The People, etc., ex rel. Christina Raj, on behalf of Michael Robinson, petitioner, v. Stanley Richards, etc., respondent. (2026)

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Michael Robinson to parole supervision in accordance with CPL 430.20(4)(b).

ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.

“[T]he power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal” (Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713;  see People ex rel. Barta v. Maginley–Liddie, 239 AD3d 920, 920).  “This principle, which forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical, moot, or otherwise abstract questions, is founded both in constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine, and in methodological strictures which inhere in the decisional process of a common-law judiciary,” and “ordinarily precludes courts from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time or change in circumstances” (Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d at 713–714;  see People ex rel. Barta v. Maginley–Liddie, 239 AD3d at 920).

“Generally, a matter will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by a determination of the matter and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment” (People ex rel. Barta v. Maginley–Liddie, 239 AD3d at 920;  see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d at 714).  Here, it is undisputed that the detainee on whose behalf this proceeding was commenced was released from custody on July 14, 2026.  Thus, the proceeding is academic (see People ex rel. Welch v. Maginley–Liddie, 44 NY3d 1048, 1048;  People ex rel. Wilder v. Markley, 26 N.Y.2d 648, 648), unless it is found to be within the exception to the mootness doctrine (see People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Is., 39 NY3d 120, 123;  People ex rel. Neville v. Toulon, 215 AD3d 874, 876).  “[T]he traditional exception to the mootness doctrine” allows courts “to consider substantial and novel issues that are likely to be repeated and will typically evade review” (People ex rel. Johnson v Superintendent, Adirondack Corr. Facility, 36 NY3d 187, 196 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Gonzalez v. Annucci, 32 NY3d 461, 470).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply in this proceeding (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d at 714–715;  People ex rel. Barta v. Maginley–Liddie, 239 AD3d at 921).

Accordingly, we dismiss the writ as academic.

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, MCCORMACK and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court