PEOPLE v. WISNESKI (2026)

The defendant, Edward Wisneski, has submitted an omnibus motion, dated May 26, 2026, seeking: preclusion of evidence; suppression of evidence; demand for Brady and Rosario material; Sandoval/Ventimiglia/Molineux relief; inspection and release of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the indictment; and leave to file further motions. The People's response dated June 17, 2026, consents to some of the relief sought and opposes other relief. The court decides the motion as follows.

PRECLUSION OF EVIDENCE

The defendant's motion to preclude any unnoticed statements or identification evidence pursuant to CPL§§ 60.45, 710.20(3) and 710.43(3) is denied. The determination of whether such evidence has been properly noticed is referred to the discretion of the hearing and trial courts before which any such evidence comes to light.

MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

The defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered, to determine whether the defendant's statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights. The court notes the People consented to the Huntley and Dunaway hearings.

The defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is denied. The People have affirmed that no property was recovered from the defendant. With respect to the water bottle found in the complainant's vehicle, the defendant has failed to establish in his pleadings a reasonable expectation of privacy in the water bottle or the complainant's vehicle. People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99 (1996) Moreover, the defendant's act of throwing the water bottle away occurred before any police involvement. Under People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583 (1980) and People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734 (1986), property discarded prior to a seizure is not suppressible unless the abandonment is precipitated by unlawful police conduct. No such conduct occurred here.

The defendant's request for a Payton hearing is denied. The People affirm that Detective Paldino arrested the defendant following a vehicle stop for a traffic violation that occurred on Saturn Boulevard. The People specifically aver that the defendant was not arrested at or inside his home. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 12)

The defendant also moves to suppress identification evidence, asserting that any “observation [of the defendant] either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case . . . . was unduly suggestive.” The motion characterizes the police investigation — review of the dashcam footage, license-plate tracing, and subsequent arrest — as a police - arranged identification procedure requiring a Wade hearing.

The record does not support this claim. First, CPL § 710.30(1)(b) applies only when the police arrange an identification procedure — such as a lineup, show up or photographic display — at which a witness identifies the defendant. Second, the People did not serve CPL § 710.30(1)(b) notice, since there were no police arranged identification procedures.

After the complainant's windshield was struck, he immediately contacted the police and provided them with dashcam footage of the incident. Detective Paldino reviewed the footage, which depicted a white pickup truck traveling southbound at the moment the bottle was thrown. Using the footage, the detective checked a license plate reader on the Throgs Neck Bridge and located a matching vehicle traveling southbound at the relevant time. He then traced the plate to the defendant's registered address.

Here, Detective Paldino did not arrange any identification procedure. Detective Paldino did not present the defendant to a witness, request that anyone identify a suspect, or orchestrate any confrontation. The complainant on his own initiative voluntarily displayed the dashcam footage. Detective Paldino's review of the dashcam footage does not constitute an identification procedure within the meaning of CPL § 710.30(1)(b); he was simply examining evidence provided by the complainant and was part of an investigative process that led to the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for a Wade hearing is denied.

The defendant also moves to controvert a search warrant and relatedly, for a Darden hearing. The People affirm that no informants were involved in the case. Further, in the People have indicated in their certificate of compliance that no search warrant was executed in this case. Accordingly, defendant's motions to controvert a search warrant and for a Darden hearing are denied.

INSPECTION AND DISMISSAL OR REDUCTION

Defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted. The minutes reveal that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors on the law. The indictment substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in CPL § 200.50. The instructions were not defective as a matter of law and the proceedings were proper. Upon inspection of the grand jury minutes and exhibits, this court found the evidence to be legally sufficient to support all counts of the indictment, except count two.

The evidence presented to the Grand Jury consists of the complainant, one of two passengers present in the vehicle, the investigating detective, and the introduction of video and photographic exhibits.

The complainant and the passenger both testified that on August 4, 2025, at about 1:30 a.m., while traveling northbound in the opposite left lane on the Throgs Neck Bridge, a water bottle filled with liquid was thrown by a driver traveling southbound. The bottle struck and shattered the complainant's front windshield. The People introduced as an exhibit footage from the complainant's dashcam. The video captures the incident, depicting the defendant in a white pickup truck traveling southbound while the complainant's vehicle is traveling northbound in the left lane. The People also introduced a photograph depicting the physical damage to the windshield of the complainant's car.

