The Landmark Society of Western New York, Inc., Petitioner, v. THE CITY OF ROCHESTER THE CITY OF ROCHESTER DIRECTOR OF ZONING AND PERMITTING THE CITY OF ROCHESTER MANAGER OF ZONING 76 ANDERSON AVENUE ASSOCIATES LLC (2026)

Petitioner The Landmark Society of Western New York, Inc. (hereinafter, "Landmark Society") brought this Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 7801 et seq. proceeding for relief challenging The City of Rochester Planning Commission's September 3, 2025 decision ("Denial"; NYSCEF document 3) denying landmark designation for 76 Anderson Avenue ("Building"). The Landmark Society's prayer for relief sought an Order of the Court annulling and voiding the Denial as well as an Order of the Court directing that the Planning Commission grant landmark status to the Building.

Respondents and Necessary Party Respondent answered the Petition in a timely fashion. Necessary Party Respondent moved for an Order of the Court dismissing the Petition pursuant to CPLR §§ 404, 3211, and 7804. Petitioner opposed.

After considering the parties' arguments and submissions (pursuant to CPLR § 2219[a], the specific papers considered were NYSCEF documents 1-17 and 19-31) and the relevant law, the following constitutes the Decision, Order, and Judgment of the Court on the Petition and Necessary Party Respondent's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

A. 76 Anderson Avenue.

The Building at issue is the Cutler Mail Chute Company Building located at 76-94 Anderson Avenue in the City of Rochester. James Goold Cutler—a one-time mayor of Rochester among many other accomplishments—invented the mail chute which collected mail in slots around a building and directed it to a central depository where the mail could be picked up. The Cutler Mail Chute Company formed as the Cutler Manufacturing Company in 1884. The Company designed and manufactured these mail chutes which were installed in buildings and skyscrapers around the world.

Built in 1908, the Building was designed to house the Cutler Mail Chute Company's operation for the design and manufacture of its eponymous product. The Building was designed by notable Rochester architect Frederick A. Brockett and built by local contractors, including the John B. Pike Company and the masonry firm Gorsline & Swan.

At present, it is vacant and an intact example of a late-1800s, early-1900s purpose-built-saw-tooth roof factory building. The two-story office and drafting room portion of the Building front Anderson Avenue with many well-preserved architectural features including a glazed terra cotta panel bearing the Cutler Mail Chute Company trademark. Behind that portion of the building is a large single-story manufacturing space.

B. Proceedings leading up to the Planning Commission's Denial.

Petitioner worked with the Neighborhood of the Arts Neighborhood Association to prepare and submit an application to the City of Rochester Preservation Board pursuant to City of Rochester Zoning Code ("Code") § 120-193 to designate the Building a local landmark. Both the Preservation Board and Respondent City of Rochester Planning Commission utilized the procedure outlined in Code §§ 120-193 et seq. to evaluate the application.

Code §§ 120-193 et seq. sets forth the process by which an application such as this is considered. First, a nomination request is submitted to the Preservation Board (Code § 120-193[A][4][a][2]) which must hold a public hearing and decided whether or not to approve and designate the proposed landmark (Code § 120-193[A][4][c]). In evaluating an application, the Preservation Board must consider whether the proposed landmark has

the potential to provide cultural and civic benefits for the people of the City by reason of prevalence of one or more of the following standards: [. . .]

[1] Presence of significant character or historic or aesthetic interest or value as part of the maritime, architectural, economic or social heritage of the City, county, state or nation.

[2] Identification with an historic person or event.

[3] Embodiment of the distinguishing characteristic of an architectural style.

[4] Significance as representative of the work of a master builder, designer, architect or landscape architect.

[5] Significance as an established and familiar visual feature of the City because of a unique location or singular physical characteristic.

[6] Relationship to a distinctive area of the City, lakefront or riverfront.

[7] Presence or potential presence of information important to history or prehistory.

[8] Worthiness for inclusion or listed on the State or National Register of Historic Places.

(Code § 120-193[A][3][a]).

The application was completed and submitted and a public hearing before the Preservation Board was scheduled. Numerous members of the public wrote in support of designation. The hearing was held on July 2, 2025, and on July 14, 2025, the Preservation Board voted 4-0-1 in favor of designation, and issued its Notice of Decision. The Notice of Decision designated only the exterior of the building, specifically excluding the interior, and concluded the Building satisfied standards (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7) for landmark designation under Code § 120-193(A)(3)(a).

