Joseph Austerlitz, Petitioner, v. RUBEN AUSTERLITZ MAYER AUSTERLITZ YEKUSIEL AUSTERLITZ JEREMY ROSENBERG (2026)

The following papers, numbered 1-4, and oral argument on June 29, 2026 were read and considered in connection with Petitioner's Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an Order (1) granting a preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining Respondents and any person acting on their behalf from selling, transferring, conveying, encumbering, performing construction upon, or otherwise altering the unimproved portion of the property located at 72 Washington Avenue, Spring Valley, New York, as more specifically identified in Petitioner's moving papers; (2) together with such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper; and also read and considered in connection with Respondent's Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2) for an Order: (i) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511, vacating and setting aside an arbitration award sought to be confirmed in this proceeding upon the grounds that such award is violative of public policy; (ii) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511, vacating and setting aside the aforementioned award upon the grounds that the award is so imperfectly executed that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to arbitration was not issued; (iii) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(7), dismissing Petitioner's action/proceeding against all Respondents; (iv) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(5), dismissing Petitioner's proceeding against all Respondents; and (v) for such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable and proper:

PAPERS NUMBERED

Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Affirmation of Joseph Austerlitz/ Affirmation of Jeremy M. Doberman, Esq. re: emergency/Affirmation of Jeremy Doberman, Esq. in Support of Order to Show Cause/Exhibits A-O 1

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2)/Affirmation of Jeremy Rosenberg, Esq./Exhibit A-E 1

Affirmation of Joseph Austerlitz, Esq./Affirmation of Yaakov Yosef Breuer/Affirmation of Jeremy M. Doberman, Esq./Exhibits A-E 2

Affirmation of Jeremy Rosenberg, Esq. in Reply 3

Letter to Court from Jeremy M. Doberman, Esq. dated June 30, 2026 4

BACKGROUND

This is a hybrid special proceeding and plenary action  ¹ concerning a dispute between two brothers over a parcel of real property located in the Village of New Square, Rockland County, and over the validity and enforceability of a Rabbinical Court award resolving that dispute.

The matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Hybrid Summons and Complaint/Petition and Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1) seeking an award of reasonable attorney's fees, costs and disbursements in avoiding the transfer of the subject property pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 276-a, a judgment against "Conflicted Counsel" and "Reuven's Sons" for aiding and abetting fraud, for confirmation of the Rabbincal Court's Final Judgment as an arbitration award pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510 as to Respondent Reuven Austerlitz, and a preliminary injunction Compelling Respondent Reuven Austerlitz to participate in the subdivision consistent with the ruling of the Rabbincal Court and remove liens from the property. The matter is also before the Court as to Respondents' motion, filed (Motion Sequence No. 2), seeking: (i) vacatur of the Final Judgment issued by the Rabbinical Court of New Square (hereinafter "Beth Din" or "Rabbinical Court") dated July 15, 2025, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511; (ii) dismissal of the petition and complaint pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7); and (iii) such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

The real property at issue is located at 72 Washington Avenue, New Square, New York (hereinafter the "Property"). The Property contains two distinct sections: a front portion improved by a single-family dwelling, and the back portion, which is unimproved (hereinafter the "Disputed Parcel"). The Property was originally owned by Jacob Austerlitz, the deceased father of Petitioner Joseph Austerlitz (hereinafter "Joseph") and Respondent Reuven Austerlitz (hereinafter "Reuven"). The Property was conveyed from Jacob's estate to Reuven approximately two decades ago. The estate has been fully administered.

Prior to Jacob's death, Joseph and Reuven reached an agreement — and, over time, a series of evolving agreements — under which Joseph was to receive certain rights in the Disputed Parcel. Among the terms alleged: that Reuven would build a house on the Disputed Parcel for Joseph in exchange for permitting Reuven's son-in-law to occupy a portion of it; and that, when Reuven failed to perform, the parties subsequently agreed that Reuven would instead purchase Joseph's interest for fair value. Reuven declined to perform under either arrangement.