The complainant further testified to the physical damage of the vehicle, stating: “The vehicle --- it's damaged. The windshields broke and the glasses went into my systems, and I have to replace the AC system and the fluids, the glasses damaged my face and my doors.” When asked by the prosecutor to confirm if all these different components of the vehicle had to be repaired, the complainant answered in the affirmative.

During the presentation, a Grand Juror requested clarification regarding valuation, stating: “․Verify that the damage is over․ask him the price of the damage again for the car. He said it was around 20 thousand dollars or so, I want him to verify that correctly.” In response, the complainant testified that the cost was “over 20 thousand dollars. Around 26 thousand.”

The investigating detective additionally testified that the complainant's vehicle was a Lexus. No repair invoices, itemized estimates, insurance receipts, or expert auto-body testimony were introduced.

A person is guilty of Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree when they intentionally damage the property of another person in an amount exceeding $1,500 (Penal Law § 145.10). On a motion to inspect and dismiss an indictment, the inquiry is limited to whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, establishes a prima facie case of the crime charged or any lesser included offense. (People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248 [1995]).

As a matter of statutory construction, the framework governing property valuation for criminal mischief is found in Penal Law § 155.20. Although codified within Article 155 under the heading of Larceny, Penal Law § 155.20 explicitly mandates that “For the purposes of this title, the value of property shall be ascertained as follows․”. Because Criminal Mischief (Article 145) and Larceny (Article 155) reside under Part Three, Title I of the Penal Law (“Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property”), the explicit language of Penal Law § 155.20 binds all valuation considerations within Title I.

Under Penal Law § 155.20(1), value means “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime.” When interpreting this statutory directive in the context of criminal mischief, New York courts have consistently held that the value of the damage to property must be established by evidence of the reasonable cost of repairing the property or, if the property cannot be repaired, the replacement cost thereof. (People v Beauvais, 105 AD3d 1081, 1083 [3d Dept 2013]; People v Shannon, 57 AD3d 1016 [3d Dept 2008]; People v Katovich, 238 AD2d 751 [3d Dept 1997]).

To sustain count two, Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree, the People were required to present competent, non-speculative evidence that the defendant intentionally caused damage exceeding $1,500. As discussed, valuation is governed by Penal Law § 155.20, which mandates proof of either (1) market value at the time and place of the crime, or (2) if that cannot be ascertained, the reasonable cost to repair or replacement.

Here, the complainant testified that repairs cost “over 20 thousand․around 26 thousand,” but the People introduced no repair invoices, estimates, itemized breakdowns or expert auto-body testimony. The detective's testimony that the vehicle was a Lexus did not supply a valuation basis. Accordingly, the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish any non-speculative basis from which the grand jury could reasonably infer repair costs exceeding $1,500. The complainant's conclusory estimate, standing alone and unsupported by documentation or expert explanation, is insufficient under People v Beauvais, supra at 1083, People v Shannon, supra at 1016 and People v Katovich, supra at 752, all of which require competent proof of repair cost or replacement value. Thus, the valuation element of count two, Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree, was not satisfied.

However, the photographic evidence introduced by the People depicted a large hole in the lower left portion of the shattered windshield, showing substantial structural damage. Photographs themselves constitute competent evidence of damage exceeding the $250 threshold required for Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 145.05), particularly where the damage is obvious and necessitates replacement of a major component. (See People v Garcia, 29 AD3d 255, 262-263 [1st Dept 2006]) Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the photograph of the shattered windshield provides a non-speculative basis for concluding that the cost of repairs exceeded $250., even though it does not support the higher threshold of $1,500.

Accordingly, count two, Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 145.10) is reduced to Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 145.05). The People have leave to represent count two to another grand jury. In all other respects, the defendant's motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment is denied.

The defendant's motion to release the grand jury minutes is partially moot and otherwise denied. In their Certificate of Compliance filed on March 6, 2026, the People certified that they had turned over the grand jury testimony to the defense in accordance with the requirements of CPL § 245.20(1)(b). Thus, the defendant has received the portion of grand jury transcript to which he is entitled pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(b) and his motion is moot with respect to that portion of the minutes. Otherwise, the defendant's motion is denied because release of the remainder of the grand jury minutes is not necessary to assist this court in determining defendant's motion to reduce or dismiss the indictment.

DEMAND FOR BRADY AND ROSARIO MATERIAL

As to the Brady/Rosario demand, the People are reminded of their continuing duty to provide evidence or information that is favorable to the defendant and referred to the court's standing Brady order, which appears below.

