Jessica Vigueras, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON COM SERVICES LLC AMAZON LOGISTICS INC (2026)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident, defendant James Vilamel moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Papers Considered NYSCEF DOC NO. 47-68

1. Notice of Motion/ Affirmation of Todd A. Rossman, Esq./Exhibits A-F/Memorandum of Law in Support/Statement of Material Facts/Affirmation of Service

2. Affirmation of John B. Telesca, Esq. in Opposition/Exhibits 1-3

3. Affirmation of Todd A. Rossman, Esq. in Reply

4. Affirmation in Support of Raymond Law, Esq.

FACTUAL AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jessica Vigueras is seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred around 7:38 a.m. on May 15, 2025 on or near 135 Shore Road in Pelham Manor, New York. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint on September 29, 2025. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant's vehicle collided with hers and that the collision was caused solely by defendant's negligence. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to yield to traffic while making a left turn. Further, due to defendant's alleged negligence, plaintiff sustained serious injuries. The complaint alleges that defendant was operating the vehicle in the scope of his employment with Amazon.com Services LLC and Amazon Logistics, Inc. (Amazon). Defendant joined issue with the service and filing of his answer on October 29, 2025. Amazon joined issue with the service and filing of its answer with crossclaims on October 30, 2025.

Instant Motion

Defendant now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant submits an affirmation, video footage, the police accident report and photos in support of the motion. Defendant affirms that on the date of the accident he was driving his own vehicle and working as an Amazon Flex Driver. He states that he was exiting the gas station located at 135 Shore Road, intending to make a left turn on Shore Road, which traveled north and south with two lanes of travel in each direction. He affirms the following, in relevant part:

"As I exited Manor Auto gas station, traffic on Shore Road in the southbound direction was stopped and there was a stopped vehicle in the middle lane. The stopped vehicle's driver motioned for me to proceed with the left turn in front of her vehicle, which I acknowledged with a wave. After looking and observing that traffic was clear, I began the left turn onto the northbound lanes of Shore Road when Plaintiff's vehicle attempted to overtake the uninvolved, stopped vehicle by crossing the solid, double yellow centerline into oncoming traffic, and causing a collision with my vehicle."

Defendant claims that plaintiff's vehicle was travelling southbound on Shore Road before it crossed over into the northbound lanes of Shore Road to avoid the stopped vehicle and impacted his vehicle. Defendant states that there was nothing he could have done to avoid the accident.

In sum, defendant argues that plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. According to defendant, as demonstrated by the dashcam video, the photographs at the scene of the accident, the police accident report and his affirmation, he was making a left turn when plaintiff attempted to overtake an uninvolved vehicle by illegally passing and travelling into the oncoming lane of travel before colliding with his vehicle. Plaintiff allegedly violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1126 (a) and 1128(a) by her actions.

Amazon submits an affirmation in support of defendant's motion. Amazon adopts defendant's arguments and states that the evidence submitted established that no negligence on the part of any defendant, including Amazon, contributed to the happening of the accident. Further, according to Amazon, if the complaint is dismissed against defendant, it would also be dismissed against Amazon as any liability against Amazon would be vicarious.

In opposition, brought only by attorney affirmation, plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied. At the outset, plaintiff claims that the motion is premature, as no depositions have taken place yet. Plaintiff states that the operator of the uninvolved motor vehicle has never been identified or deposed and that no expert affidavit on accident reconstruction has been submitted by either side. Plaintiff also claims that the evidence submitted by defendant is insufficient to sustain defendant's burden on summary judgment. For example, only defendant, and not an independent witness, has confirmed the accuracy of the dashcam video from inside defendant's vehicle. Further, the police accident report is uncertified and does not meet any hearsay exception. Lastly, as the photographs depict the post accident resting position of the vehicles, they do not depict how the accident unfolded.

