Dugg Construction, Inc., Plaintiff, v. MANDEEP KUMAR (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 200, 201, 202 were read on this motion to/for SET ASIDE VERDICT.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 005) 193, 194, 195, 196 were read on this motion to/for SANCTIONS.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 006) 197, 198, 203, 204, 205 were read on this motion to/for AMEND/MODIFY DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT.

After a jury trial was held from December 17 through December 19, 2025, the jury found in favor of plaintiff, Dugg Construction, Inc. ("Dugg"), in the amount of $200,000. Defendant Sandeep Pal makes a post-trial motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set aside the verdict against Dugg Construction, asserting the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff cross-moves for sanctions for violation of 22 NYCRR 130.1.1(c) against defendant, asserting the motion to set aside the verdict was frivolous and made to harass plaintiff. The cross-motion further seeks an award of pre-trial interest on the verdict pursuant to CPLR 5001. Defendant makes a motion pursuant to CPLR 5004 to correct the interest rate on the judgment by seeking an amended order to the Nassau County Clerk. Defendant claims the debt as a result of the verdict is consumer debt, and should use an interest rate of 2% per annum instead of 9% per annum.

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Verdict

Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict asserts that the jury verdict on damages was against the weight of the evidence and speculative because the matter was a construction case based on quantum meruit where damages calculations should be related to job cost. Defendant cites to DiSario v Rynston (138 AD3d 672 [2d Dept 2016]) for support because that case provides that the customary method of calculation of damages on a quantum meruit basis, in a construction case, is based on actual job costs plus an allowance for overhead and profits, minus amounts paid. Defendant argues that the jury did not calculate correctly and that plaintiff's construction expert provided testimony of the customary method of calculating damages for compensation as a general contractor. Defendant asserts that plaintiff's expert witness provided that a general contractor, for their fee, would use a formula of 10 and 10, which is 10 percent of actual job costs for overhead and insurance and 10 percent as profit. Defendant additionally argues that because the jury award of $200,000 does not rely on a 10 and 10 formula, the damages calculation should have been plaintiff Dugg Construction's costs for the project based on the checks and other financial documents admitted at trial, making the calculation for damages about $67,640.

Further, defendant asserts that their theory at trial was that defendant Sandeep Pal also did general contracting work and plaintiff could not establish plaintiff did the entire general contracting work for the construction. Therefore, the defendants' position of how damages should be calculated provides that the award should be reduced by defendant Sandeep Pal's participation in that final amount.

Plaintiff opposes defendant's argument related to the 10 and 10 formula to determine damages, stating that the formula has no factual application here because plaintiff was not seeking damages based on actual job costs for his general contracting work, but was instead seeking to recover based on the promise from his cousin, Sandeep Pal, to pay plaintiff for the reasonable value of his general contracting services. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that the jury verdict sheet did not provide for damages based on the actual job costs and the 10 and 10 formula.

The standard of review under CPLR 4404(a) and 4405 is that a verdict may be set aside as against the weight of the evidence only where the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence. "A motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) for judgment as a matter of law may be granted only where there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party" (Williams v Ncho, 212 AD3d 687, [2d Dept 2023], quoting Hiotidis v Ramuni, 161 AD3d 955, 956 [2018]). Credibility determinations are for the jury and are entitled to great deference (Kerper v Betancourt, 255 AD3d 677 [2d Dept 2024]).

Appellate Courts have repeatedly emphasized that unjust enrichment is rooted in factual determinations, including whether a defendant received a benefit, whether that benefit was obtained at the plaintiff's expense, and whether equity requires restitution. In Mobarak v Mowad, (117 AD3d 998 [2d Dept 2014]), the Court explained that unjust enrichment claims turn on whether (1) the defendant was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff's expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered. In Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v. Rieder (86 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2011], affd 19 NY3d 511 [2012], citing IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 142 [2009]), the Court held that unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract theory of recovery, and "is an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in the absence of an actual agreement between the parties concerned."