SANDOVALVENTIMIGLIA/MOLINEUX RELIEF

The defendant's request for a Sandoval/Ventimiglia/Molineux hearing and, ultimately, the preclusion of evidence of prior bad acts is referred to the trial court. The People are reminded that the disclosure of Sandoval/Ventimiglia/Molineux evidence that they intend to introduce at trial shall be made in accordance with the time frame set forth in CPL § 245.10(1)(b) and 245.20(3).

ORDER TO COUNSEL

This court issues this order as both a reminder and a directive that counsel uphold their constitutional, statutory and ethical responsibilities in the above-captioned proceeding:

To the Prosecutor:

The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case, or, if the matter is not being prosecuted by the District Attorney, the prosecuting agency and its assigned representative, is directed to make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 (1972), People v Geaslen, 54 NY2d 510 (1981), and their progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions, and pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 and Rule 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, as described hereafter.

• The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case have a duty to learn of such favorable information that is known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and should therefore confer with investigative and prosecutorial personnel who acted in this case and review their and their agencies' files directly related to the prosecution or investigation of this case.

• Favorable information could include, but is not limited to:

a) Information that impeaches the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness, including (i) benefits, promises, rewards or inducements, express or tacit, made to a witness by a law enforcement official or law enforcement victim services agency in connection with giving testimony or cooperating in the case; (ii) a witness's prior inconsistent statements, written or oral; (iii) a witness's prior convictions and uncharged criminal conduct; (iv) information that tends to show that a witness has a motive to lie to inculpate the defendant, or a bias against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution; and (v) information that tends to show impairment of a witness's ability to perceive, recall, or recount relevant events, including impairment of that ability resulting from mental or physical illness or substance abuse.

b) Information that tends to exculpate, reduce the degree of an offense, or support a potential defense to a charged offense.

c) Information that tends to mitigate the degree of the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense, or to mitigate punishment.

d) Information that tends to undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged crime, such as a non-identification of the defendant by a witness to a charged crime or an identification or other evidence implicating another person in a manner that tends to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.

e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on a suppression motion.

• Favorable information shall be disclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible form, and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

• Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States and New York State constitutional standards, and in accordance with the timing provisions of CPL article 245. The prosecutor is reminded that the obligation to disclose is a continuing one. Prosecutors should strive to determine if favorable information exists. The prosecutor shall disclose the information expeditiously upon its receipt and shall not delay disclosure if it is obtained earlier than the time period for disclosure in CPL 245.10(1).

• A protective order may be issued for good cause pursuant to CPL 245.70 with respect to disclosures required under this order.

• Failures to provide disclosure in accordance with CPL Article 245 are subject to the available remedies and sanctions for nondisclosures pursuant to CPL 245.80.

• Only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a violation of this order or be eligible to result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.

To Defense Counsel:

Defense counsel, having filed a notice of appearance in the above captioned case, is obligated under both the New York State and the United States Constitution to provide effective representation of defendant. Although the following list is not meant to be exhaustive, counsel shall remain cognizant of the obligation to:

a) Confer with the client about the case and keep the client informed about all significant developments in the case;

b) Timely communicate to the client any and all guilty plea offers, and provide reasonable advice about the advantages and disadvantages of such guilty plea offers and about the potential sentencing ranges that would apply in the case;

c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status, ensure that the client receives competent advice regarding the immigration consequences in the case as required under Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356 (2010);

d) Perform a reasonable investigation of both the facts and the law pertinent to the case (including as applicable, e.g., visiting the scene, interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing pertinent materials, consulting experts, inspecting exhibits, reviewing all discovery materials obtained from the prosecution, researching legal issues, etc.), or, if appropriate, make a reasonable professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter;

e) Comply with the requirements of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct regarding conflicts of interest, and when appropriate, timely notify the court of a possible conflict so that an inquiry may be undertaken or a ruling made;

f) Possess or acquire a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal substantive, procedural and evidentiary law to ensure constitutionally effective representation in the case; and

g) When the statutory requirements necessary to trigger required notice from the defense are met (e.g., a demand, intent to introduce particular evidence, etc.), comply with the statutory notice obligations for the defense as specified in CPL 250.10, 250.20, and 250.30.

LEAVE TO FILE FURTHER MOTIONS

The branch of the motion requesting leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent recognized by CPL 255.20(3).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.

Gary F. Miret, J.