Plaintiff also argues that defendant violated his own independent duty of care under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 when he entered the roadway from the gas station and failed to yield to all vehicles approaching the roadway. According to plaintiff, defendant's purported reliance on a gesture from the uninvolved vehicle does not discharge this duty. Plaintiff also claims that the dashcam video did not conclusively establish if defendant adequately surveyed the traffic coming in either direction before making the turn. As a result, there is a possibility that defendant failed to observe plaintiff's approaching vehicle because he was focused on the yielding vehicle to his left. Plaintiff also relies on the video to show that defendant was allegedly on his phone prior to the accident, which establishes negligence on defendant's part. Plaintiff asserts that, even if she does bear some fault for the accident, comparative negligence should preclude defendant's motion.

In addition, plaintiff claims that the emergency doctrine raises a separate and triable issue of fact as to whether her conduct was excused. Plaintiff may have been confronted simultaneously with an obstruction in her lane of travel and defendant's vehicle entering the roadway from the private driveway, creating a sudden and unforeseen emergency not of her own making.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

"The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dallas-Stephenson v Waisman, 39 AD3d 303, 306 (1st Dept 2007). The movant's burden is "heavy," and "on a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon proffer of evidence establishing a prima facie case by the movant, "the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of produc[ing] evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact." People v Grasso, 50 AD3d 535, 545 (1st Dept 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A motion for summary judgment should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility." Ruiz v Griffin, 71 AD3d 1112, 1115 (2d Dept 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and a defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident." Timmons v Logan Bus Co., Inc., 229 AD3d 734, 734 (2d Dept 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "although it is generally for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause, it may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts." Elusma v Jackson, 186 AD3d 1326, 1328 (2d Dept 2020).

It is well settled that "an unexcused violation of a statutory standard of care, if unexplained, constitutes negligence per se." Dalal v City of New York, 262 AD2d 596, 597 (2d Dept 1999). As relevant here, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a) provides, "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." Courts have found that "[a] driver has a duty not to merge into a lane of moving traffic until it is safe to do so, and a violation of this duty constitutes negligence as a matter of law." Ferguson v City of New York, 209 AD3d 981, 982 (2d Dept 2022).

It is also violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 (a) to cross over a yellow line into opposing lane of traffic. Court have held that "a driver who crosses over a double yellow line into opposing traffic, unless justified by an emergency not of the driver's own making, violates the Vehicle and Traffic Law and is guilty of negligence as a matter of law." Hodnett v Westchester County Dept. of Pub. Works & Transp., 181 AD3d 655, 658 (2d Dept 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[a] driver is not required to anticipate that a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction will cross over into oncoming traffic. Eichenwald v Chaudhry, 17 AD3d 403, 404 (2d Dept 2005).

At the outset, the police report is not evidence in admissible form as it was not accompanied by a certification or authentication as required by CPLR 4518 for a business record to be admitted into evidence. See CPLR 4518 (a) and (c); see also Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62, 65-66 (2d Dept 2020). Notably, while plaintiff argues that the police accident report is inadmissible, she relies on it in opposition to the motion. She states that the diagram is consistent with her account that defendant's vehicle entered the public roadway directly into her path of travel, forcing her to maneuver to avoid a collision. However, the diagram shows a stopped vehicle in the lane closest to the double line and plaintiff's car going around to the left, and crossing into the opposing lane of traffic. Accordingly, by all accounts, it is undisputed that there was a stopped vehicle in front of plaintiff and that she entered the opposing lane of traffic to get around the vehicle. In any event, the Court need not address the admissibility of every item, as defendant's affirmation alone, is enough to satisfy defendant's prima facie burden. See e.g. Reyes v Gropper, 212 AD3d 565 (1st Dept 2023) (internal citations omitted).¹

Accordingly, here, defendant has established his initial burden as movant by demonstrating, prima facie, that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident. Through defendant's affirmation, he has demonstrated that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law by violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126(a) and/or Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a). Specifically, as defendant was making a left turn onto Shore Road in the proper lane, plaintiff unexpectedly left her lane of travel and crossed over the double line into opposing traffic to maneuver around a stopped vehicle, thereby colliding with defendant's vehicle. See e.g. Rivera v Corbett, 69 AD3d 916, 917 (2d Dept 2010) (internal citations omitted) ("The respondents established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Riley was lawfully operating the Corbett vehicle within her own lane of traffic when the DeJesus vehicle entered into her lane of traffic and collided with the Corbett vehicle. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the comparative negligence of the respondents"); see also Ferguson v City of New York, 209 AD3d at 982 ("Here, in support of their motion, the transit defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff violated, at a minimum, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a) and that Lucas was not at fault in the happening of the accident").