Ultimately, Joseph summoned Reuven to a rabbinical court to arbitrate their dispute. Reuven accepted the invitation to arbitrate but designated the Rabbinical Court of New Square — known as the Mishpetei Tzedek of New Square — as the forum. In or about June 2024, the parties, through duly appointed agents, executed an arbitration agreement vesting in the Rabbinical Court jurisdiction over their dispute regarding the Property. Critically, the arbitration agreement crossed out the provision in the Rabbinical Court's standard form that would have authorized the panel to consider Jacob Austerlitz's intent without a written will. The arbitration was thus expressly confined to issues of contract and agreement between the brothers — not inheritance.

The Beth Din, composed of three rabbinical judges, held hearings commencing June 20, 2024. It issued a series of rulings: a First Judgment on August 7, 2024, awarding three-quarters of the Disputed Parcel to Joseph and one-quarter to Reuven; an Addendum on December 18, 2024, clarifying that Reuven's one-quarter interest could take the form of either a legal fractional interest or a right to one-quarter of the profits of the Disputed Parcel at Joseph's discretion, and placing on Reuven the obligation to pursue subdivision or otherwise implement the division; and a Final Judgment on July 15, 2025, confirming the foregoing and cautioning Reuven, on pain of contempt, against relying on subsequently asserted ownership claims by his sons to obstruct implementation. Paragraph 7 of the Final Judgment noted that an "exact calculation" of a tax payment owed by Joseph to Reuven on a counterclaim had not yet been reached because the necessary documentation had not been submitted by Reuven.

Parallel to the Beth Din proceedings, Respondents Mayer Austerlitz and Yekusiel Austerlitz — sons of Reuven — commenced an Article 75 proceeding before the Hon. Hal B. Greenwald, J.S.C. under Index No. 036008/2025 (hereinafter the "Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding"), seeking confirmation of an award issued by a separate rabbinical tribunal. In that proceeding, Reuven's sons claimed to own the Property based on a purported tax foreclosure sale and subsequent repurchase from a third-party buyer. Jeremy Rosenberg, Esq. — now named as a Respondent herein — represented both Reuven in connection with Beth Din proceedings and Reuven's sons in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding. On December 15, 2025, Justice Greenwald confirmed the award in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding. Joseph was not named as a party therein; upon learning of the proceeding after the return date had passed, he sought an adjournment through counsel, which was opposed by Rosenberg on the ground that Joseph "lacks any legally cognizable interest in the arbitration or its outcome" and directed Joseph to pursue his claims "in a separate plenary action." No adjournment was granted.

Joseph filed the instant hybrid action seeking: (i) confirmation of the Beth Din's Final Judgment pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510; (ii) voidance of the August 2025 transfer of the Property from Reuven to his sons as a fraudulent conveyance under Debtor and Creditors Law § 273; and (iii) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. Respondents have moved to vacate the award and dismiss all claims.

DISCUSSION

I. THE AFFIRMATION OF RABBI YAAKOV YOSEF BREUER IS STRICKEN

Respondents contend, in their reply memorandum, that the affirmation of Rabbi Yaakov Yosef Breuer — a member of the three-judge Rabbinical Court panel that adjudicated the parties' dispute — filed in opposition to Respondent's motion (Motion Seq. No. 2) must be stricken as inadmissible.

Respondents are correct. The doctrine of functus officio holds that, upon issuance of a final arbitration award, the arbitrators relinquish all authority over the subject matter of the proceeding. See American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v Allied Capital Corp., 35 NY3d 64 [2020]. New York courts have long declined to permit arbitrators to explain, supplement, or defend their determinations through post-award submissions. See Martin Weiner Co. v Fred Freund Co., 2 AD2d 341, 341 [1st Dept 1956] ("An arbitrator should not be called upon to give a reason for his decision"). In a proceeding under Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 75, the Court's inquiry is confined to the award itself and the statutory grounds enumerated in Civil Practice Law and Rules §§ 7510 and 7511; the Court may not probe the deliberative processes, motivations, or reasoning of the arbitral panel.

The Breuer affirmation is squarely the type of post-award submission that the functus officio doctrine is designed to preclude. It purports to characterize the nature of the dispute before the Rabbinical Court, describe the evidence and arguments the panel received, and explain the panel's reasoning — all matters internal to the deliberative process that are not subject to post-hoc judicial inquiry. Accordingly, the Breuer affirmation is stricken and will not be considered. As explained below, however, this ruling does not affect the outcome of any issue presented, as each question is resolved on the basis of the properly admitted record, including the face of the award, the arbitration agreement, and the parties' pleadings.

