average juror (People v Seeley, 186 Misc 2d 715, 719 (Kings Co. Sup Ct, 2000) (Leventhal, J.); People v Neathway, 43 Misc 3d 1235[A] (NY Co. Sup Ct. 2014) (Conviser, J); People v White, 4 Misc 3d 797 (District Ct. Nassau Co 2004) (St. George, J); People v DeSarno, 121 AD2d 651 (2nd Dept 1986).

The defense has not argued that Mr. Amass has ever testified as an expert in the context of self-defense claims by a defendant who was not engaged in law enforcement activities. Based on defendant's submission, Mr. Amass has investigated officer-involved shootings in which he has assessed the law on justification as it relates to the officers' compliance with NYPD patrol guides and training and "other law enforcement use-of-force policies." His expertise is limited to those situations (see e.g. People v McLean, 128 AD3d 1094 [2nd Dept 2015](expert testimony as to the meaning of Section 35.30, use of deadly physical force by a police officer effecting an arrest); People v. Brown, 16 AD3d 39 [1st Dept 2018](discussion of defense expert testimony as to police procedures and training in use of deadly physical force where defendant was corrections officer convicted of shooting someone off-duty) rev'd on other grounds 33 NY3d 316 [2019](reversed Appellate Division decision holding that trial court should have charged self-defense).

The case of People v Vanderhorst, 117 AD3d 1197 (3rd Dept 2024) illustrates this point. In Vanderhorst, defendant, a teenager, was convicted of Manslaughter in the First Degree after a jury trial (Id. at 1198). Defendant, who stabbed the victim in the chest during a knife fight, raised the defense of justification as he had been feuding with the victim for many months and he believed the victim was going to kill him (Id.). There were numerous witnesses to the fight, and the entirety of the altercation was recorded on video (Id.). During the trial, defendant proffered as an expert witness, a certified security trainer with experience instructing law enforcement officers in the use of force and weapons, including knives (Id. at 1200-1201). During the offer of proof, the expert testified as to his opinions of the "intentions and strategies employed by defendant and the victim, as allegedly revealed by their body positions and movements during the video" (Id.). The expert opined that defendant "intended to run away" and described the "Tueller drill, a principle allegedly describing the distance that must be maintained during a knife fight because of the distance an armed person can travel before the other combatant can react" (Id. at 1201). However, the expert conceded that "these opinions were based on principles derived from law enforcement training, and that he had no knowledge as to whether defendant or the victim had such training" (Id.). The Third Department held that "in the absence of such evidence, the proposed testimony was within the average juror's understanding, not beyond the range of ordinary knowledge or intelligence and did not require professional or scientific knowledge" and thus, the trial court's preclusion of the testimony was affirmed as proper (Id.). Similarly, there is no evidence that either the defendant or the victim had law enforcement training, and it is not beyond the ken of the average juror to watch the video, evaluate the actions of the victim and the defendant to determine whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.

The testimony of Mr. Amass as proposed will improperly bolster the defendant's credibility, which is not a permissible use of expert testimony (see People v Bennett, 79 NY2d 464, 473 [1992]; People v White, 4 Misc 3d 797 (District Ct. Nassau Ct. 2004) (St. George, J). Nor should expert testimony be permitted if "its purpose is simply to provide an alternative, purportedly better informed, gloss on the facts of the case" (People v Inoa, 25 NY3d 466, 475 [2015](detective's testimony as expert in translating uncoded portions of co-defendant's conversations invaded the fact-finding province of the jury). In People v Ramos, defendant's assault related convictions were reversed where the trial court permitted the testimony of a police detective regarding his opinion as to what a video of the assault on a victim depicted (People v Ramos, The Second Department held that "such testimony improperly usurped the jury's function by interpreting, summarizing, and marshaling the evidence . . . Rather than aiding the jury in understanding the investigation, the detective improperly narrated the video and the detective's interpretation of the video, which was not necessarily supported by the video itself, also improperly instruct[ed] the jury on the existence of the facts needed to satisfy the elements of the charged offense" (People v Ramos, 218AD3d 495, 496-497 [2nd Dept 2023] (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Mr. Amass' testimony as proffered will impermissibly bolster defendant's testimony as to the facts that the jury should find to satisfy the elements of justification and will usurp the jury's function to evaluate the video evidence for itself (see also People v Ingram, 2 AD3d 211 (1st Dept 2003)(court improperly received detective's opinion testimony on ultimate issue that defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to sell them rather than limiting testimony to the act and circumstances consistent with the sale of drugs rather than mere possession).

Nonetheless, the topics listed under Nos. 2 and 7, general principles of firearms safety and the mechanics of the firearm that Gravenhise possessed, are beyond the ken of the average juror and are admissible (see People v Magliato, 110 AD2d 266 (1st Dept 1985)(description of defendant's ballistics expert's testimony concerning about how murder weapon could be cocked and fired and the amount of pressure needed to fire the gun) aff'd 68 NY2d 24 (1986). The general principles of firearms safety and the mechanics of the firearm possessed by Gravenhise will "aid the jury in forming an accurate conclusion as to the defendant's subjective believe and the reasonableness of the belief" without usurping the jury's role in evaluating the video evidence (People v DeSarno, 121 AD2d 65, 655 [2nd Dept 1986](in a self-defense claim court properly limited defense psychiatrist's testimony to the details of the defendant's psychiatric diagnosis and properly precluded expert testimony that the defendant was "convinced the (decedent) was going to kill him").

Conclusion

The defendant's motion is denied in part and granted in part.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

SO ORDERED:

June 2, 2026

HON. DINEEN ANN RIVIEZZO

Dineen Ann Riviezzo, J.