People of the State of New York ex Rel. Gregory Chang, Esq., on behalf of William Fero, Petitioner, v. LYNELLE MAGINLEY LIDDIE (2026)

Petitioner William Fero was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) based on allegations that he violated specific conditions of release during his community supervision. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus to contest the legality of his detention. This court had ordered petitioner's temporary release pursuant to CPLR 7009 (e) pending final disposition of this habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner challenges the securing order issued by the recognizance court. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the writ is DISMISSED.

A recognizance hearing was held on December 4, 2025. The court liaison officer, appearing on behalf of DOCCS, argued for remand, citing petitioner's arrest history. Specifically, the officer referenced a recent arrest on October 12, 2025, for criminal mischief in the third degree and criminal obstruction of breathing. In addition, the officer noted that petitioner faced a pending case in Manhattan, related to an earlier arrest on January 24, 2024, in which petitioner was charged with burglary in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property, and petit larceny.

Petitioner's attorney argued against remand, noting that petitioner was not charged with absconding, missed office reports, or missed curfew visits on his current term. However, petitioner's attorney acknowledged one prior sustained violation from February 2020, framing it as an instance of reform given its age. Petitioner's attorney also acknowledged the violation charges in supplementary violation of release report No. 3, which the court liaison officer had mentioned. When asked about petitioner's open case in Manhattan, petitioner's attorney indicated that petitioner had attended most of his court dates but acknowledged that a bench warrant was issued in February of that year.

At the end of the hearing, the recognizance court remanded petitioner. In remanding petitioner, the recognizance court stated that petitioner had an obligation to abide by his conditions of community supervision. The recognizance court noted petitioner's open case in Manhattan and his newest open case in the Bronx.

Petitioner now contends that the detention order issued at the recognizance hearing is invalid because the recognizance court failed to properly apply the governing statutory standard.

Habeas corpus may test the lawfulness of detention under a recognizance court's securing order. After a recognizance hearing, detention rests on the recognizance court's securing order, not merely on the parole warrant (People ex rel. Lotze v Annucci, 219 AD3d 1102, 1105 [3d Dept 2023]). By analogy habeas review of a criminal court's securing order is as limited as habeas review of a recognizance court's securing order (compare Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi] [enumerating criteria for recognizance court determination], with CPL 510.10 [1] [enumerating analogous criteria for bail determinations]). The habeas court may not examine the detention question afresh or substitute its own judgment (People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497, 501 [1969] [limiting habeas review of bail to whether constitutional or statutory standards were violated]; People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230, 232-233 [1979] [confining habeas review to the record before the bail court]). The same limited review applies by analogy to a recognizance court's securing order, which is a judicial determination governed by statutory criteria (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]).

Habeas relief does not lie where the securing order is "supported by the record" and "rest[s] on a rational basis" (People ex rel. Parker v Hasenauer, 62 NY2d 777, 778-779 [1984] [applying the rule to a bail securing order]; People ex rel. Fischetti v Brann, 166 AD3d 29, 39 [1st Dept 2018] [denying habeas relief where the bail court considered the statutory factors and the record supported detention]). The inquiry is whether the recognizance court complied with the statutory and constitutional limits governing detention, including by making the required findings, providing a reviewable explanation, and reaching a determination with rational record support (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]; cf. People ex rel. Shapiro v Keeper of City Prison, 290 NY 393, 399 [1943] [holding that habeas review of a bail order asks whether the securing court acted "without reason or for reasons insufficient in law"]).

Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi] requires that before detaining a releasee, the recognizance court must find that there is a substantial risk the releasee will willfully fail to appear at the preliminary or final revocation hearings, and that no non-monetary condition or combination of conditions in the community will reasonably assure the releasee's future appearance. In making these determinations, the court must also consider all available evidence regarding the releasee's employment, family and community ties (including length of residency in the community), history of timely reporting to a supervision officer, and other indicators of stability. Although the recognizance hearing does not adjudicate the alleged violations themselves (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iv], [f] [viii]), evidence of alleged violations is relevant to the court's assessment under the statutory criteria. At the hearing, DOCCS is statutorily required to submit information regarding the alleged violation and the releasee's community supervision record (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v]). The recognizance court may then evaluate alleged noncompliance with supervision conditions to the extent that such evidence is pertinent to the risk of nonappearance and the sufficiency of nonmonetary conditions. In this case, both of petitioner's open criminal cases were admissible and appropriate for the court's consideration under these statutory factors, as they directly relate to petitioner's supervision record and broader stability in the community (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v]-[vi]).

On the record before the recognizance court, the findings required for detention are rationally supported (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]; cf. Parker, 62 NY2d at 778-779 [affirming denial of habeas relief where bail determination rested on rational basis in the record]). Specifically, petitioner's two recent arrests that resulted in criminal charges in New York and Bronx County, provided the court with concrete evidence of [ ]. instability and a pattern of allegedly failing to comply with the conditions of community supervision. The recognizance court also considered the issuance of a bench warrant in the Manhattan case, which directly implicated petitioner's likelihood to appear for future proceedings. Taken together, these adjudicated facts addressed both statutory prongs: first, by establishing a substantial risk that petitioner would willfully fail to appear at preliminary or final revocations hearings; and second, by demonstrating that petitioner's repeated failures to adhere to non-monetary supervision conditions made it unlikely that any non-monetary condition or set of conditions would reasonably assure his future appearance. Consequently, the recognizance court's decision to remand petitioner was rationally supported by the record, and habeas relief is therefore unwarranted (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]; cf. Parker, 62 NY2d at 779; Fischetti, 166 AD3d at 39).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and this proceeding is DISMISSED; it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioner is REMANDED to the custody of respondent and shall be detained pursuant to the securing order issued by the recognizance court in connection with parole warrant No. 829659.

Dated: July 13, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

Verena C. Powell, J.