PEOPLE v. PETERSON (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephanie L. Zaro, J.), rendered June 5, 2019, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny (two counts), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Where, like here, the conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence, this Court must also “satisfy itself that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” (People v. Baque, 43 N.Y.3d 26, 30, 229 N.Y.S.3d 62, 254 N.E.3d 606 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of burglary in the second degree and two counts of petit larceny was not against the weight of the evidence (see id. at 29–30, 229 N.Y.S.3d 62, 254 N.E.3d 606;  People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).  The recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the thief (see People v. Baskerville, 60 N.Y.2d 374, 382–384, 469 N.Y.S.2d 646, 457 N.E.2d 752;  People v Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, 290, 112 N.E. 1041;  People v. Quiles, 115 A.D.3d 680, 680–681, 981 N.Y.S.2d 541).  Here, there was no reasonable view of the evidence, which included admissions made by the defendant during a series of telephone calls that he left the complainants' building with the stolen property, whereby the jury could have found that the defendant unlawfully possessed certain stolen property without also finding that he committed burglary and larceny.

“ ‘[T]he Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes [the] right to have [defense] counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in [defendant's] favor’ ” (People v. Mairena, 34 N.Y.3d 473, 481–482, 121 N.Y.S.3d 731, 144 N.E.3d 340, quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593).  A closing argument is a basic element of a defense in a criminal trial (see People v. Abrams, 231 A.D.3d 963, 964, 219 N.Y.S.3d 407;  People v. Aponte, 204 A.D.3d 1031, 1034, 167 N.Y.S.3d 154).  However, “[t]he privilege of counsel to comment in summation on any matters of fact pertinent to questions that the jury must decide is not absolute” (People v. Smith, 16 N.Y.3d 786, 787–788, 920 N.Y.S.2d 284, 945 N.E.2d 477).  “In summation, defense counsel is not permitted to ‘call upon the jury to reach conclusions that are not fairly inferrable from the evidence’ ” (People v. Kennedy, 177 A.D.3d 628, 630, 113 N.Y.S.3d 122 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Smith, 16 N.Y.3d at 787, 920 N.Y.S.2d 284, 945 N.E.2d 477).  Thus, the trial court may preclude summation arguments that are speculative and unsupported by any evidence (see People v. Kelson, 218 A.D.3d 491, 492, 194 N.Y.S.3d 230;  People v. Kennedy, 177 A.D.3d at 630, 113 N.Y.S.3d 122).  Here, the Supreme Court properly limited the defendant from arguing, in summation, that a third party committed the burglary and larcenies of which the defendant was accused, since that argument was speculative and unsupported by the evidence (see People v. Kelson, 218 A.D.3d at 492, 194 N.Y.S.3d 230;  People v. Singh, 138 A.D.3d 767, 767–768, 27 N.Y.S.3d 882).

A defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses is protected by the Federal and State Constitutions (see U.S. Const 6th Amend;  NY Const, art I, § 6;  People v. Kennedy, 177 A.D.3d at 630, 113 N.Y.S.3d 122).  However, an accused's right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute (see People v. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d 303, 313, 598 N.Y.S.2d 167, 614 N.E.2d 730;  People v. Kennedy, 177 A.D.3d at 630, 113 N.Y.S.3d 122).  “The scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court[,] and it must weigh the probative value of such evidence against the possibility that it would confuse the main issue and mislead the jury ․ or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one of the parties” (People v. Hayes, 17 N.Y.3d 46, 53, 926 N.Y.S.2d 382, 950 N.E.2d 118 [internal citation and quotation marks omitted] ).  Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court improperly limited his cross-examination of a police officer by refusing to allow defense counsel to refresh that witness's recollection is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ).  Nonetheless, the court properly refused to allow the defendant to refresh the witness's recollection, as the witness did not indicate that he lacked memory on the subject (see People v. Farrow, 216 A.D.3d 996, 997, 189 N.Y.S.3d 267).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record does not show that the Supreme Court relied on materially incorrect or unreliable information in imposing the sentence (see People v. Kaye, 209 A.D.3d 873, 874, 176 N.Y.S.3d 678).  Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

CHAMBERS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS and HOM, JJ., concur.