When, in circumstances such as this, the Preservation Board approves and designates a proposed landmark, the application goes on to the Planning Commission, which "shall give due consideration to the resolution of the Preservation Board, the evidence produced at its public hearing, any staff reports prepared with respect to the proposed landmark and its own knowledge and expertise" (Code § 120-193[A][4][d][2]). In evaluating an application that the Preservation Board has approved, the Planning Commission must consider whether the proposed landmark has

the potential to provide cultural and civic benefits for the people of the City by reason of prevalence of one or more of the following standards:[. . .]

[1] The proposed designation will be in harmony with the City's Comprehensive Plan and overall planning program of the City.

[2] The proposed designation will not adversely impact the growth and development of the City.

[3] The proposed designation will not adversely impact any scheduled public improvement or renewal project

(Code § 120-193[A][3][b]).

After the Preservation Board's recommendation, the application went to Respondent City of Rochester Planning Commission for consideration. The Planning Commission prepared a staff report, and all the materials considered by the Preservation Board were also provided. A public hearing has held before the Planning Commission on August 18, 2025, where many people spoke in favor of designation. The managing member of the owner of the Building spoke in opposition, and submitted materials in support of his position from his engineering team, and the developer of an adjacent property.

The Planning Commission denied the application via a written notice of decision on September 3, 2025, finding designation met standards Code § 120-193(A)(3)(b)(1) & (3), but did not meet standard Code § 120-193(A)(3)(b)(2).

Petitioner brought this proceeding via Petition filed October 3, 2025.

ANALYSIS

A. The motion to dismiss.

In their motion to dismiss, Necessary Party Respondent argued Petitioner lacked standing to challenge the Denial, relying in part on the three-part test set forth by the Court of Appeals in Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761 (1991):

In the area of associational or organizational standing, the applicable principles are embodied in three requirements. First, if an association or organization is the petitioner, the key determination to be made is whether one or more of its members would have standing to sue; standing cannot be achieved merely by multiplying the persons a group purports to represent. Second, an association must demonstrate that the interests it asserts are germane to its purposes so as to satisfy the court that it is an appropriate representative of those interests. Third, it must be evident that neither the asserted claim nor the appropriate relief requires the participation of the individual members. These requirements ensure that the requisite injury is established and that the organization is the proper party to seek redress for that injury

(id. at 775 [emphasis in original]).

Necessary Party Respondent argued that Petitioner recited that its members "include Rochester residents directly affected by the [Denial]" (NYSCEF document 1, para. 17), but the Petition is not supported by an affidavit from any individual described therein.

Necessary Party Respondent also argued that Petitioner lacks standing because it sustained no injury-in-fact as a result of the Denial. In support of this Necessary Party Respondent criticized first Petitioner's reliance on Code § 120-193(A) as a basis for its allegation of injury-in-fact and second, that general grievances regarding speculative future development do not differ from grievances others from the public could assert.

In opposition, Petitioner argued that Code § 120-193 bypasses the common law test in Society of Plastics:

Appeal. An appeal from any final decision of the Preservation Board or Planning Commission as to any matter regarding the landmark designation may be taken within 30 days of the filing of such decision by any person aggrievedor by any authorized officer, department, bureau, board or commission of the City in accordance with Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules

(Code § 120-193[A][5] [emphasis added]). Taken together with Code § 1-9's broad definition of "person" which includes "[a]ny natural individual, firm, trust, partnership, association, or corporation in his or her own capacity", Petitioner argued it has the ability to bring this proceeding. Petitioner further argued that § 120-193(A)(5)'s clause "any person aggrieved" describes Petitioner given the procedural framework of § 120-193 provides no internal administrative appeal process, and specifically identifies an Article 78 proceeding as the vehicle for an appeal. Petitioner pointed to its role in assisting in the preparation of the application that was the subject of the Denial as further evidence it was aggrieved with the meaning of § 120-193(A)(5).

