ALAVA v. BUFFALO AIRPORT CAR RENTAL (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Larry D. Martin, J.), dated November 14, 2024.  The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion;  as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In August 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained on May 26, 2018, when a vehicle in which he was a passenger crashed into a traffic pole in Brooklyn.  The vehicle allegedly was operated by the defendant John Doe and owned by the defendant Buffalo Airport Car Rental, LLC (hereinafter Buffalo).  The defendants interposed an answer to the complaint in which they asserted, inter alia, as their fourteenth affirmative defense, that they could not be vicariously liable for the accident pursuant to the Graves Amendment (see 49 USC § 30106).

The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, among other things, a copy of the rental agreement for the vehicle between Buffalo and an individual who is not a party to this action, which provided, in pertinent part, that the rental period commenced on April 27, 2018, and concluded on May 4, 2018 (hereinafter the rental agreement).  The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense.  In an order dated November 14, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Under the Graves Amendment (49 USC § 30106), the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held liable for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle if the owner (i) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (ii) engaged in no negligence or criminal wrongdoing” (Bravo v. Vargas, 113 A.D.3d 579, 580, 978 N.Y.S.2d 307;  see Ballatore v. HUB Truck Rental Corp., 83 A.D.3d 978, 979, 922 N.Y.S.2d 180).  “The Graves Amendment does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to hold a vehicle owner liable for the alleged failure to maintain a rented vehicle” (Olmann v. Neil, 132 A.D.3d 744, 745, 18 N.Y.S.3d 105;  see Casine v. Wesner, 165 A.D.3d 749, 749–750, 85 N.Y.S.3d 530).  Thus, in order to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, the defendants were required to show (1) that Buffalo owned the vehicle, (2) that it engaged in the business of leasing or renting motor vehicles, (3) that the accident occurred during the period of the lease or rental, and (4) that there is no triable issue of fact as to the plaintiff's allegation that negligent maintenance contributed to the accident (see Carrera v. Prophete, 240 A.D.3d 655, 656, 235 N.Y.S.3d 697;  Kurtaj v. Borax Paper Prods., Inc., 231 A.D.3d 939, 941, 221 N.Y.S.3d 151).

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.  In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, the rental agreement.  However, the date of the subject accident does not fall within the date range for the rental period for the subject vehicle listed on the rental agreement, and the defendants did not submit evidence showing that the rental agreement was extended beyond the projected return date (see Alfaro v. Lavacca, 186 A.D.3d 1591, 1592–1593, 129 N.Y.S.3d 846;  Cioffi v. S.M. Foods, Inc., 129 A.D.3d 888, 892, 10 N.Y.S.3d 620;  cf.  Cioffi v. S.M. Foods, Inc., 178 A.D.3d 1006, 1012, 116 N.Y.S.3d 306).  Moreover, the defendants failed to submit any evidence to demonstrate that Buffalo did not negligently maintain the vehicle (see Caldeira v. EAN Holdings, LLC, 240 A.D.3d 654, 655, 238 N.Y.S.3d 498;  Casine v. Wesner, 165 A.D.3d at 750, 85 N.Y.S.3d 530).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

However, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense.  CPLR 3211(b) provides that “[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit.”  “When moving to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the affirmative defenses are without merit as a matter of law because they either do not apply under the factual circumstances of [the] case, or fail to state a defense” (Shah v. Mitra, 171 A.D.3d 971, 974, 98 N.Y.S.3d 197 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Diversified Building Co., LLC v. Nader Enters., LLC, 243 A.D.3d 542, 543, 246 N.Y.S.3d 114).  “On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b), the court should apply the same standard it applies to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the factual assertions of the defense will be accepted as true” (Shah v. Mitra, 171 A.D.3d at 974, 98 N.Y.S.3d 197 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “If there is any doubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed” (Blachowicz v. City of New York, 241 A.D.3d 1513, 1516, 242 N.Y.S.3d 720 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Here, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense was without merit as a matter of law (see Amsterdam Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Harold Levinson Assoc., LLC, 241 A.D.3d 469, 469–470, 236 N.Y.S.3d 326).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.