NIDAR RODGERS v. LYNELLE MAGINLEY LIDDIE (2026)

Petitioner Nidar Rodgers was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for allegedly violating certain conditions of release during his community supervision. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his detention. This court previously ordered petitioner's release pursuant to CPLR 7009 (e) pending final disposition of this habeas proceeding. Petitioner challenges whether the recognizance court's securing order was lawfully issued and whether the preliminary hearing determination was supported by sufficient evidence. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the writ is DISMISSED.

A recognizance hearing was held on October 31, 2025. The court liaison officer, appearing on behalf of DOCCS, explained petitioner's supervision history. Petitioner's attorney emphasized that petitioner had no allegations of missed office reports or absconding. In remanding petitioner, the recognizance court stated: "defendant has been convicted of a serious crime involving a firearm as to which he was given a serious sentence and because of which he now faces a serious sanction for violating his parole, which gives him every incentive to flee and not to appear" (petition, exhibit C, recognizance hearing tr at 15, lines 10-13).

A preliminary hearing was held on November 5, 2025. The parole revocation specialist who represented DOCCS proceeded on charge 4, alleging a rule 8 violation, "their behavior violated the provision of law to which they are subject, which provides for a penalty of imprisonment, in that, on or about 3/1, 2024, in Camden County Superior Court, New Jersey, they were convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon" (affirmation of respondent's counsel, exhibit F, preliminary hearing tr at 4, lines 3-5). To support this charge, the parole revocation specialist presented a certificate of disposition from New Jersey, dated March 4, 2024, reflecting petitioner's conviction and sentence for possessing a handgun without a permit. Petitioner's attorney objected, arguing that the certificate was not prepared by DOCCS, lacked a signature and seal, constituted hearsay, and violated petitioner's right to confrontation. The hearing officer overruled the objection, stating that "in the spirit of Morrissey v. Brewer as well as a McGee analysis has been conducted, I don't find any issue with admissibility" (id. at 5, lines 3-4).

At the end of the hearing, the hearing officer found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that petitioner violated a condition of release.

Petitioner now challenges both the recognizance hearing determination and the preliminary hearing determination.

Petitioner argues that the recognizance court acted unlawfully in remanding petitioner. A recognizance court may detain a releasee only upon finding both that "the releasee currently presents a substantial risk of willfully failing to appear at the preliminary or final revocation hearings" and that "no non-monetary condition or combination of conditions in the community will reasonably assure the releasee's appearance" at those hearings (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]). In making those findings, the court must consider "all available evidence of the releasee's employment, family and community ties including length of residency in the community, history of reporting in a timely fashion to a parole or supervisory officer, and other indicators of stability" (id.).

Although the releasee's alleged violations are not adjudicated at the recognizance hearing (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iv], [f] [viii]), evidence of alleged violations is relevant to the court's assessment under the statutory criteria. At the hearing, DOCCS is statutorily required to submit information regarding the alleged violation and the releasee's community supervision record (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v]). The recognizance court may then evaluate alleged noncompliance with supervision conditions to the extent that such evidence is pertinent to the risk of nonappearance and the sufficiency of nonmonetary conditions. In this case, petitioner's New Jersey conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon was admissible and appropriate for the court's consideration under these statutory factors, as they directly relate to petitioner's supervision record and broader stability in the community (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v], [vi]).

On the record before the recognizance court, the findings required for detention are rationally supported (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]; cf. Parker, 62 NY2d at 778-779 [affirming denial of habeas relief where bail determination rested on rational basis in the record]). Petitioner is thus not entitled to release on this ground. Specifically, petitioner's New Jersey conviction and sentence for a weapons possession offense, along with the possible sanction of reincarceration for violating parole based on that conviction, provided the court with concrete evidence of instability and of an alleged failure to comply with the conditions of community supervision.

In a habeas proceeding challenging a preliminary hearing determination, the court's review is limited to whether the hearing officer followed the required procedural rules and whether sufficient evidence supports the determination (People ex rel. Watson v Commr. of NY City Dept. of Corr., 149 AD2d 120, 125 [1st Dept 1989]). The formal rules of evidence do not apply at a revocation hearing, and hearsay is therefore admissible (see 9 NYCRR 8005.2 [a]). By statute, however, a releasee is entitled to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iii]).

At revocation proceedings, a releasee has the right to confrontation, and a hearing officer may dispense with it only upon a specific "finding of good cause" (People ex rel. McGee v Walters, 62 NY2d 317, 322 [1984]). This involves carefully weighing the general preference for confrontation, the nature of the evidence at issue, the likely utility of cross-examination, and the State's burden in producing the declarant (id. at 319-320). Where the challenged hearsay furnished the sole proof of a fact necessary to establish the violation and no adequate good cause finding was made, the determination cannot stand (id. at 323).

