The People of the State of New York v. Christopher Estrella, Defendant (2026)

The defendant, Christopher Estrella, has submitted an omnibus motion, dated March 13, 2026, seeking: inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the indictment; suppression of evidence; an order for a bill of particulars; preclusion of evidence, a production and preservation order; and leave to file further motions. The People's response, dated April 2, 2026, consents to some of the relief sought and opposes other relief. The court decides the motion as follows.

INSPECTION AND DISMISSAL OR REDUCTION

Defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted. The minutes reveal that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors on the law. The indictment substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in CPL § 200.50. The instructions were not defective as a matter of law and the proceedings were proper. Upon inspection of the grand jury minutes and exhibits, this court found the evidence to be legally sufficient to support all counts of the indictment except for count 5.

Count 5 of the indictment charges Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 165.52). That statute provides that a person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than the owner thereof, or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds fifty thousand dollars.

The grand jury evidence established that on March 28, 2025, at approximately 3:20 a.m., the defendant and two accomplices burglarized the Ridgewood City Pharmacy. Surveillance footage captured the defendant along with an accomplice inside the premises. After committing the burglary, the three individuals fled in a waiting 2021 BMW X3. Approximately thirty minutes later, at about 3:50 a.m., the same group burglarized a second pharmacy, Reo Chemist. During this second burglary, the defendant was the driver of the BMW. When the police approached the vehicle following the second burglary, the defendant fled at high speed, ultimately crashing the BMW into a parked vehicle before being apprehended.

Officer Bruinsma testified that the BMW had been reported stolen from Connecticut. The People introduced a supporting deposition from the owner, Paul Rodriguez, who stated that he had owned the BMW for approximately two years, last saw it on February 11, 2025, believed its value exceeded $50,000, and described its condition as "like new". He did not recall when he purchased the vehicle or how much he paid. No evidence was presented regarding the vehicle's mileage, purchase price, market value, replacement cost, or any physical signs of theft such as a broken ignition, punched lock, mismatched key, or altered VIN. The grand jury was not instructed on the doctrine of recent and exclusive possession.

An indictment or a count thereof must be dismissed where the evidence before the grand jury is not legally sufficient to establish every element of the offenses charged. CPL § 210.20(1)(b); CPL § 70.10(1). Evidence is legally sufficient only if, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, it would, if accepted as true, establish each element of the offense. People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 114 (1986)

Penal Law § 155.20(1) defines "value" as the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or, if market value cannot be established, the replacement cost. Mr. Rodriguez's statement that he "believed" the BMW was worth more than $50,000 was conclusory and unsupported by any factual basis. He did not recall the purchase price or date, and he provided no information regarding mileage, appraisal, or market data. Bare owner estimates such as this are insufficient to establish value. (see People v Lopez 79 NY2d 402 [1992][an affidavit submitted to a grand jury pursuant to CPL § 190.30(3) wherein the owner states in conclusory terms the worth of the allegedly stolen property without indicating a basis for that valuation where value is an element of the offense charged is insufficient]; People v Gonzalez, 221 AD2d 203, 204 [1st Dept 1995][an approximation or estimate of value without a basis is inadequate]; People v Selassie, 166 AD2d 358, 359 [1st Dept 1990][a rough estimate without evidence of its basis is inadequate].) Nor may value be supplied by assumption or common knowledge based solely on the model and year of the vehicle. See People v Irrizari, 5 NY2d 142 [1959]; People v Loomis 56 AD3d 1046 [3d Dept 2008]) Accordingly, the People failed to present legally sufficient evidence that the BMW's value exceeded $50,000.

To sustain a charge of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property, the People must prove that the defendant knew the property was stolen. Knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the doctrine of recent and exclusive possession, but only where the facts support that inference.

The BMW was stolen on February 11, 2025, and the defendant possessed it on March 28, 2025, a gap of approximately six weeks. The inference of knowledge from "recent possession" weakens as the time between the theft and the possession increases, and that the inference applies only when the interval is short enough to make it unlikely that the property passed through innocent hands. A six-week gap between the theft and the defendant's possession cannot be reasonably described as 'recent' for purposes of the inference, a conclusion consistent with the analysis in People v Schillaci, 68 AD2d 124, (2d Dept 1979). The Court of Appeals has likewise recognized that the inference of knowledge from possession weakens as the time between the theft and the possession increases. (See People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374 [1983]).

Nor was the defendant's possession exclusive. The BMW was used by three individuals during both burglaries, and it was already waiting outside the first pharmacy when the defendant and his accomplices fled. The People presented no evidence that the defendant alone possessed the keys, obtained the vehicle, or exercised dominion over it outside the burglaries. Where multiple individuals share access, possession is not exclusive. (see People v Zorcik, 67 NY2d 670 [1986])

Although the record reflects that the defendant and his accomplices jointly used the BMW, such joint possession does not satisfy the exclusivity requirement necessary to invoke the doctrine of recent and exclusive possession. The exclusivity contemplated by the doctrine concerns whether the defendant's connection to the property was distinct enough from others' access to support a reliable inference that he knew it was stolen. When multiple individuals have equal access to and use of the property, and when the evidence does not establish who obtained the vehicle, who exercised primary control over it, or who was aware of its origin, the possession cannot be deemed exclusive for inferential purposes. As Schillaci makes clear, shared access to a stolen vehicle undermines the exclusivity necessary to draw an inference of knowledge. The circumstances here — three individuals using the BMW interchangeably, with no evidence identifying the defendant as the one who acquired or controlled it — preclude reliance on the exclusivity component of the doctrine.

