IN RE: the Application of J.R. By his attorney ANTHONY MAYOL (2026)

The following papers numbered EF 1-12 read on this Order to Show Cause by the petitioner for an order directing the respondent to immediately designate an appropriate institution for the care, treatment and custody of petitioner and notify the New York City Department of Correction that petitioner should be immediately transferred from Rikers Island to such facility, ordering the respondent to accept custody of the petitioner and declaring a delay of more than seven days between the date of a CPL Article 730 order of commitment and transfer to the appropriate facility unconstitutional.

PAPERS NUMBERED

Order to Show Cause - Petition - Exhibits EF 1-12

Upon the foregoing papers and the record made in open court on July 27, 2026 in which petitioner and respondent appeared by their counsels, it is ordered that this Order to Show Cause by petitioner for an order directing the respondent to immediately designate an appropriate institution for the care, treatment and custody of petitioner and notify the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC") that petitioner should be immediately transferred from Rikers Island to such facility, ordering the respondent to accept custody of the petitioner and declaring a delay of more than seven days between the date of a CPL Article 730 order of commitment and transfer to the appropriate facility unconstitutional is decided as follows:

Petitioner, J.R., was indicted and accused of violating New York Penal Law § 120.05, Assault in the second degree, and related and lesser included offenses. On January 20, 2026, on the consent of the parties, the Honorable Toni Cimino, Supreme Court, Criminal Term, in the underlying criminal action, People v J.R., Ind. No. 74462-25, adjudicated the petitioner an incapacitated person and issued an Order of Commitment pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 730.50 whereby the petitioner was "committed to the custody of the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health" ("OMH") "for care and treatment in an appropriate institution to be designated by said Commissioner for a period not to exceed one year from the date of this order..." The order further provided that the petitioner is "committed to and shall remain in the care and custody of the NYC DOC pending the designation of an appropriate institution by the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health, and upon notice of the designated institution by the said Commissioner, the NYC DOC shall FORTHWITH deliver the defendant (petitioner herein) to the designated institution."

OMH, on January 21, 2026, identified Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center ("Kirby") as the facility to receive the petitioner, although Kirby has not been formally designated. Petitioner has not yet been transferred to Kirby or any other appropriate facility and remains confined to Rikers Island.

Petitioner commenced this Article 78 proceeding and brings the instant Order to Show Cause seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus to direct the respondent to immediately designate an appropriate institution and notify the New York City Department of Correction that petitioner should be immediately transferred from Rikers Island to such facility and to direct the respondent to accept custody of the petitioner.

Petitioner asserts that OMH lacks discretion to delay accepting custody of the petitioner and to prevent petitioner's timely transfer to an OMH facility where he can receive necessary care and treatment. According to petitioner, while at Rikers, the petitioner has not received adequate medical and psychiatric care. Petitioner further states that he has been assaulted at least five times and suffered fractures to his ribs and nose, as well as a renal laceration. He has also missed several Correctional Health Services visits at Rikers. Respondent concedes that the petitioner has been waiting an especially long time to be transferred from Rikers. Respondent contends, however, that it has been unable to comply with the Order of Commitment due to a shortage of available bed space rather than any refusal to carry out its statutory obligations.

Mandamus to compel lies where an administrative body has failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law, the performance of that duty is mandatory and ministerial rather than discretionary, and there is a legal right to the relief sought. (Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn., 41 NY3d 341, 364 [2023]; New York Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 182 [2005].) It is well established that relief in the nature of mandamus to compel is an extraordinary remedy that lies only where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought. (see Matter of Seherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991].)

Article 730 of the CPL sets forth the procedures for determining whether a criminal defendant has the mental capacity to stand trial. It also details the procedures to be followed once it is determined that a defendant is incapacitated. The purpose of CPL Article 730 is to ensure that criminal defendants who lack the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against them are not prosecuted until competency is restored. The statute mandates commitment for "care and treatment." (People v Betances, 176 Misc 2d 66, 70 [Sup Ct, New York County 1998].)

CPL § 730.60(1) provides that upon receipt of an Order of Commitment, the Commissioner of the OMH "must designate an appropriate institution operated by the department of mental hygiene in which the defendant is to be placed..." The Sheriff or DOC "must hold the defendant in custody pending such designation by the commissioner," and when notified of the commissioner's designation, must deliver the defendant to the designated institution. Once the defendant has been transferred to the Commissioner's custody, the criminal action is "suspended until the superintendent of the mental institution in which the defendant is confined "determines that he is no longer an incapacitated person." (CPL § 730.60[2].)

