BEIJING FINE WINE AND LIQUOR INC v. WANG (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover unpaid wages, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Esposito, J.), dated February 24, 2025.  The order denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants Thomas Wang, Vicky Wang, and Taipei Fine Wine and Liquor, Inc.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

On June 24, 2024, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants Thomas Wang (hereinafter Thomas), Vicky Wang, and Taipei Fine Wine and Liquor, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the defendants), among others, to recover, inter alia, unpaid wages.

On August 19, 2024, the plaintiffs moved for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants based on the defendants' alleged failure to timely appear or answer the complaint.  On August 29, 2024, the defendants interposed an answer asserting a counterclaim and affirmative defenses, which the plaintiffs rejected on the same date.  Thereafter, the defendants opposed the plaintiffs' motion, contending that they had a reasonable excuse for their default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action.  By order dated February 24, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

“To avoid the entry of a default judgment, a defendant who has failed to appear or answer the complaint must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action” (King v. 105–02 Forest Hills, LLC, 233 A.D.3d 939, 940, 225 N.Y.S.3d 267 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Jong Gwon Kim v. Strippoli, 144 A.D.3d 982, 983, 42 N.Y.S.3d 245).  “Whether there is a reasonable excuse for a default is a discretionary, sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” (Jong Gwon Kim v. Strippoli, 144 A.D.3d at 983, 42 N.Y.S.3d 245 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Fried v. Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 A.D.3d 56, 60, 970 N.Y.S.2d 260).  “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the discretion of the trial court” (Browne v. Lyft, Inc., 219 A.D.3d 443, 444, 193 N.Y.S.3d 281 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Under the circumstances of this case, including the short delay, lack of willfulness on the part of the defendants, and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting the defendants' proffered excuse as reasonable (see U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v. Braun, 242 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 244 N.Y.S.3d 199;  ZG Palmetto, LLC v. Alongi, 230 A.D.3d 1194, 1197, 218 N.Y.S.3d 109;  Browne v. Lyft, Inc., 219 A.D.3d at 445, 193 N.Y.S.3d 281;  Wax v. 716 Realty, LLC, 151 A.D.3d 902, 903, 58 N.Y.S.3d 83;  Hense v. Baxter, 79 A.D.3d 814, 815, 914 N.Y.S.2d 200).  Moreover, the defendants' submission of their answer with affirmative defenses, which was verified by Thomas, demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Pemberton v. Montoya, 216 A.D.3d 988, 990, 189 N.Y.S.3d 645;  Juseinoski v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 15 A.D.3d 353, 356, 790 N.Y.S.2d 162).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.