People of the State of New York ex rel. Japheth Baker, Esq., on behalf of Demetri Jewell, Petitioner, v. LYNELLE MAGINLEY LIDDIE (2026)

Petitioner Demetri Jewell was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for allegedly violating certain conditions of release during his community supervision. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his detention. This court previously ordered petitioner's release pursuant to CPLR 7009 (e) pending final disposition of this habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner argues that the parole warrant was unlawfully issued after he posted bail in the related criminal case, that the recognizance court unlawfully remanded him, and that the charge established at the preliminary hearing was not a non-technical violation that could authorize his continued detention. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the writ is DISMISSED.

Petitioner was arrested on a parole warrant charging technical violations on December 10, 2025. Petitioner pleaded guilty to a technical violation and was restored to supervision on December 18, 2025. Petitioner was not released, having been arrested on an I-card arising from an incident during which a parole officer allegedly sustained a laceration. Petitioner was arraigned on the criminal matter, and bail was set on December 19, 2025. Petitioner posted bail on December 23, 2025. Later that day, DOCCS issued and executed a new parole warrant based on the same alleged criminal conduct. A recognizance hearing was held on December 24, 2025, at which petitioner was remanded.

A preliminary hearing was held on December 29, 2025. The parole revocation specialist appearing on behalf of DOCCS, proceeded on charge 10, alleging a rule 8 violation in that petitioner threatened the safety and well-being of himself and others when he refused commands given by a senior parole officer to stop resisting. At the end of the hearing, the hearing officer found by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner violated a condition of release in an important respect. Petitioner now brings this habeas petition on multiple grounds.

Petitioner first argues that DOCCS could not issue a parole warrant after he had posted bail. Release on a criminal case does not preclude the issuance of a parole warrant based on the same alleged conduct (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [viii]). The statute addresses two relevant timing scenarios. If DOCCS has already issued a parole warrant and the criminal court then sets bail or otherwise authorizes release, then DOCCS may not continue detention "based solely on the [parole] warrant" (id.). If the criminal court has already issued a CPL article 530 securing order and DOCCS later issues a parole warrant based on that conduct, DOCCS must provide the releasee with a recognizance hearing within 24 hours of the warrant's execution (id.). This case falls within the second scenario. The criminal court issued a securing order on December 19, 2025, setting a partially secured bond of $20,000. Petitioner posted bail on December 23, 2025, and DOCCS issued a parole warrant later that day. Petitioner received a recognizance hearing on December 24, 2025. Although petitioner contends that posting bail should preclude the subsequent issuance of a parole warrant, such an interpretation would conflate or eliminate the distinction between the two statutory scenarios described above. The statute expressly contemplates petitioner's circumstances and requires only a prompt recognizance hearing, not an absolute bar to the issuance of a new parole warrant after bail. As DOCCS complied with the statutory procedure, petitioner is not entitled to release on this ground.

Petitioner next argues that DOCCS failed to show that the parole warrant was properly issued. At a recognizance hearing, DOCCS must show that the warrant was properly issued and served (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v]). Nothing in the statute requires an express finding by the recognizance court as to the issuance of a warrant. So long as there is record support for the issuance of a warrant, DOCCS will have met its burden. A warrant may issue on "probable cause to believe that such person has committed a non-technical violation" (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [i]; Executive Law § 259 [7 [a] [defining a non-technical violation as the commission of a new felony or misdemeanor offense]). In this case, the facts indicate that petitioner's alleged acts of resisting arrest and causing a laceration to a parole officer could reasonably establish probable cause, since these actions, if substantiated, constitute new criminal offenses that meet the statutory definition of a non-technical violation. Therefore, there is a direct and sufficient connection between the alleged conduct and the probable cause standard required for warrant issuance. Further, the warrant was not issued in violation of Executive Law § 259-i (3) (a) (viii) as described earlier. Petitioner is thus not entitled to release on this ground.

