PHILLIPS v. MIDOCEAN TRAVELPRO GROUP HOLDINGS LP (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37 were read on this motion to/for INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER.

Plaintiff Juan E. Phillips brings this action seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants MidOcean TravelPro Group Holdings, LP and Travelpro Products Inc. (collectively, “Defendants” or “Travelpro”), from enforcing the restrictive covenants contained in the unit grant agreements the parties entered into, thereby allowing Plaintiff to continue in the next steps of his communications with employment at Briggs & Riley.

Plaintiff commenced employment with Travelpro in 2013 and worked there for thirteen years and three months. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiffs last job title was Vice President, Product Design and Innovation (Summons and Complaint, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). As Vice President of Product Design and Innovation, Plaintiff led a team that designed products based on Travelpro's patented designs and innovations, aesthetic looks, and targeted price segment of the marketplace (id.). Plaintiff resigned from his position at Travelpro, sold his home in Florida, and has plans to move to the New York Metro area with his family due to alleged health hardships (Phillips Declaration, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12). As he has been attempting to find new employment, and engaged in discussions with Briggs & Riley, a competitor of Travelpro, Plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the non-compete and non-solicit provisions contained in the unit grant agreements against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requested a temporary restraining order pending the hearing on a preliminary injunction. On June 5, 2026 the Court declined to sign Plaintiff's requested temporary restraining order, and ordered oral argument on the preliminary injunction (Order to Show Cause, NYSCEF Doc. No. 23). The parties appeared for oral argument on June 16, 2026.

Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction and contends that non-compete and non-solicit provisions of the parties' agreements are overbroad and are causing him and his family immediate and irreparable harm. The purported restrictive covenants are for a period of 12 months after the plaintiff's employment with Travelpro and they prohibit Plaintiff from working at five of Defendants' specific competitors, including Briggs & Riley.

Defendants oppose and allege that they have not taken any action against Plaintiff and that since Plaintiff has not been offered a job at Briggs & Riley, Plaintiff therefore cannot establish any legal right to seek injunctive relief. Moreover, Defendants allege that neither a temporary restraining order nor a preliminary injunction are justified, as the balance of equities favors Defendants and the restrictive covenants are not unreasonable.

Pursuant to CPLR § 6301,

A preliminary injunction may be granted in any action where it appears that the defendant threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, or in any action where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled to a judgment restraining the defendant from the commission or continuance of an act, which, if committed or continued during the pendency of the action, would produce injury to the plaintiff.

“The party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of the equities in its favor” (Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839 [2005] [citing CPLR § 6301; Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]]).

Here, as further detailed below, Plaintiff has failed to meet the standard for injunctive relief.

Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing the requisite likelihood of success on the merits. For the provisions to be upheld, they must satisfy the requirements of Delaware law, which governs per the parties' Incentive Unit Grant Agreements. The 2018 Agreement (NYSCEF Doc. No. 8) and the 2021 Agreement (NYSCEF Doc. No. 9) read:

All issues and questions concerning the construction, validity, enforcement and interpretation of this this Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware, without giving effect to any choice of law or conflict of law rules or provisions (whether of the State of Delaware or any other jurisdiction) that would cause the application of the laws of any jurisdiction other than the State of Delaware. In furtherance of the foregoing, the internal law of the State of Delaware shall control the interpretation and construction of this Agreement, even though under that jurisdiction's choice of law or conflict of law analysis, the substantive law of some other jurisdiction would ordinarily apply.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the noncompete provision of the agreement is unreasonable in light of Delaware law. The relevant provisions “must be reasonable in geographic scope and temporal duration, advance a legitimate economic interest of [the party enforcing the provision], and survive a balancing of the equities” (see Newmark Partners, L.P. v. Hunt, 200 AD3d 557, 557 [1st Dep't 2021] [citations omitted]). The non-compete provision is limited, in that it prohibits Plaintiff from working for five specific competitor companies (Samsonite, Tumi, Swiss Gear, Briggs & Riley, and Away) (2018 Agreement, NYSCEF Doc. No. 8; 2021 Agreement, NYSCEF Doc. No. 9; Phillips Declaration, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12; Affirmation of Lori Gonzalez, NYSCEF Doc. No. 36). As the scope of the non-compete provision is limited to five direct competitors, the provision is reasonable in terms of scope, because it legitimately protects valid economic interests of Defendants without causing irreparable harm to the Plaintiff (Affirmation of Lori Gonzalez, NYSCEF Doc. No. 36). The five carved out companies represent the most significant competitors to Defendants (Emails, NYSCEF Doc. No. 11; Affirmation of Lori Gonzalez, NYSCEF Doc. No. 36). The one-year temporal duration is also reasonable, and the purported provisions read alongside the carveouts are no greater than required to protect Defendants' legitimate economic interest.

Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the irreparable-harm element required to succeed on a preliminary-injunction motion. Loss of employment by itself does not constitute irreparable damage, (see Stewart v Parker, 41 AD2d 785, 786 [3d Dept 1973]), and “injury, premised solely on monetary loss, is insufficient to satisfy the standard for irreparable injury” (Kauffman v. Aras, No. 150868/2021, 2021 WL 2432137, at *2 [NY Sup. Ct. June 09, 2021]). If Plaintiff prevails at trial, monetary damages will be an adequate compensation for the financial harms suffered (see Somers Assoc., Inc. v Corvino, 156 AD2d 218, 219 [1st Dept 1989]).

The Court finds that the balancing of the equities tips in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff's interest is primarily economic, whereas defendants are acting pursuant to the interest of protecting confidential information and trade secrets, the disclosure of which would “unfairly and inappropriately assist in competition” (2018 Agreement, NYSCEF Doc. No. 8; 2021 Agreement, NYSCEF Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff's potential losses from denying injunction relief are not trivial: he will be forced to recruit at another company, with possible impacts on his career development and familial income. However, Plaintiff had an opportunity to mitigate potential financial hardships by, among other things, indicating to Defendants that he was in employment discussions with a competitor, even if he was unable to disclose the competitor's identity due to separate confidentiality obligations (Affirmation of Lori Gonzalez, NYSCEF Doc. No. 36; Phillips Declaration, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12). Plaintiff was also aware, or should have been aware, that he agreed to a non-compete provision when he was hired at Defendants' company, in addition to when he made the decision to leave his employment at Defendants' company and seek employment at a competing firm, which would result in a breach of the non-compete provisions (Phillips Declaration, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Leslie A. Stroth, J.