The People of the State of New York v. Joshua Rodriguez, Defendant. (2026)

In the indictment, the defendant is charged with Robbery in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 160.10[2][a]) and related charges. He moves to suppress identification evidence pursuant to Wade, statements pursuant to Huntley and all evidence derived from his arrest pursuant to Dunaway. The People oppose the defendant's motion in its entirety.

This court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 12, and April 20, 2026. Police Officer Justin Corrado and Police Officer Toufiqur Chowdhury testified on behalf of the People. The defense presented no witnesses. As an initial matter, this court finds that the People's witnesses testified in a credible and straight-forward manner.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

On July 27, 2025, at approximately 8:55 p.m., Police Officer Justin Corrado, a fourteen-year veteran of the NYPD assigned to the 101st Precinct, responded with his partner to 1372 Eggert Street following a radio run reporting a larceny. Upon arrival, he activated his body worn camera (BWC). Other officers were already speaking with the complainant, Princess Marie Embaro Morales.

Ms. Morales reported that she had been followed for about a block by a man who frightened her, causing her to run. The man grabbed her by the right arm, attempted to take her purse, and ultimately removed a red Target bag from her shoulder containing a sweater and medication. She described the perpetrator as a white male, approximately 5'11", wearing all black, with dreadlocks. This description was broadcast to other police units in the area.

A canvass began at approximately 9:10 p.m. Officer Corrado also testified that almost immediately after beginning the canvass, he received an unrelated radio transmission indicating that other officers required assistance. His location at that moment was about six blocks from the call for assistance; he diverted and went to that location. When he arrived, he determined that the situation was in hand and resumed the canvass. The total elapsed time from the moment he diverted to assist until he returned to the canvass area was about five minutes.

At about 9:19 p.m., Officer Chowdhury reported he had stopped a man matching the description at Mott Avenue and Gipson Street, about one block from the crime scene. Officer Corrado arrived within a minute. The defendant was standing calmly, unhandcuffed and matched the complainant's description in race, height, clothing color, and hairstyle.

As the patrol car approached, Ms. Morales stated, "I think that's him." Officer Corrado repositioned the vehicle to provide her with a clearer view. As the vehicle moved closer, Ms. Morales began to cry, repeated the clothing description she had previously given, and stated, "Yes, oh my God. That's him." The defendant was then placed under arrest. The red Target bag was not recovered, and the defendant was not wearing a beanie or shoes. Video footage from Officer Corrado's BWC was received in evidence as exhibit 1 and played.

Later, at approximately 11:30 p.m., at the 101st Precinct, Officer Corrado escorted the defendant from his holding cell to the fingerprint scanner. Without any questioning, the defendant asked "What am I being charged with, robbery, right?" No Miranda warnings had yet been administered.

Police Officer Toufiqur Chowdhury, an officer with the 101st Precinct, testified that on July 27, 2025, he and his partner responded to the call of a larceny in progress at 1372 Eggert Street. He explained that he and his partner had begun canvassing at 9:15 p.m., after receiving the description of a white male, six feet tall, wearing all black with dreadlocks and a beanie, and carrying a red bag. At 9:19 p.m., he encountered the defendant, who matched the description in all significant respects except for the beanie and the missing bag. The defendant was calm and cooperative. Officer Chowdhury informed him that he was not in trouble but was being stopped because he matched the description of a suspect. He then requested a show-up, which occurred moments later when Officer Corrado arrived with the complainant. Video footage from Officer Chowdhury's body worn camera was received in evidence as exhibit 2 and played.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The court first concludes that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant. The complainant provided a detailed description of the perpetrator — a white male, approximately 5'11", wearing all black, with dreadlocks — within minutes of the robbery. Officer Chowdhury encountered the defendant one block from the crime scene, matching the description in all material respects in race, height, clothing, and hairstyle. The temporal and geographical proximity of the encounter, combined with the substantial match between the complainant's description and the defendant's appearance, provided the officers with specific, articulable facts suggesting that the defendant may have been involved in the reported robbery. Reasonable suspicion does not require a perfect match; rather, the question is whether the police possessed specific and articulable facts suggesting that the person stopped may have committed a crime. That standard was plainly met and the stop was lawful under Dunaway.

