MAHONEY v. VILLAGE OF SPRINGVILLE (2025)

DECISION

PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND BACKGROUND HISTORY OF PROCEEDING

This is a hybrid special proceeding under CPLR Article 78 brought by petitioner to have his termination from employment with the respondent on August 16, 2024, set aside as an error of law, arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of discretion in violation of a proper reading and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties (the “CBA” including the Employee Handbook [the “Handbook”] which is incorporated and included by reference therein) and for related civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations intertwined with the grounds specified by the respondent as the “just cause” basis for the termination. The grounds for the termination were set forth in a Notice of Charges and Charges with enumerated “Specifications” in support of each of the Charges which explicitly identified the alleged behavior of the petitioner and sections or portions of the CBA and/or the Handbook which respondent was relying upon as the “just cause” basis to terminate the petitioner. The Notice of Charges and Charges with its supporting Specifications is 31 pages in length, with 122 individual “Specification” paragraphs, specifying the alleged events and/or conduct by the petitioner comprising “incompetence” (36 specifications), “insubordination” (36 specifications), “misconduct” (42 specifications) and “dishonesty” (8 specifications). Dkt. No. 7.

The proceeding was commenced with the filing of a co-captioned “Notice of Petition and Summons,” with a “Verified Petition and Complaint,” and supporting exhibits on December 14, 2024. Dkt. Nos. 1-7. Three (3) separate but nearly identical affidavits of service (one for each of the named or captioned respondents) were filed on December 28, 2024, setting forth the delivery of the pleadings on December 20, 2024, by a process server to an individual employed by and working at what turned out to be the Town of Concord Town Hall for the purpose of completing what the process server believed to be some form of “one-shoe fits all” service upon all of the separately and individually named respondents through this one- person drop-off. Dkt. Nos. 10-12.

The record is clear and undisputed (and judicial notice is so given) that the public entity respondent, Village of Springville (the “Village”), is a duly constituted political subdivision of the State of New York․separate and distinct from its neighboring community, the Town of Concord (the “Town”), which is also a wholly separate political subdivision. It is further undisputed that the Village maintains and conducts its official public business and affairs at a Village Hall located at 5 West Main Street, Springville, New York, and the Town maintains and conducts its official public business and affairs from a Town Hall located at 86 Franklin Street, Springville, New York, Concord, New York.

The affidavits of service set forth that the process server allegedly delivered and “served” an individual he affirmatively described as a “Deputy Town Clerk” at 5 West Main Street, Springville, New York. The identity and specific public employment status of the individual who received the papers delivered by the process server (in what appears to be his own handwriting) was notated to be and has been indisputably confirmed to be one Laura Safford, Deputy Town Clerk for the Town of Concord. See Dkt. Nos. 10-12 and 62. There is no evidence or inference from any of the filed papers that Ms. Safford held herself out or represented herself to the process server as holding any dual or some other form of co-terminus public office or position with the Village. Indeed, the process server affirmatively described the person served as a “Deputy Town Clerk.” Contradictory to the content of the affidavits of service, however, Ms. Safford affirmed that she was at the Town Hall at 86 Franklin Street when she received these papers, not at 5 West Main Street as alleged in the affidavits of service.¹ Out of a sense of professional courtesy (and commendable public duty), Ms. Safford did make a call to the Village offices and spoke to a “Clerk Typist” to inform them that “papers” naming and addressed to the Village had been dropped off at the Town Hall, and the Village thereafter sent another “Clerk Typist” to pick up the papers. See the affirmation of Ms. Safford (Dkt. No.62, ¶¶ 8-9).²

Respondents filed their Verified Answer (Dkt. No. 13) with a supporting affirmation from the Village Attorney (Dkt. No 14), along with accompanying exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 15-49) and a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 50), all in support of multiple “defenses” to dismiss the entire proceeding on grounds customarily set forth under CPLR Rule 3211 (a), starting with defective service of process and then challenging the legal sufficiency of the substantive claims made in the petition. Petitioner replied to respondents' opposing/moving papers by way of an affirmation of counsel (Dkt. No. 51), with accompanying exhibits (Dkt. Nos 52-59) and a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 60).