II. THE AWARD IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY

Respondents contend that the Final Judgment must be vacated as violative of the established New York rule that "the distribution of an estate cannot be the subject of arbitration." Glassman v Cohen, 213 AD3d 850, 852 [2d Dept 2023]; See also Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623 [1979]. The premise of this argument — that the Beth Din adjudicated the distribution of Jacob Austerlitz's estate — is contradicted by the record.

The property at issue was conveyed from Jacob's estate to Reuven approximately twenty years before the arbitration. The estate was fully administered and closed long before any dispute was submitted to the Rabbinical Court. The property accordingly stood entirely outside any stage of estate administration when the arbitration commenced. The public policy rule prohibiting arbitration of estate distributions does not extend to disputes about property that has already passed beyond the estate and is held outright by a private party.

The very authority Respondents cite supports this conclusion. In Swislocki v Spiewak, 273 A.D. 768 [1st Dept 1947] — which, contrary to Respondents' characterization, is a First Department decision, not a Second Department one — the court held that a claim "originating in an estate but presently in a status beyond any stage of estate administration" may be arbitrated. That is precisely the posture of this dispute.

Moreover, the face of the award, read in conjunction with the arbitration agreement that is in the record, establishes that what the Beth Din adjudicated was not an inheritance dispute but a contract dispute. The parties' arbitration agreement — which was executed by duly appointed agents — expressly crossed out the provision of the Rabbinical Court's standard form that would have authorized the panel to consider Jacob's intent without a written will. The parties thereby contractually confined the arbitral scope to issues of agreement and obligation between themselves. The award, on its face, resolves claims and counterclaims arising from the brothers' dealings with each other: whether Reuven made an enforceable promise to Joseph, whether Joseph performed, and whether Reuven breached. These are contractual questions.

It is true that Petitioner's complaint and petition contain background allegations referencing Jacob's expressed wishes as the genesis of the parties' dealings. Background context does not transform the nature of what was actually arbitrated. The arbitration agreement, the award itself, and Joseph's own affirmation — which clarifies that his claims before the Beth Din were founded on breach of contract principles under Jewish law, not inheritance — uniformly establish that the substance of the arbitration was a contract dispute. The public policy prohibition against arbitration of estate distributions is not implicated.

III. THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY FINAL AND DEFINITE TO PERMIT CONFIRMATION

Respondents argue that the Final Judgment is not a "final and definite" award within the meaning of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511(b)(iii), pointing to paragraph 7, in which the Rabbinical Court acknowledged that it had "not yet reached an exact calculation" of the amount Joseph would owe Reuven in connection with Reuven's counterclaim for tax reimbursement. The Court disagrees.

The governing legal standard is not in dispute. The Second Department has held that an award "is final, and may be vacated or confirmed, when it finally and conclusively disposes of a separate and independent claim, even though it does not dispose of all of the claims that were submitted to arbitration." Wendt v Bond Factor Co., LLC, 169 AD3d 808, 810 [2d Dept 2019] (emphasis added); See also Muller v Wertzberger, 39 Misc 3d 1237(A) [Sup. Ct. Kings County 2013]; Vitra, Inc. v Ninety-Five Madison Co., L.P., 2020 NY. Slip Op. 32389(U) [Sup. Ct. NY County 2020]. An award need not resolve every issue submitted to constitute a confirmable final determination as to the issues it does resolve.

The Final Judgment — read together with the First Judgment and the Addendum, which it incorporates — finally and conclusively determined the primary subject of the arbitration: the parties' respective rights in the Disputed Parcel. Joseph was awarded three-quarters and Reuven retained one-quarter. That determination is complete, definite, and capable of enforcement.

The open item in paragraph 7 — an unresolved calculation of Joseph's tax reimbursement obligation to Reuven — arises from a counterclaim that Reuven himself prosecuted. It remains open not because the arbitration was incomplete as to Joseph's claims, but because Reuven failed to submit the documentation necessary to quantify his own counterclaim. A party cannot exploit his own failure to produce evidence in support of a counterclaim to defeat confirmation of an award that fully resolved his adversary's independent claims against him.