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to defendant's liability. Plaintiff did not submit an affidavit or evidentiary material and relies solely on an attorney affirmation to reconstruct the accident. This affirmation lacks any probative weight as to the happening of the accident. See e.g. Becker v Elm Air Conditioning Corp., 143 AD2d 965, 966 (2d Dept 1988) ("The affirmation by the plaintiffs' attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the facts, and which was not accompanied by any other affidavits or evidentiary proof, was insufficient").

Further, plaintiff's contention, brought only by attorney affirmation, that defendant negligently made the left turn by, for example, relying on the gesture from the uninvolved motorist, is unavailing, and does not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant was comparatively at fault. See e.g. Sirico v Beukelaer, 14 AD3d 549, 549 (2d Dept 2005) (internal citation omitted) ("The affirmation of the plaintiff's attorney lacked probative weight and could not raise a triable issue of fact. Mere speculation that the defendant may have failed to take some unspecified measures to avoid the accident, or in some other way contributed to the occurrence of the accident, was insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment"). oreover, defendant did not only rely on the gesture from the uninvolved motorist but affirmed that "[a]fter looking and observing that traffic was clear, I began the left turn onto the northbound lanes of Shore Road."

"The emergency doctrine provides that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context." Fergile v Payne, 202 AD3d 928, 930 (2d Dept 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, plaintiff asserts, by attorney affirmation, that her conduct of crossing the centerline, may be fully excused under the emergency doctrine. However, this argument is misplaced. Counsel avers that plaintiff was confronted simultaneously with an uninvolved vehicle suddenly stopping and obstructing her lane of travel and defendant's vehicle suddenly entering the roadway directly into her path. However, again, defendant affirmed that he saw the stopped vehicle as he exited the gas station, and then plaintiff attempted to pass it by swerving around it across the double line. Even if the uninvolved vehicle did stop suddenly, the emergency doctrine is not applicable because plaintiff should have left sufficient room between her car and the uninvolved motorist in front and was not confronted by a sudden and unexpected circumstance which left little time for thought.

Finally, defendant's motion is not premature, as plaintiff "failed to establish that discovery might lead to relevant evidence, or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion . . . were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendants." Nicola v Nicolas, 208 AD3d 791, 792 (2d Dept 2022).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. Amazon did not move for summary judgment, but as noted, also seeks to have the complaint dismissed. The Court has searched the record and is awarding the nonmoving defendants summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that any liability to plaintiff would be vicarious, through defendant as its employee. As defendant established that he was not at fault for the happening of the accident, Amazon bears no liability to plaintiff as a matter of law.

All other arguments raised on this motion and evidence submitted by the parties in connection thereto have been considered by this court notwithstanding the specific absence of reference thereto.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant James Vilamel's motion, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety as against said defendant, with costs and disbursements to said defendant as taxed by the Clerk of the Court, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly in favor of said defendant; and it is further

ORDERED that the complaint is also dismissed against nonmovant defendants Amazon.com Services LLC and Amazon Logistics, Inc.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Case dismissed.

Dated: August 3, 2026

White Plains, New York

HON. WILLIAM J. GIACOMO, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Similarly, plaintiff challenges the authenticity of the dashcam video, but relies on it to allege that defendant was using his cell phone. Defendant affirmed that he was not distracted by a mobile phone or any device when the incident occurred. The Court has reviewed the video. Although the defendant did briefly pick up his phone at some point during the video, this took place prior to when the accident unfolded. The remainder of the video depicts defendant waiting to make a left turn and then being suddenly struck by plaintiff's vehicle.

William J. Giacomo, J.