The principles articulated in People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234 (1986) reinforce this conclusion. Although the facts of Hicks involved two men stopped in a car matching a broadcast description of robbery suspects, the holding applies directly here. The Court of Appeals in Hicks recognized that officers responding to a recently reported crime may briefly detain individuals who reasonably fit the description of the suspects and are encountered in close temporal and geographic proximity to the crime. The Court emphasized that police officers are permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances confronting them during an active investigation. Here, the officers were responding to a robbery that had occurred moments earlier, and the defendant was encountered almost immediately, one block from the scene, matching the complainant's description. Under Hicks, these circumstances fully justified the officers' decision to detain him.

The reasoning in People v Robinson, 282 AD2d 75 (1st Dept 2001) further supports this conclusion. In Robinson, the Appellate Division upheld a stop where the defendant matched a general description of a suspect and was found in close proximity to the crime shortly after it occurred. The court held that even when certain descriptive details differ, the combination of temporal proximity, geographic closeness, and a substantial match in appearance provides a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion. The facts here are even stronger: the defendant matched the complainant's description in height, race, clothing color, and hairstyle, and was encountered within minutes of the crime and within a block of the location. Under Robinson, the officers acted well within constitutional bounds in detaining him.

The way the stop was conducted further demonstrates that it was a brief investigatory detention rather than an arrest. The defendant was told the reason he was being stopped — that he matched the description of a person who reportedly had stolen property. He was not handcuffed, and there was no show of force. The entire encounter was extremely brief, lasting only the short time necessary for Officer Corrado to arrive with the complainant for a show-up identification. Under these circumstances, no reasonable person, innocent of any wrongdoing, would have believed that he was under arrest. The encounter had all the indications of a temporary, minimally intrusive investigative detention of the type expressly authorized by Hicks and Robinson. Accordingly, the officers had ample reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, and the detention was conducted in a manner consistent with constitutional standards that govern brief investigative stops.

The defendant next argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him because he was not wearing a beanie and did not possess the red Target bag described by the complainant. He contends these discrepancies undermine the reliability of the identification and therefore defeats probable cause. This argument is unpersuasive. Probable cause does not require that every descriptive detail be present at the moment of arrest. Clothing can be removed, and property can be discarded in the short time between a crime and a police encounter. Such discrepancies go to the weight of the evidence, not to the existence of probable cause.

More importantly, probable cause in this case did not rest solely on the descriptive match. It arose from the complainant's clear, emotional, and immediate identification of the defendant during the show-up. After initially stating, "I think that's him," the complainant was repositioned for a clearer view. She then began to cry, repeated the clothing description she previously given and stated, "Yes, oh my God. That's him." This was a spontaneous, unequivocal identification made within minutes of the crime and in close proximity to the scene. The complainant's was told only that someone had been stopped, not that the police believed they had the perpetrator and the defendant was not handcuffed. The show-up identification was not unduly suggestive. It was conducted promptly, and in close geographic proximity to the crime scene. This time span and distance are sufficiently proximate. (See, People v Howard, 22 NY3d 388, 402 [2013]; People v Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 601 [Smith, J., dissenting] [2003]; People v Mathis, 60 AD3d 1144 [3rd Dept 2009]) The show-up was reliable and provided probable cause to arrest.

The defense further argues that the show-up should be suppressed because the testimony did not establish any exigency warranting its use. This argument misstates the governing law. In People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541 (1991), the Court of Appeals held that show-ups conducted in close temporal and geographic proximity to the crime are permissible because they serve the legitimate and important purpose of securing a prompt, reliable identification while the witness's memory is fresh and the police are still engaged in the immediate pursuit of a suspect. The Court emphasized that such procedures are not only permissible but often necessary in the immediate aftermath of a crime.