Respondents rely on In re Kowaleski (New York State Dep't of Correctional Services), 16 N3d 85 [2010], but that case is distinguishable. In Kowaleski, the Court of Appeals vacated an award because the arbitrator refused to consider and separately determine an affirmative defense that a governing statute expressly required be adjudicated as part of the award. The deficiency there was not a party's failure to prosecute a claim, but the arbitrator's failure to address a legally mandated issue. No comparable statutory command is implicated here. The open tax calculation is a free-standing counterclaim, not an unresolved defense bearing on the validity or completeness of the award as to Joseph's claims.

The Final Judgment is final and definite within the meaning of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511(b)(iii) to the extent it determines Joseph's ownership interest in the Disputed Parcel and imposes on Reuven the obligation to effectuate the division of the Property.

IV. THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE CAUSE OF ACTION SURVIVES

A. The Claim Is Timely

Respondents contend that Joseph's fraudulent conveyance cause of action accrued in March 2006, when Jacob's estate conveyed the Property to Reuven, making the claim time-barred under the six-year limitation period applicable to such claims. This argument is meritless.

Joseph's pleading expressly identifies the August 2025 transfer of the Property from Reuven to his sons Mayer and Yekusiel Austerlitz as the challenged conveyance. That transfer is alleged to have been made without fair consideration and with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Joseph's right to enforce the Beth Din's impending judgment. The 2006 transfer from Jacob's estate to Reuven appears in the pleadings as historical context; it is not the subject of any fraudulent conveyance claim. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(5), the Court must accept the allegations of the pleading as true. Respondents may not defeat a timely claim by substituting a fictitious one of their own invention. The cause of action, premised on a transfer occurring in August 2025, is timely.

B. The Current Statute Is Properly Pleaded

Respondents argue that the fraudulent conveyance claim is defectively pleaded because the complaint fails to allege that the challenged transfer rendered any Respondent insolvent. This argument rests on the former Debtor and Creditor Law § 273, which did contain an insolvency element. That statute no longer exists.

The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act ("UVTA") became effective in New York on April 4, 2020, repealing the former fraudulent conveyance provisions and enacting a new Debtor and Creditor Law § 273 as part of a comprehensive statutory overhaul. The current Debtor and Creditor Law § 273 contains no standalone insolvency requirement. Respondents' argument on this point is frivolous, resting as it does on a statute that the Legislature repealed more than five years ago.

In their reply, Respondents raise a related contention: that Joseph lacks "creditor" status under the UVTA because the Beth Din's award was unconfirmed at the time of the challenged transfer. This argument also fails. The UVTA defines "creditor" as one who has a "claim," and defines "claim" to encompass rights to payment even if contingent, unmatured, unliquidated, or disputed. See Debtor Creditor Law § 270. An unconfirmed arbitration award is a cognizable "claim" within this broad definition. Significantly, the Final Judgment was issued on July 15, 2025, and the challenged transfer from Reuven to his sons was made in August 2025, after the award. Joseph therefore possessed a "claim" within the meaning of the UVTA before the transfer was made. The fraudulent conveyance cause of action is sufficiently pleaded and survives dismissal.

V. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DO NOT BAR THIS ACTION

Respondents contend that the instant action is precluded by the Decision and Order of this Court (per Justice Greenwald) dated December 15, 2025, confirming the award in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding, Index No. 036008/2025. For the following independent reasons, each of which standing alone is sufficient, these contentions are rejected.

A. Judicial Estoppel

The doctrine of judicial estoppel "precludes a party from taking a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to that which it took in a prior proceeding, simply because its interests have changed." See Flanders v E.W. Howell Co., 193 AD3d 822, 823 [2d Dept 2021]. In the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding, Jeremy Rosenberg — acting as counsel for Mayer and Yekusiel Austerlitz — successfully argued that Joseph "is not a party to the instant proceeding, was not a party to the underlying arbitration and thus, has no standing to request any adjournment" and that he "lacks any legally cognizable interest in the arbitration or its outcome." Rosenberg directed Joseph to pursue any interest he might have "in a separate plenary action." That position prevailed: no adjournment was granted, and the award was confirmed without Joseph's participation.

Respondents now argue in this separate plenary action — the very proceeding Rosenberg told Joseph he must bring — that Joseph was required to intervene in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding and that his failure to do so bars his claims. Respondents cannot occupy both positions. Having induced Joseph's non-participation by successfully arguing that he had no cognizable interest in the prior proceeding and no standing to be heard, Respondents are judicially estopped from using his non-participation against him in this action.