Courts have repeatedly held that unjust enrichment damages may be established without cost documentation through testimony as to reasonable value and that recovery in quantum merit claims can be construed liberally. In Cruz v McAneney (31 AD3d 54 [2d Dept 2006]), the Second Department held that unjust enrichment recovery does not depend on contract damages, written agreements, or cost plus formulas; rather, it depends on whether the plaintiff conferred a benefit and whether equity requires the defendant to pay for its value. In Sperry v Crompton Corp. (8 NY3d 204 [2007], citing Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v State of New York, 30 NY2d 415 [1972], cert denied 414 US 829 [1973]), the Court of Appeals found it well settled that "[t]he essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment or restitution is whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered." In Thompson v. Horowitz (141 AD3d 642 [2d Dept 2016]), the Court found it wasn't improper for the jury to consider factual issues in quantum meruit.

The Court finds that defendant, in his motion to set aside the verdict, is seeking to reargue the Court's prior ruling during the trial where the Court determined that plaintiff's damages are to be awarded based on a quantum meruit cause of action for general contracting services, which considered the reasonable value of plaintiff's services provided through the evidence elicited at trial. Additionally, the jury considered unjust enrichment claims. Moreover, the Court determined at trial, and reaffirms here that this intra-family dispute hinged upon the jury's assessment of the parties' credibility regarding their differing accounts on whether a prior agreement existed for the general contracting work and the amount of compensation the plaintiff was to receive for those services. The Court finds that the factual record at trial provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find a verdict of $200,000 in unjust enrichment damages because the plaintiff testified that the parties had an initial agreed-upon price for his general contracting services of $125,000, but that he then performed services that took him an additional three months of work and were more detailed and complex than initially contemplated, and that he therefore did a minimum of $200,000 in contracting services. Furthermore, plaintiff provided specifically detailed documentation and witnesses to back up his claims of general contracting services. Additionally, plaintiff called an expert witness with 45 years of expertise in general contracting and construction, who testified that the type of high-end construction and custom work involved in the general contracting services plaintiff provided for defendants' project was "at least" valued at the sum of $200,000.

At the trial, the Court provided the jury with a verdict sheet that asked the jury to determine the reasonable value of plaintiff's services if they found that there was an agreement between the parties. Furthermore, defendants submitted a proposed verdict sheet to the Court that did not include any questions related to the 10 and 10 formula as raised in this motion. The two questions related to damages that were submitted by defendants in their proposed jury verdict sheet are as follows:

Did the plaintiff prove, by preponderance of evidence, the reasonable value of the services he personally performed?

What sum of money, if any, represents the reasonable value of the services proven by the plaintiff, exclusive of speculation, overhead, or work performed by others?

The verdict sheet provided to the jury was consented to by both parties, and did not include questions related to the costs of the construction project. There were seven questions proposed to the jury. The questions related to damages were as follows:

Did plaintiff establish the reasonable value for the services that were performed for defendant that were accepted by plaintiff and that plaintiff expected compensation for?

Was defendant unjustly enriched by receiving services performed by plaintiff?

Did plaintiff establish the reasonable value for the services that were performed for defendant that defendant was unjustly enriched by?

State the amount of money that will fairly compensate plaintiff for the reasonable value of the surfaces it performed.