A releasee who fails to assert the right to confrontation at the hearing may not raise that claim on review (Matter of Westcott v New York State Bd. of Parole, 256 AD2d 1179, 1179 [4th Dept 1998] [deeming the claim waived where the releasee neither objected to the hearsay nor sought to cross-examine the declarant]). Likewise, where a witness becomes unavailable, the releasee must object to the witness's absence, request an adjournment, or otherwise assert the confrontation right on the record (Matter of Currie v New York State Bd. of Parole, 298 AD2d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2002] [finding the claim unpreserved where the releasee did not object when the witness left without testifying]). The nature of the objection also matters. Because hearsay is admissible in revocation proceedings (9 NYCRR 8005.2 [a]), a bare hearsay objection alone does not preserve a confrontation claim (cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]). Nor does a generalized or standing confrontation objection suffice where it does not alert the hearing officer to the specific confrontation issue being raised (cf. People v Paulin, 78 AD3d 557, 558 [1st Dept 2010]).

Although the right to confrontation is strongly favored, its denial does not always warrant habeas relief. If competent proof apart from the challenged hearsay establishes the violation, the determination may stand (People ex rel. Peters v Walker, 262 AD2d 1025, 1025 [4th Dept 1999] [affirming denial of habeas relief where the remaining evidence independently sufficed despite improper admission of hearsay]). That is especially so where the absent witness's testimony "would merely have been cumulative and corroborative" (People ex rel. Lee v New York State Bd. of Parole, 165 AD2d 959, 960 [3d Dept 1990]). But where the challenged hearsay supplies the sole proof of a fact necessary to establish the violation, relief is warranted (see McGee, 62 NY2d at 323).

Evidence is deemed sufficient if it demonstrates that, more likely than not, the releasee violated a condition of community supervision in an important respect (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iv]). The preponderance of the evidence standard requires the proof to establish that the existence of the alleged violation is more probable than its nonexistence, or as articulated in Jarrett v Madifari, to "produce a reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted" (67 AD2d 396, 404 [1st Dept 1979] [citation modified]).¹ In applying this standard, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the hearing officer (see Watson, 149 AD2d at 125; cf. People ex rel. Walker v Hammock, 78 AD2d 369, 371 [4th Dept 1981]). Where the releasee contests the hearing officer's resolution of conflicting evidence, this presents a credibility issue solely within the purview of the hearing officer to determine (see People ex rel. Jenkins v Senkowski, 232 AD2d 774, 774 [3d Dept 1996]; accord Matter of Mosley v Dennison, 30 AD3d 975, 976 [4th Dept 2006]).

The admission of the certificate of disposition reflecting petitioner's prior conviction is fully supported by controlling precedent. CPLR 4540 (a) and (b), establish that a certified or attested copy constitutes self-authenticating evidence and does not require a foundation witness or a raised or embossed seal.² Judicial authority further permits authentication through circumstantial proof of genuineness, as articulated in People v Manganaro (218 NY 9, 13 [1916]) and CPLR 4543). Moreover, the Appellate Division in Matter of Thomas v New York State Bd. of Parole (208 AD2d 460, 460 [1st Dept 1994]) recognizes that out-of-state records may be admitted upon substantial compliance with the applicable authentication requirements. Given these precedents, the hearing officer's good-cause analysis, while careful, was unnecessary in these circumstances.

With the certificate of disposition, the hearing officer had prima facie evidence of a rule 8 violation. Based on the evidence presented, including the official record of petitioner's conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon, the hearing officer could find by a preponderance of the credible evidence that petitioner failed to comply with rule 8 in an important respect. This court will not disturb that finding.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and this proceeding is DISMISSED; it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioner is REMANDED to the custody of respondent and shall be detained pursuant to the securing order issued by the recognizance court in connection with parole warrant No. 741959.

Dated: July 14, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The amended statute contains an internal tension as to the standard of proof at a preliminary hearing. The 2021 amendments altered the preliminary-hearing framework by changing subparagraph (iv) to provide that the standard of proof at a preliminary hearing is "a preponderance of the evidence" and by adding subparagraph (ix), which directs the matter to be sent to a final hearing if the hearing officer finds "by a preponderance of the evidence" that a violation was committed in an important respect (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iv], [ix], as amended and added by L 2021, ch 427, § 5). However, some provisions retained the older probable-cause terminology for a preliminary hearing (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [vi]-[viii]; [d]). The implementing regulations treat the standard at the preliminary hearing to be a preponderance of the evidence (9 NYCRR 8005.7 [d]-[g]). Read together, the amended statute and the implementing regulations support the conclusion that the governing standard at a preliminary hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2.   Where applicable, the seal of the court or of an officer with legal custody of the original must be affixed; it does not require a raised or embossed seal (id.).

Verena C. Powell, J.