In the case at bar, the petitioner has established his right to compel the respondent to comply with Justice Cimino's Order of Commitment. The order is a clear and unequivocal mandate from the court that respondent has violated. Justice Cimino found that petitioner was an incapacitated person in need of mental health treatment. As a result of the delay herein, petitioner has been deprived of such necessary treatment for more than six months. This prolonged and unjustified delay has frustrated the very purpose of the Order of Commitment and has denied the petitioner access to the treatment the court found to be necessary. Each additional day of noncompliance further jeopardizes the petitioner's mental health, increasing the risk of continued deterioration. Such inexcusable delay cannot be permitted to continue.

Moreover, as noted above, petitioner has alleged that he has been assaulted on at least five separate occasions and seriously injured while confined to Rikers Island. It is well known that Rikers Island "is in a state of crisis and has been for years." (People v L.G., 83 Misc 3d 1030, [Sup Ct, New York County 2024], affd as mod 238 AD3d 568, 570 [1st Dept 2025].) Individuals suffering from mental illness, such as petitioner, are particularly vulnerable. As stated by Justice April A. Newbauer, Supreme Court, New York County, in People v L.G. (83 Misc 3d at 1037), "Rikers is, at present, one of the worst places for mentally ill individuals ... to be for any length of time, let alone a prolonged period." In addition, in People ex rel. Burse v Schiraldi (74 Misc 3d 927, 934 [Sup Ct, New York County 2021]), Justice Newbauer discussed the report of an independent federal court-appointed Monitor, which described Rikers Island as having a " 'pervasive high level of disorder and chaos' " and found that " 'there is a manifest risk of serious harm to both detainees and staff.' " Under these circumstances, it is unacceptable that petitioner continues to languish at Rikers Island where he has already been the victim of violent assaults and remains at substantial risk of further violence. Requiring the petitioner to remain in the very environment in which he was seriously injured exposes him to a continuing and foreseeable risk of harm. This is especially troubling to the court since the petitioner should have been transferred to the appropriate OMH facility months ago.

Moreover, respondent's argument that it cannot comply with the Order of Commitment due to the lack of available bed space at Kirby is unavailing. Administrative or logistical difficulties, including the unavailability of bed space, does not permit OMH to avoid its clear statutory obligations. (People v L.G., 238 AD3d at 570.) Indeed, OMH has a clear, unequivocal legal duty that must be complied with. (CPLR 7803[1].) To hold otherwise would permit OMH to ignore court orders and statutory mandates whenever it experiences any capacity issues. Such result would fly in the face of the plain language and purposes of CPL Article 730. The Legislature did not provide an exception based upon the temporary unavailability of bed space.

The court is also not persuaded by respondent's contention that petitioner is ineligible for placement at certain facilities because he is accused of a felony offense. Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime. He has merely been indicted, which is not proof of guilt. To deny the petitioner access to mental health treatment based on unproven allegations would be inconsistent with the fundamental principle of our judicial system of a presumption of innocence.

Further, respondent has an affirmative obligation to explore and utilize any available alternative placement within the OMH system. The court notes that although Kirby has been identified as the facility to accept custody of the petitioner, another OMH facility, such as Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychotherapy Center, may be able to receive petitioner sooner. Respondent cannot disregard other available options, as doing so would also undermine the Order of Commitment and its statutory duties.

Therefore, the respondent has failed to demonstrate any legal basis for delaying compliance with the Order of Commitment. The respondent's duty is mandatory, not discretionary, and, thus, mandamus to compel is appropriate.

Petitioner further seeks to have this court declare that a delay of more than seven days between the date of a CPL Article 730 order of commitment and transfer to an appropriate institution, as has occurred in this case, is unconstitutional. Although this court has concluded that respondent was obligated to effectuate petitioner's transfer to an appropriate facility and failed to do so in a timely manner, the court declines to adopt a per se constitutional deadline. Indeed, while the respondent's failure to comply with the order of commitment may give rise to appropriate judicial relief, it does not automatically follow that any delay beyond a specified number of days is, standing alone, unconstitutional. CPL Article 730 does not provide for such a seven-day deadline.

Accordingly, this Order to Show Cause by the petitioner is granted to the extent that it is

ORDERED, that the respondent shall formally designate an appropriate institution for the care, treatment and custody of petitioner, and it is further

ORDERED, that the respondent shall notify the New York City Department of Correction of such designation, and it is further

ORDERED, that such transfer of the petitioner from Rikers Island to such appropriate institution shall be effectuated no later than 5:00 P.M. on July 29, 2026, and it is further

ORDERED, that respondent shall accept custody of the petitioner, and it is further

ORDERED, that if the petitioner has not been transferred to such appropriate institution by 5:00 P.M. on July 29, 2026 as set forth herein, respondent shall pay the sum of $5,000.00 per day to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, and it is further

ORDERED, that the branch of the application seeking a declaration that a delay of more than seven days between the date of a CPL Article 730 order of commitment and transfer to the appropriate facility is unconstitutional is denied.

Dated: July 28, 2026

CARMEN R. VELASQUEZ, J.S.C.

Carmen R. Velasquez, J.