Similarly, in People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828 (1983), the Court reaffirmed that prompt, on-the-scene showups are justified precisely because they allow the police to quickly determine whether they have detained the correct individual or should continue searching for the perpetrator. The Court explained that the need for swift confirmation or elimination of a suspect constitutes an exigency inherent in the immediate post-crime context.

Most recently, in People v Howard, 22 NY3d 388 (2013), the Court again upheld the results of a show-up where the police acted promptly and reasonably in the wake of a crime. Howard reaffirmed that the critical considerations are temporal and spatial proximity, the absence of undue suggestiveness, and the practical necessity of quickly determining whether the detained person is the perpetrator.

Applying these principles here, the show-up was plainly justified. The police were responding to a robbery that had occurred minutes earlier. They encountered the defendant one block from the crime scene. The complainant was transported to the location immediately, and the identification occurred almost instantaneously. These circumstances fall squarely within the framework approved by Duuvon, Johnson, and Howard. The law does not require the police to articulate a separate, extraordinary exigency beyond the inherent need to confirm or dispel suspicion during an active, unfolding investigation. The show-up was therefore lawful, and the identification was properly obtained.

The defendant further contends that the complainant's identification was tainted because she remained in a police vehicle for approximately ten minutes before the show-up occurred. He argues that this waiting period created an atmosphere of undue suggestiveness. There is no merit to this argument. There is no evidence the police made any suggestive statements to the complainant during this brief waiting period. She was told only that an individual had been stopped, which is permissible and does not imply that the police believed they had apprehended the perpetrator. Her initial reaction — "I think that's him" was spontaneous and equivocal, and the officers appropriately repositioned the vehicle to allow her a clearer view. Her subsequent identification — "Yes, oh my God. That's him"- was immediate, emotional, and unequivocal. Nothing in the record suggests that the ten-minute interval influenced or tainted her perception, nor is there any indication that the police engaged in conduct that conveyed to the complainant that the detained individual was the perpetrator. The waiting period must also be understood by reference to the prompt and active nature of the investigation. The show-up occurred within minutes of the crime, one block from the scene, and under circumstances that were neither contrived nor coercive. The complainant remained in the police vehicle only because the officers were in the process of locating and securing a potential suspect and ensuring the scene to safe for her to view him. A brief waiting period in a patrol car does not, by itself, render a show-up suggestive. New York courts have consistently upheld show-ups where the complainant was transported to the suspect's location and remained in a police vehicle until the officers were prepared to conduct the viewing. (see People v Patterson, 240 AD3d 521[2d Dept 2025]; People v Gibson, 227 AD3d 1105 [2d Dept 2024]; People v Huerta, 141 AD2d 602 [2d Dept 2016]; People v Jerry, 126 AD3d 1001 [2d Dept 2015]; People v Ervin, 118 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2014]; People v Charles, 110 AD3d 1094 [2d Dept 2013]; People v Mathis, 60 AD3d 1144 [2d Dept 2009]) The complainant's identification was the product of her own perception, not police influence. The court therefore rejects the defense's argument that the ten minute waiting period tainted the identification.

An additional factor further undermines the defense's argument. As established in the findings of fact, Officer Corrado briefly diverted from the canvass to respond to an unrelated radio transmission requesting fellow officer assistance. His location at the time was close by to the location of the call for assistance and the entire diversion lasted roughly five minutes before he returned to the canvass area. This brief and legitimate interruption in police activity explains, in part, why the complainant remained in the vehicle for approximately ten minutes. The delay was not the product of any attempt to influence the complainant or to stage-manage the identification; it was simply the result of routine police operations unfolding in real time. This further confirms that the waiting period does not render the show-up unduly suggestive.

The defendant's statements at the precinct were spontaneous and not the product of interrogation. Although he was in custody, Officer Corrado did not question him or engage in conduct designed to elicit a response. The defendant's inquiry — "What am I being charged with, robbery, right?" — was volunteered. Spontaneous statements are admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings. The statement is therefore admissible.

For these reasons, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied in all respects.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.

June 2, 2026

GARY F. MIRET J.S.C.

Gary F. Miret, J.