To begin, the Court agrees with Petitioner that it meets the definition of "person" under § 1-9. Accepting Necessary Party Respondent's other arguments as true, the Court struggles to imagine a petitioner that would have standing to challenge the denial of landmark status other than the owner of the property at issue. Reaching such a result would close the courthouse doors to a group of "persons" for whom the Code sought to provide avenues of relief.

The Code very clearly contemplates scenarios where the interests of the property owner are in conflict with others ("Purpose. Landmarks may be designated in furtherance of the following public purposes, which are hereby found to be in the interest of the health, prosperity and welfare of the City and its residents: [. . .] [b] To safeguard the City's historic, aesthetic and cultural heritage as embodied and reflected in such improvements and areas" [Code § 120-193(A)(2)]).

This conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of § 120-193 (7-27-2004 by Ord. No. 2004-240; 6-16-2009 by Ord. No. 2009-179; 6-20-2017 by Ord. No. 2017-170; 6-17-2025 by Ord. No. 2025-209), which entirely post-dates Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761 (1991). Petitioner effectively conceded it does not prevail using the three-part test in Society of Plastics, and it logically follows given the plain language of § 120-193 that the its authors recognized common law presented a barrier to preservationists and wanted to create an avenue for relief for "persons" similarly situated to Petitioner.

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

B. The Petition.

In its Petition, Petitioner alleged that " Planning Commission's Decision was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and lacked a rational basis in fact or in the record. The Planning Commission also failed to perform its legal duty and misapplied the applicable law" (NYSCEF document 1, para. 76), partitioned into two causes of action, the first alleging the Planning Commission's Denial was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence, and the second that the Planning Commission's Denial constituted an error of law and procedure and a failure of a lawful duty (id. at para. 78-87).

"Zoning restrictions, being in derogation of common-law property rights, should be strictly construed and any ambiguity resolved in favor of the property owner" (Toys "R" Us v Silva, 89 NY2d 411, 421 [1996])

CPLR § 7803(3) allows a court to annul a governmental action when a determination "was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion."

1. First cause of action: Denial was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.

"An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts" (Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]). Conversely, "there is a rational basis for [a] determination" when such a determination is "consistent with [the agency's] own rules and precedents" (id.). "If the court finds that the determination is supported by a rational basis, it must sustain the determination even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency" (id.).

"This review is deferential for it is not the role of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives" (Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d 416, 430 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]).

Both standards drive at functionally the same inquiry: "Rationality is what is reviewed under both the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary and capricious standard" (Pell v. Bd. of Ed., 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]).

Petitioner argued the Denial was arbitrary and capricious because the Planning Commission failed to properly apply the governing standards in the Code, specifically that the Planning Commission concluded that designating the Building met two of the three standards under Code § 120-193(A)(3)(b) when only one standard must be met in order for a landmark designation to be approved.

But just as Petitioner is correct to argue that nothing in Code § 120-193(A)(3)(b) states that all three standards must be met in order for a landmark designation to be approved, it is equally correct to say nothing in the Code states that when two standards are met, a landmark designation must be approved. The presence of three total factors and the Code's permissive not mandatory edict that the Planning Commission not designate a landmark unless "by reason of prevalence of one or more of the following standards" (Code § 120-193[A][3][b]) evinces a statutory grant of discretion to the Planning Commission in weighing the significance of each standard.

"The evidence in this case presented a close, fact-specific choice of the kind that local boards are uniquely suited to make" (Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d 190, 196 [2002]). "[W]here, as here, conflicting inferences may be drawn, it was the responsibility of the [Planning Commission], not this Court, to weigh the evidence and exercise its discretion in approving or denying" landmark designation

(MLB, LLC v Schmidt, 50 AD3d 1433, 1436 [3d Dept 2008]).

Petitioner further argued that the Denial's findings regarding standards (1) and (2) are contradictory. For standard (1), the Planning Commission found designation of the Building would be "in harmony with the City's Comprehensive Plan and overall planning program of the City", while finding for standard (2) that designating the Building will "adversely impact the growth and development of the City."

But the Denial expressly acknowledged the tension between the two standards, writing "As noted above in standard [1], the board agreed that the [Building] contributed to the fabric of the City, but found that in critically important ways, other aspects of the landmarking of said structure would run counter to vitally important development goals outlined in the Comprehensive Plan" and proceeded to list two specific examples (Denial, page 3). One need not agree with the Planning Commission's nuanced consideration of the effect of different aspects of the Comprehensive Plan on the question of landmarking, but it cannot fairly be called irrational.