The Court notes that during defendants' summation, the entire theory of their case asserted against plaintiff during the trial completely changed. During the opening, cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses and their own testimonial case, the issues raised by defendants were that there was no agreement made that plaintiff was to be the general contractor, and that defendant Sandeep Pal was the general contractor for his own residential house build. Defendants' opening and cross focused on the facts that plaintiff was not present or providing general contracting services during construction. However, during the end of the trial, defense counsel sought to admit a calculation document/spreadsheet made by counsel themselves with no foundation, no appropriate witness to lay that foundation  ¹ and no supporting documentation related to construction costs, which the Court did not allow to be entered because the entire document was hearsay. At this point in the trial, immediately before closing arguments, the Court believed that defendants might ask the jury to calculate damages based on the arguments now asserted in this motion. Because defendants' new assertions regarding damage calculations were clear to both parties prior to closing statements, the Court cautioned defense counsel that closing argument must be based on the evidence as provided during the trial and the closing charges. However, during closing statements, defendants' counsel made argument to the jury asking them to use the documentary evidence that, in part, had construction costs listed to find a specific value for plaintiff's services to add up to a calculation in the same manner now asserted in their motion. The Court did not allow defense counsel to argue to the jury that any damages should be based on the formula of 10 percent of actual job costs for overhead and insurance and 10 percent as profit because that was a legal determination in the purview of the Court.

The Court finds the trial was related to issues of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit and the jury had to determine which of the parties was more believable, whether there was a monetary agreement between them before the construction started and whether the agreement was based on the actual amount of time and work provided. Lastly, defendant Sandeep Pal's participation in work related to the construction issue was before the jury, and the jury decided which party was more credible. Any calculation or amount of reduction of the verdict based on asserted work of defendant Sandeep Pal would be the Court making a factual finding outside the jury's determination.

Accordingly, the Court finds there is no basis to set aside the verdict.

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff cross-moves for sanctions against defendant and his counsel for filing a frivolous motion to set aside the jury verdict. He argues that it's a frivolous motion because it was completely without merit in law or in fact, and claims that it was made primarily to harass and maliciously injure the plaintiff and its attorney by requiring them to incur unnecessary legal expenses.

The Court finds that plaintiff does not assert why the defendant's motion is frivolous nor provide any reason as to why it was made to harass the plaintiff. The Court further finds that post-trial motions are to be expected after a jury verdict.

Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's cross-motion seeking sanctions is denied.

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Pre-Trial Interest

Plaintiff's cross-motion for pre-trial interest to recover damages in quantum meruit asserts that the verdict interest pursuant to CPLR 5001 on damages awarded for a cause of action for unjust enrichment under quantum meruit theory is generally mandatory. Plaintiff argues that the interest on the cost of work for quantum meruit is awarded from the date of the demand of the payment. Further, plaintiff contends that the Court should award pre-trial interest from the date that plaintiff's services were completed, which was on or about September 22, 2022.

In opposition, defendant asserts that plaintiff waived pre-judgment interest because plaintiff took steps to execute their judgment on the jury determination on January 28, 2026, prior to the plaintiff making its February 5, 2026, cross-motion to add pre-judgment interest. Defendant also claims that plaintiff never made a formal demand for payment and waived its right to pre-judgment interest, but does not provide any legal basis for either assertion.

The Second Department treats quantum meruit cases like contract claims for interest purposes. The accrual date, if unclear, is in the Court's discretion, as well as the analysis of the rate of interest if special circumstances apply or other equitable considerations. In Tesser v Allboro Equipment Co. (73 AD3d 1023 [2d Dept 2010]), the Court held that quantum meruit claims are "legal, not equitable," and therefore pre-decision interest under CPLR 5001 should be awarded, citing Brent v Keesler (32 AD2d 804, 805 [2d Dept 1969]). In Atlas Refrigeration-Air Conditioning, Inc. v Lo Pinto (33 AD3d 639 [2d Dept 2006]), the Court awarded pre-judgment interest from the date of demand for payment—the earliest ascertainable accrual date under CPLR 5001(b)—in a quantum meruit case.

The Court finds that the quantum meruit claims are to be treated as contract claims and that plaintiff should be awarded pre-judgment interest. However, there was no jury determination at trial or exact date in the trial record regarding the plaintiff's demand for payment. Moreover, the case was brought as an unjust enrichment claim because there was no writing to memorialize the understandings and there was testimony regarding ongoing requests to the defendants' family member to pay for plaintiff's general contracting services, so the Court does not have enough information to determine a demand date.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the pre-judgment interest should start from the date of the filing of the action, which the Court considers to be a firm demand date. The action was filed on September 29, 2023. Therefore, pre-judgment interest is awarded from that date through to the date of the jury verdict on December 19, 2025.

