CAWLEY v. LAMBIASE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property and for declaratory relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph A. Santorelli, J.), dated March 10, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment declaring that they own a certain parcel of real property and dismissing the defendant's counterclaim to quiet title, and denied that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was for summary judgment declaring that he owns the western portion of said parcel up to the centerline of the private road known as Barns Lane, subject to the easement rights of others.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment declaring that they own a certain parcel of real property and dismissing the defendant's counterclaim to quiet title is denied, that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was for summary judgment declaring that he owns the western portion of said parcel up to the centerline of the private road known as Barns Lane, subject to the easement rights of others, is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings and the entry of a judgment, inter alia, making the appropriate declaration in favor of the defendant in accordance herewith.

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that an approximately 900–square–foot parcel of land (hereinafter the disputed area) is owned in fee by the plaintiffs.  The defendant interposed an answer with counterclaims, including a counterclaim to quiet title, which sought a judgment declaring that he is the owner in fee of the disputed area.  The disputed area lies near the northern terminus of a private road known as Barns Lane, approximately 30 feet wide, which allows access to the nearest public road to the south.  The defendant owns the property to the west of the disputed area, and the plaintiffs own the property to the east of the disputed area.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment declaring that they own the disputed area and dismissing the defendant's counterclaim to quiet title.  The defendant cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment declaring that he owns the western portion of the disputed area up to the centerline of Barns Lane, subject to the easement rights of others.  In an order dated March 10, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the plaintiffs' motion and denied that branch of the defendant's cross-motion.  The defendant appeals.

“The construction of deeds is a matter of law” (Blangiardo v. Horstmann, 32 A.D.3d 876, 879, 822 N.Y.S.2d 545;  see Deckoff v. W. Manning Family L.P., 193 A.D.3d 812, 147 N.Y.S.3d 91).  “Every instrument creating [or] transferring ․ an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to the intent of the parties, so far as such intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, and is consistent with the rules of law” (Real Property Law § 240[3];  see D'Andrea v. 3 Unqua Place, LLC, 222 A.D.3d 830, 830, 203 N.Y.S.3d 94).  “The intent of the parties is manifested by the language of the deed, and unless the deed is ambiguous, ‘evidence of unexpressed, subjective intentions of the parties is irrelevant’ ” (Deckoff v. W. Manning Family L.P., 193 A.D.3d at 814, 147 N.Y.S.3d 91, quoting Perry v. Edwards, 79 A.D.3d 1629, 1630, 913 N.Y.S.2d 460).

Here, the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law declaring their ownership of the disputed area.  In support of their motion, the plaintiffs relied upon the chain of title tracing back to a 1973 deed, which purported to convey title to the northern portion of Barns Lane, including the disputed area, to the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest.  However, the plaintiffs' submissions also included a separate chain of title, tracing back to a 1960 deed, which reflected that the disputed area was previously conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in interest.  Specifically, the 1960 deed conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in interest a certain parcel of land, defined by metes and bounds with the eastern boundary of the parcel running for 30 feet along the “westerly side of Barns Lane,” “together with all right, title and interest of the [grantor] of, in and to the land lying in the streets and roads in front of and adjoining said premises.”  This provision is separate and distinct from another provision, which conveyed easement rights to be used in common with others over the portion of Barns Lane running between the conveyed premises and the nearest public road.

By its plain language, the 1960 deed conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in interest both the specific parcel described by metes and bounds as well as the portion of Barns Lane which abutted that parcel (see Minassian v. Temares, 16 A.D.3d 634, 637, 795 N.Y.S.2d 50;  Taylor v. Devendorf, 140 A.D.2d 510, 511, 528 N.Y.S.2d 409).  Accordingly, the 1973 deed relied upon by the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the plaintiffs' ownership of the disputed area, as that deed could not convey to the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest any ownership interest in that portion of Barns Lane which had already been conveyed by an earlier deed (see Town of Clifton Park v. Boni Bldrs., Inc., 156 A.D.3d 1035, 1038, 66 N.Y.S.3d 550;  Margolin v. Gatto, 70 A.D.3d 1014, 1016, 895 N.Y.S.2d 501).

In contrast, the defendant's submissions in support of his cross-motion demonstrated the defendant's ownership of the western portion of the disputed area up to the centerline of Barns Lane, subject to the easement rights of others.  The defendant submitted, among other things, deeds which traced the chain of title for the defendant's property and the plaintiffs' property to their remote common source of title, before the land was divided into separate lots.  These deeds demonstrated that, at the time of the 1960 deed, which created the parcel of land conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in interest, the grantor still held title to Barns Lane, and was therefore able to convey to the defendant's predecessor in interest title to the portion of Barns Lane abutting the parcel described in the 1960 deed.  Absent any evidence of a contrary intent by the grantor, the interest of the defendant's predecessor in interest to this portion of Barns Lane is presumed to extend to the centerline of the road (see Mott v. Mott, 68 N.Y. 246, 253;  Sullivan v. Markowitz, 239 A.D.2d 404, 404–405, 658 N.Y.S.2d 634).  Moreover, the defendant submitted the deeds in his chain of title subsequent to 1960, each of which included a paragraph expressly conveying the property together with the abutting road to the centerline.  Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the language of the deeds and the circumstances of the conveyances support, rather than rebut, the presumption that the defendant's ownership of Barns Lane extends to the centerline of Barns Lane (see Town of Clifton Park v. Boni Bldrs., Inc., 156 A.D.3d at 1038, 66 N.Y.S.3d 550;  Sullivan v. Markowitz, 239 A.D.2d at 404–405, 658 N.Y.S.2d 634).

The plaintiffs' remaining contention is without merit.

We therefore remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings on the remaining causes of action and counterclaims, and for the entry thereafter of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the defendant owns the western portion of the disputed area up to the centerline of the private road known as Barns Lane, subject to the easement rights of others.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHAMBERS, VOUTSINAS and HOM, JJ., concur.