Petitioner also argues that the recognizance court acted unlawfully by remanding petitioner because of his alleged parole violations. A recognizance court may detain a releasee only upon finding both that "the releasee currently presents a substantial risk of willfully failing to appear at the preliminary or final revocation hearings" and that "no non-monetary condition or combination of conditions in the community will reasonably assure the releasee's appearance" at those hearings (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]). In making those findings, the court must consider "all available evidence of the releasee's employment, family and community ties including length of residency in the community, history of reporting in a timely fashion to a parole or supervisory officer, and other indicators of stability" (id.). Although the releasee's alleged violations are not adjudicated at the recognizance hearing (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iv], [f] [viii]), evidence of alleged violations is relevant to the court's assessment under the statutory criteria. At the recognizance hearing, DOCCS is statutorily required to submit information regarding the alleged violation and the releasee's community supervision record (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v]). The recognizance court may then evaluate alleged noncompliance with a supervision conditions to the extent that such evidence is pertinent to the risk of nonappearance and the sufficiency of nonmonetary conditions (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [v], [vi]). In this case, the recognizance court relied on the alleged parole violations as "indicators of stability in terms of not complying with what he's supposed to do in terms of this GPS unit, in leaving New York State without permission, and in addition not complying with the program" (reply, recognizance hearing tr at 15, lines 10-13). That was a permissible use of the information. The recognizance court did not purport to adjudicate the alleged violations. Instead, the court used the information in making the statutory appearance-risk determination. On the record before the recognizance court, the findings required for detention are rationally supported (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [vi]; cf. Parker, 62 NY2d at 778-779 [affirming denial of habeas relief where bail determination rested on rational basis in the record]). Petitioner is thus not entitled to release on this ground.

Finally, petitioner argues that the charge established at the preliminary hearing could not justify his continued detention, as it did not subject him to reincarceration. The preliminary hearing serves a due process function by requiring DOCCS to present a sufficient basis for continued detention pending the final revocation hearing (Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 485 [1972]). The statutory scheme likewise ties detention on a parole warrant to violations that may authorize reincarceration if sustained (Executive Law §§ 259-i [3] [a] [i], [f] [xii]). Thus, if the violation established at the preliminary hearing cannot result in further reincarceration, then continued detention is not authorized.

The charge established at the preliminary hearing may authorize continued detention on this record. A violation is nontechnical if the charged conduct constitutes a new felony or misdemeanor (Executive Law § 259 [7] [a]). Determining whether a charge is nontechnical requires looking to the violation as noticed and sustained, including the factual manner alleged, because the notice must state the conditions alleged to have been violated and "in what manner" (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [iii]). Consistent with that principle, this court has previously focused on what the charged violation placed at issue, rather than on additional facts in the hearing record. Where the charged rule and manner of violation fairly allege only technical conduct, unrelated facts from the hearing record do not alter the charge's classification.

Here, the noticed rule 8 charge alleged that petitioner threatened the safety and well-being of himself and others when he refused commands given by a senior parole officer to stop resisting. The hearing decision sustained that charge by finding that petitioner flailed his arms while parole officers were attempting to arrest him, causing a laceration to a parole officer. Resisting arrest is committed when a person "intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person" (Penal Law § 205.30). A parole officer is a peace officer (CPL 2.10 [23]), and the parole warrant authorized the parole officer to arrest the petitioner. Therefore, because the violation as noticed and sustained involved factual allegations of petitioner's resistance to an authorized arrest, resulting in injury to a parole officer, the conduct satisfies the statutory definition of a non-technical violation, as it constitutes conduct amounting to a new felony or misdemeanor offense (Executive Law § 259 [7] [a]). Accordingly, the charge established at the preliminary hearing may properly be classified as non-technical, and petitioner is thus not entitled to release on this ground.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and this proceeding is DISMISSED; it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioner is REMANDED to the custody of respondent and shall be detained pursuant to the securing order issued by the recognizance court in connection with parole warrant No. 860627.

Dated: July 13, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

Verena C. Powell, J.