Defendant's Motion to Have the Interest Rate on the Judgment Amended

Defendant asserts that the Nassau County Clerk used the wrong interest rate at 9%. Defendant argues that the interest rate on the judgment needs to be amended to apply an interest rate related to a "consumer debt" at 2% per annum pursuant to CPLR 5004.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, asserting that the Clerk of the Court has the sole discretion to provide the amount of interest to be added to a money judgment pursuant to CPLR 5002. Further, plaintiff's asserts the facts of the jury determination do not fit what is to be considered "consumer debt" under CPLR 5004. They argue that their claim against defendants did not arise from a consumer transaction as defined in CPLR 5004 because it was a commercial transaction for defendants because the residential home was for new construction and a business investment and not his primary residence. Plaintiff also asserts that CPLR 5004 does not apply to this matter because the plaintiff started providing general contracting services on or about May of 2021, which is prior to the effective date of CPLR 5004.

Plaintiff cites trial testimony for proof that it was a business transaction and the start time of the project. That testimony is as follows:

Q. When was the project completed?

A. I don't remember. I think it was some time in September or October of 2022. Started in May 2021. It took about anywhere 16 to 18 months because it was sometime it was difficult to get material during the COVID and sometimes people don't even show up and then, of course, a lot of custom work in that house. It took like three month additional.

CPLR 5004, in part, states:

(a) Interest shall be at the rate of nine per centum per annum, except where otherwise provided by statute; provided the annual rate of interest to be paid in an action arising out of a consumer debt where a natural person is a defendant shall be two per centum per annum

(i) on a judgment or accrued claim for judgments entered on or after the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand twenty-one which amended this section, and

(ii) for interest upon a judgment pursuant to section five thousand three of this article from the date of the entry of judgment on any part of a judgment entered before the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand twenty-one which amended this section that is unpaid as of such effective date."

(b)For the purpose of this section "consumer debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of any natural person to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment, including, but not limited to, a consumer credit transaction as defined in subdivision (f) of section one hundred five of this chapter" (emphasis added).

CPLR 5004 clearly defines a "consumer debt" as "any obligation or alleged obligation of any natural person to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." This definition closely mirrors the definition of consumer debt under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 USC § 1692 [a] [5]). As the Yonkers City Court observed in Allen v Whidbee (88 Misc 3d 319 [2025]), New York's Fair Consumer Judgment Interest Act's (FCJIA) definition of consumer debt is broader than a "consumer credit transaction" and does not require that credit be extended — it encompasses any obligation of a natural person for personal, family, or household purposes.

The statutory language of CPLR 5004 (b) expressly includes "services" within the definition of consumer debt when those services are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes under CPLR 5004. Home improvement and home contracting services performed on a residential property are quintessentially personal and household in nature. New York courts have consistently recognized this principle in analogous consumer protection contexts. In Ragucci v Professional Const. Services (25 AD3d 43 [2005]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that architectural services for the construction of a new home constituted "consumer goods" under General Business Law 399-c because such services were "clearly for the plaintiffs' personal and family use." Similarly, in Kreiten v Scott (61 Misc 3d 528 [2018]), the Civil Court of the City of New York noted that suits against home improvement contractors involving natural persons for personal or household purposes are consumer transactions. These decisions support the conclusion that home contracting services for a residential property satisfy the "personal, family or household purposes" requirement of CPLR 5004 (b).