B. Absence of Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate

Collateral estoppel operates only where the party against whom preclusion is sought had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in the prior proceeding. See Villaver v. Paglinawan, 230 AD3d 533 [2d Dept 2024]. That standard is not satisfied here by any measure. Joseph was not named as a party in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding. He was not served. He had no notice of the proceeding until after the return date had already passed. His counsel timely sought an adjournment to prepare opposition papers. Respondents opposed it; and the Court record does not reflect that any adjournment was granted. A litigant who was affirmatively excluded from a proceeding — through his adversary's own deliberate litigation strategy of keeping him out — cannot be held to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

C. Non-Party Status

Res judicata bars future litigation "between the same parties or those in privity with the parties." Winkler v Weiss, 294 AD2d 428 [2d Dept 2002]. Joseph was not a party to the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding. Respondents identify no cognizable basis for finding privity between Joseph and the parties to that proceeding. The involvement of the same property does not, without more, create the identity of parties necessary to extend preclusive effect to a stranger to the proceeding.

D. Fraud on the Court

Even if the procedural predicates for claim preclusion were otherwise satisfied — and they are not — Joseph's allegations that the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding was procured through fraud on the court would defeat the preclusion argument at the pleading stage. "A judgment entered through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct practiced on the court is a nullity and is subject to collateral attack." See Hernandez v Am. Transit Ins. Co., 2 AD3d 584, 585 [2d Dept 2003]. Joseph alleges, with specificity, that the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding was prosecuted by counsel simultaneously representing adverse parties in a coordinated scheme to undermine a legitimate arbitration award; that the underlying "arbitration" was a fabricated proceeding using a purported "rabbinical court" whose legitimacy the New Square Rabbinical Court itself repudiated; and that the factual narrative offered to this Court — including an account of a tax foreclosure that the public land records do not support — was false. These are serious allegations. See Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp. v Sorrento Cheese Co., 62 AD2d 1015 [2d Dept 1978]. They cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

VI. THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED

Respondents argue that Joseph's cause of action for injunctive relief must be dismissed for failure to allege irreparable harm, on the theory that any harm to Joseph can be remedied through monetary compensation. This argument cannot be sustained under governing authority.

The Second Department has consistently held that the threatened conveyance or encumbrance of unique real property constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law. See Kelley v Garuda, 36 AD3d 593, 596 [2d Dept 2007] ("It is clear that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury should the defendants sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the property"); Church of God Pentecostal Fountain of Love, MI v Iglesia de Dios Pentecostal, MI, 27 AD3d 685, 687 [2d Dept 2006]. The Disputed Parcel — a specific unimproved lot in New Square — is unique real property. Joseph's cause of action for injunctive relief is adequately pleaded.

Respondents' reliance on Berman v. Sosman, 243 AD3d 755, 758 [2d Dept 2025], for the proposition that monetary compensation is an adequate remedy, does not alter this conclusion. That principle operates where the harm in question is economic in character. Where, as here, the subject matter is unique real property, the Second Department's settled authority recognizes irreparable harm as a matter of law. The motion to dismiss the injunctive relief cause of action is denied.

VII. THE CLAIMS AGAINST JEREMY ROSENBERG SURVIVE DISMISSAL

Respondents argue that all claims against Jeremy Rosenberg must be dismissed because the complaint does not allege conduct independent of his role as counsel. Under New York law, an attorney acting within the scope of legitimate representation is generally not liable to the adversary party absent allegations of independent fraud, malicious conduct, or tortious participation separate from legal advocacy.

The Court is not persuaded that this doctrine compels dismissal on the allegations presented here. Joseph alleges that Rosenberg simultaneously represented Reuven Austerlitz in connection with the Beth Din proceedings and represented Reuven's sons in the Fraudulent Conveyance Proceeding brought against Reuven — clients whose interests were directly adverse to each other— in a coordinated effort to undermine the Beth Din's legitimate award and deprive Joseph of his rights. These allegations, accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, describe conduct that goes beyond ordinary zealous advocacy. Representing directly adverse parties in a scheme to manipulate litigation outcomes — if proven — would not be shielded from liability by the attorney immunity doctrine, which protects legitimate legal representation, not concerted tortious misconduct.