Petitioner also faulted the Denial's conclusion on standard (2) as lacking evidentiary basis, asserting that the "determination appears to rest largely on speculative testimony of the Building's owner, Mr. Rainaldi, that was provided during the hearing" (NYSCEF document 29, page 29). But Rainaldi unequivocally stated that if the Building were landmarked, he would not proceed with the redevelopment of the Building, which is otherwise presently vacant. Petitioner argued Rainaldi's position was contradicted "by extensive evidence demonstrating that historic preservation has been an important component of the successful redevelopment of the Neighborhood of the Arts" (id., page 30).

To reach the conclusion they did, the Planning Commission credited Rainaldi's testimony, as it was their prerogative to do, and given Rainaldi's account that he has been a developer for 22 years, it was not irrational to do so. And his position is not necessarily in tension with Petitioner's evidence that preservation contributed to successful redevelopment; to conclude Rainaldi intends on redeveloping in a manner that is inconsistent with historical preservation requires speculation. It is thus rational to conclude, as the Planning Commission did, that landmarking the Building would adversely impact the growth and development of the City.

In opposition to the Petition, Necessary Party Respondent submitted an affirmation from Rainaldi (NYSCEF document 18), which Petitioner rightly identified as improper for the Court to consider. In the context of Article 78 proceedings, "[j]udicial review of administrative determinations is confined to the facts and record adduced before the agency" (Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342, 347 [2000]).

But Petitioner also reached outside the record to argue that there is some unidentified redevelopment concept was floating around without the Planning Commission having the opportunity to review (see NYSCEF document 8, Loopnet listing). To be sure, this argument is not entirely sourced outside the record, but that which does come from within the record is too speculative to lend credence to.

In sum, the Denial was rational, not arbitrary and capricious, and it was supported by substantial evidence.

2. Second cause of action: Denial constituted an error of law and procedure and a failure of a lawful duty.

A determination is affected by an error of law when a governmental body erroneously interprets an applicable statute or applies an incorrect standard of proof (Pace University v New York City Commission on Human Rights, 85 NY2d 125, 128 [1995]; White v County of Cortland, 97 NY2d 336, 339 [2002]).

Petitioner additionally contended that the Denial failed to give "reasoned effect to the Preservation Board's findings and disregarded substantial evidence establishing the Building's historic and architectural significance" (NYSCEF document 1, para. 85; NYSCEF document 29, page 33). The record is clear the Planning Commission considered the Preservation Board's recommendation, and then employed their own Code-mandated, distinct analysis (see Code § 120-193[A][3][b]).

Petitioner also alleged that the "Planning Commission misstated and misunderstood the law during deliberations, indicating owner consent was required. This misapprehension tainted the proceeding and deprived Petitioners (sic) of a fair process" (NYSCEF document 1, para. 84). In searching the record, the Court cannot find an indication that the Planning Board believed that owner consent was required in its deliberations. Even in the event that there is something in the record that amounts to an indication that the Planning Commission believed owner consent was required, the Denial itself does not contain such an indication. It cannot be said that this amounts to a process that was not fair to Petitioner.

Petitioner has not established that the Denial constituted an error of law and procedure or a failure of a lawful duty.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has standing to challenge the Denial. The Denial was rational and not arbitrary or capricious nor was it affected by error of law, and thus relief is not warranted under CPLR § 7801. The Court considered all arguments presented, and to the extent any argument is not specifically addressed herein, the Court finds it is without merit. Even if, arguendo, the Denial's findings were inadequate "the record as a whole addresses the applicable considerations or otherwise provides a basis for concluding that there was a rational basis for the Planning [Commission]'s determination" (Dietrich v Planning Bd. of Town of W. Seneca, 118 AD3d 1419, 1421 [4th Dept 2014]).

Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Necessary Party Respondent's motion to dismiss is DENIED;

ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief sought and not specifically addressed herein is DENIED.

Dated this 7th day of July, 2026, at Rochester, New York.

HONORABLE VINCENT M. DINOLFO

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Vincent M. Dinolfo, J.