Regarding defendant's motion to change the interest rate of 9% on plaintiff's judgment issued on January 20, 2026, determined by the Nassau County Clerk's office, New York courts treat the applicable interest rate as a substantive right, not a clerical or computational matter. This distinction is critical and controls which post-judgment remedies are available. The Court in Pjetri v New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (169 AD2d 100 [1st Dept 1991]) relied on the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau (61 NY2d 739 [1984]), which determined that a court's inherent power to exercise control over its judgment is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party "from judgments taken through fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," which is not alleged here by defendant. However, there is a narrow exception. In Kiker v Nassau County (85 NY2d 879 [1995]), the New York Court of Appeals interpreted CPLR 5019 to hold that where the wrong interest rate was applied by the Court Clerk as a purely ministerial act — meaning the rate was never contested by the parties and was never judicially determined — the court of original jurisdiction retains the power to correct the error, even after the appeals process is complete, which is not the case herein. The key distinction is whether the interest rate was the subject of judicial determination or merely a clerical application of a statutory rate. If the Court never decided the applicable rate and the Court Clerk simply applied the wrong rate, correction is permissible.

CPLR 5004 applies the 2% consumer rate to: (i) judgments entered on or after April 30, 2022; and (ii) for interest accruing from the date of entry on any portion of a judgment entered before April 30, 2022, that remains unpaid as of that date.

In making its determinations, the Court must assess whether the underlying factual determinations made by the jury constitute a business debt or a consumer debt. The Court does not find that the testimony by plaintiff quoted supra established that building the residential home for defendants was a business transaction. Additionally, there was no testimony or facts established at the trial that the residential home was being built for investment purposes. The testimony of witnesses made clear the house was being built for defendants' residential use and not for commercial purposes. Moreover, the defendant homeowners are natural persons as defined under CPLR 5004 (b) and not a business entity.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the 2% consumer rate applies to the jury verdict judgment and to the pre-judgment interest.

Regarding the timing of the defendant's application to have a consumer debt interest of 2% applied pursuant to CPLR 5004, the Court finds that although the acts giving rise to the claim occurred before CPLR 5004 was enacted on April 30, 2022, the judgment was filed after that date. Under CPLR 5004 (a), the amended 2% interest rate applies to all money judgments arising out of consumer debt entered on or after the statute's effective date. Moreover, the statute contains no grandfather clause tied to the date of the wrongful act, breach, or transaction. The Legislature could have limited the amendment to debts arising after enactment but did not. Recent case law interpreting CPLR 5004 emphasizes the purpose of the amendment was relief to natural persons saddled with consumer debt judgments, and not limiting application to newly arising causes of action. (Allen v Whidbee, 88 Misc 3d 319 [Yonkers City Ct 2025]). Therefore, because the lawsuit commenced after the effective date of the statute, the verdict was rendered after the effective date and any judgment in this matter is or will be entered after the effective date, the Court finds that CPLR 5004 expressly applies to this matter.

The Court next considers whether defendant's post-judgment modification of the interest rate can be applied. The Court determines that defendant's request applies only in limited circumstances where the wrong rate was applied as a pure ministerial act by the Court Clerk (not as a judicial determination), or where one of the enumerated grounds under CPLR 5015 applies. Here, the Court never made a prior judicial determination related to the question of whether the debt from the verdict was a consumer debt based on the facts of this case and will treat the application by the Court Clerk of the 9% per annum rate as a ministerial error that the Court can correct. Based upon the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's cross-motion for pre-judgment interest is granted to the extent that interest is awarded from September 29, 2023, to December 19, 2025, at the consumer rate of 2% per annum; and it is further

ORDERED that the Nassau County Clerk is to amend the judgment issued on January 28, 2026, to apply a consumer interest rate of 2% per annum instead of the rate of 9% per annum.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

E N T E R

Date: 7/27/2026

Hon. Carolyn Mazzu Genovesi

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defense counsel sought to take the stand as a witness themselves to admit the spreadsheet with numbers and calculations that had no clear basis in the record. That request was denied by the Court.

Carolyn Mazzu Genovesi, J.