Whether Petitioner can ultimately establish the facts alleged is a question for another day. At the pleading stage, the claims against Rosenberg are not amenable to summary dismissal. The motion to dismiss those claims is denied without prejudice to renewal upon a more developed record.

VIII. THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS CONFIRMED AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED

Having denied the motion to vacate and finding no basis to dismiss the petition, the Court turns to Petitioner's affirmative application in the third cause of action of the Hybrid Complaint/Petition to confirm the Final Judgment under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510 and his motion for a preliminary injunction.

Under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510, the Court "shall confirm" a timely application for confirmation of an arbitration award "unless the award is vacated or modified upon a ground specified in section 7511." This application is timely. As this Court has determined, no ground for vacatur under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511 has been sustained. The Final Judgment is therefore confirmed to the extent it determines that Joseph Austerlitz is entitled to three-quarters of the Disputed Parcel located at 72 Washington Avenue, New Square, New York, and that Reuven Austerlitz retains one-quarter — which may, at Joseph's election, constitute either a legal fractional interest or a right to profits from one-quarter of the Disputed Parcel — with Reuven bearing the obligation to pursue subdivision or otherwise effectuate the division of the Property.

As to the preliminary injunction, Joseph has demonstrated the elements required for injunctive relief: (i) a likelihood of success on the merits, established by the confirmed award; (ii) irreparable harm, established as a matter of law by the threatened loss of unique real property; and (iii) a balance of equities in his favor, given that the confirmed award establishes his property interest and Respondents have employed a series of procedural maneuvers designed to frustrate enforcement of that interest. The preliminary injunction is accordingly granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the affirmation of Rabbi Yaakov Yosef Breuer (NYSCEF Doc. No. 62) is stricken as inadmissible pursuant to the functus officio doctrine and the prohibition under New York law against probing the deliberative processes of arbitrators, and shall not be accorded any evidentiary weight in this proceeding; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondents' motion (Motion Seq. No. 2) to vacate the Final Judgment of the Rabbinical Court of New Square dated July 15, 2025, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the petition and complaint pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7) (Motion Seq. No. 2) is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner's application to confirm the Final Judgment of the Rabbinical Court of New Square dated July 15, 2025, (Third Cause of Action of the Hybrid Complaint/Petition), pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510, is GRANTED; the award of three-quarters of the Disputed Parcel — being the back portion of the real property located at 72 Washington Avenue, New Square, New York — to Petitioner Joseph Austerlitz is hereby confirmed, together with Reuven Austerlitz's obligation to pursue subdivision or otherwise implement the division in accordance with the terms of the award, and Reuven's retention of a one-quarter interest (legal or equitable, at Petitioner's election); and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction (Motion Sequence No. 1) is GRANTED; during the pendency of this action, Respondents and all persons acting in concert or participation with them are hereby enjoined and restrained from selling, conveying, mortgaging, encumbering, or otherwise transferring or alienating the real property located at 72 Washington Avenue, New Square, New York (including the Disputed Parcel and the improved front portion thereof), and from taking any action to interfere with Petitioner's rights in the Disputed Parcel as determined by the confirmed Final Judgment; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining issues in this action — including but not limited to Respondent Reuven Austerlitz's unresolved counterclaim for tax reimbursement arising from the Beth Din proceedings, and the plenary claims for fraudulent conveyance (First and Second Causes of Action of the Hybrid Complaint/Petition) and injunctive relief (Fourth Cause of Action of the Hybrid Complaint/Petition) — shall proceed to discovery and further proceedings; the parties shall appear for a preliminary conference on August 11, 2026 at 9:30 a.m.; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner's counsel shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon all parties via NYSCEF within seven (7) days of entry, with notice of entry.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 4, 2026

New City, New York

HON. JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner commenced the instant hybrid action with the filing of a "Hybrid Verified Complaint and Petition" raising four (4) causes of action — 1st Cause of Action — Avoidance of Transfer Pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 273, 2md Cause of Action — Aiding and Abetting Fraud against Reuven's Sons and Conflicted Counsel, 3rd Cause of Action — Confirmation of Award pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510 against Reuven, and 4th Cause of Action — Injunction. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 2.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.