The initial return date with respect to the Article 78 special proceeding branch of the relief sought by the petitioner was adjourned by mutual agreement of counsel to accommodate the aforesaid filings and was held on May 1, 2025. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court afforded both parties 30 days to serve any post-appearance papers (closing argument briefs, letters, etc.) which were timely served. Dkt. Nos. 61, 62 (respondent's filings); Dkt. Nos. 63, 64 (petitioner's filings).

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON GROUNDS OF DEFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL SUSTAINABILITY OF PROCEEDING

Before addressing the substantive issues laid out and thoroughly briefed by both parties, the Court must address the question of whether the proceeding survives respondents' first defense of lack of personal jurisdiction as grounds to dismiss for the alleged defective service of petitioner's papers. Petitioner has answered said defense with a responding request for the Court to deem the papers “served” because they were eventually actually received by the Village, or alternatively, to extend the time for the petitioner to re-serve the papers based on “good cause shown or in the interest of justice” pursuant to CPLR § 306-b, notwithstanding the lapse of the applicable statute of limitations under CPLR § 217 (a).

The Court's view on this aspect of the case is, (i) the service of process performed (or better characterized as “attempted”) on the Village was entirely non-compliant with the requirements of CPLR § 311 (a) (6) (see Matter of Country Side Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Town of Pomfret Zoning Bd. Of Appeals, 57 AD3d 1501 [4th Dept. 2008]; Buenos Hill v. City of Saratoga Springs, 223 AD3d 1030 [3rd Dept. 2024]) and would typically require the respondent's defense to dismiss on said grounds to be granted as a matter of law; but, (ii) petitioner's affirmative responsive request to be given an extension of time to re-serve respondent(s) in the interest of justice pursuant to CPLR § 306-b) (though not formally made as a motion or more technically as a cross-motion, see Nelson v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 188 AD3d 692 [2nd Dept. 2020]) is GRANTED IN PART notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations (Buster v. Corbett, 259 AD2d 13 [4th Dept. 1999]). Under the facts of this case, particularly the extensive interactions of the respondent(s) with the petitioner serving as the basis for and giving rise to the legal proceeding at issue herein, “the absence of prejudice to defendants [respondents]” and co-extensive result that “it would be unjust to deprive the plaintiff [petitioner] of the opportunity to prove her [his] claims,” id. at 17, the respondents' defense “motion” to dismiss on lack of personal jurisdiction grounds is denied without prejudice, conditioned on Petitioner completing re-service of his pleading papers within 15 days from the date of the filing and uploading of an Order in furtherance of this Decision pursuant to Uniform Rule 202.48 and service of said order with notice of entry in accordance with Uniform Rule 202.5-b (h) (2), failing which the motion to dismiss will be granted nunc pro tunc.

Based on the foregoing the Court's issuance of a final determination on the core substantive issues raised in the pleadings and submissions is RESERVED pending the satisfactory re-serving of the notice of petition/summons and the petition/complaint with proof of proper service on all the respondents as required for each of them.³ The respondent(s) shall be given 20 days to answer or move against the re-served pleading in such a manner as they deem to be necessary and desired, including but limited to any new grounds based on any alleged failure to properly re-serve the respondent(s), and to bring such matter back before the Court for motion argument. Alternatively, at their sole option, respondent(s) may inform the Court that they will rely upon the papers (the verified answer, affirmations, all exhibits and memorandum of law) previously filed to seek dismissal of the substantive claims/causes of action made in the re-served verified petition/complaint. If so advised by respondent(s) of their choice to exercise the optional response, no further papers will be accepted from the petitioner, the pleading record will be deemed closed, and the Court will render a final determination on said submission.

Submit order accordingly.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The discord between the address written in the affidavits of service and Ms. Safford's conflicting statement of her physical whereabouts when the pleading papers were left with her would typically require a traverse hearing, but in this case that undertaking is irrelevant and unnecessary.

2.   There is no affidavit of service showing that any of the individually named respondents were separately served.

3.   Petitioner may leave the return date in the notice of petition blank pending respondent(s) response, infra.

John J. DelMonte, J.