The defendant's flight from the police does not alter this conclusion. Although the defendant fled at high speed when officers approached following the second burglary, flight is probative only when it reflects consciousness of guilt of the crime charged. (see People v Yazum, 13 NY2d 301(1963). To support an inference of knowledge that the BMW was stolen, the flight must be tied to the theft or to the defendant's awareness of the stolen nature of the vehicle. Here, the defendant had just committed two burglaries within a thirty-minute span, and his flight is fully and logically explained by those crimes. Nothing in the record suggests that the defendant fled because he knew the BMW was stolen, and the People presented no evidence linking the flight to the theft rather than to the burglaries. As Schillaci makes clear, criminal use of a vehicle — even in the course of other felonies — does not establish knowledge that the vehicle itself was stolen.

Even if the facts had supported the recency and exclusivity components of the doctrine, the inference of knowledge could not be invoked here because the grand jury was not instructed on recent and exclusive possession. The inference is permissive and arises only when the grand jury is advised that it may, but is not required to, infer knowledge from such possession. Without that instruction, the grand jury cannot be presumed to have applied the doctrine, and a court may not retroactively supply an inference the grand jury was never told it could draw. The absence of any instruction on the doctrine of recent and exclusive possession therefore provides an independent basis for concluding that the People failed to establish the knowledge element.

Finally, the People presented no evidence of physical signs of theft, inconsistent statements, or attempts to conceal the vehicle.

The motion to dismiss count 5 of the indictment, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 165.52), is granted on the grounds that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient to establish both that the value of the BMW exceeded $50,000, and that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. The People have leave to re-present count 5 to another grand jury. The motion to dismiss the indictment is, therefore, denied with respect to the remaining counts.

MOTION FOR PRETRIAL VOLUNTARINESS HEARING

Defendant's motions for pre-trial hearing to determine the voluntariness of any unnoticed statements that the People intend to use for impeachment purposes is denied as premature. If it becomes clear that any such statements exist, the defendant has leave to move for such a hearing at that time. Should the People become aware of such statements, they are directed in inform the defendant in a timely manner.

REQUEST FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS

The defendant's request for a bill of particulars is granted to the extent provided by the People pursuant to CPL § 200.95.

PRECLUSION OF EVIDENCE

The defendant's motion to preclude any unnoticed statements or identification evidence pursuant to CPL§§ 60.45, 710.20(3) and 710.43(3) is denied. The determination of whether such evidence has been properly noticed is referred to the discretion of the hearing and trial courts before which any such evidence comes to light.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered, to determine whether the defendant's statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights and whether the statements were involuntarily made within the meaning of CPL § 65.45.

PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION ORDER

The People are directed to preserve all case related police body worn camera footage, 911 calls, radio runs, Sprint Reports, and other communication related materials.

ORDER TO COUNSEL

This court issues this order as both a reminder and a directive that counsel uphold their constitutional, statutory and ethical responsibilities in the above-captioned proceeding:

To the Prosecutor:

The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case, or, if the matter is not being prosecuted by the District Attorney, the prosecuting agency and its assigned representative, is directed to make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 (1972), People v Geaslen, 54 NY2d 510 (1981), and their progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions, and pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 and Rule 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, as described hereafter.

• The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case have a duty to learn of such favorable information that is known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and should therefore confer with investigative and prosecutorial personnel who acted in this case and review their and their agencies' files directly related to the prosecution or investigation of this case.

• Favorable information could include, but is not limited to:

a) Information that impeaches the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness, including (i) benefits, promises, rewards or inducements, express or tacit, made to a witness by a law enforcement official or law enforcement victim services agency in connection with giving testimony or cooperating in the case; (ii) a witness's prior inconsistent statements, written or oral; (iii) a witness's prior convictions and uncharged criminal conduct; (iv) information that tends to show that a witness has a motive to lie to inculpate the defendant, or a bias against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution; and (v) information that tends to show impairment of a witness's ability to perceive, recall, or recount relevant events, including impairment of that ability resulting from mental or physical illness or substance abuse.

b) Information that tends to exculpate, reduce the degree of an offense, or support a potential defense to a charged offense.

c) Information that tends to mitigate the degree of the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense, or to mitigate punishment.

d) Information that tends to undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged crime, such as a non-identification of the defendant by a witness to a charged crime or an identification or other evidence implicating another person in a manner that tends to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.

e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on a suppression motion.

• Favorable information shall be disclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible form, and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

• Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States and New York State constitutional standards, and in accordance with the timing provisions of CPL article 245. The prosecutor is reminded that the obligation to disclose is a continuing one. Prosecutors should strive to determine if favorable information exists. The prosecutor shall disclose the information expeditiously upon its receipt and shall not delay disclosure if it is obtained earlier than the time period for disclosure in CPL 245.10(1).

• A protective order may be issued for good cause pursuant to CPL 245.70 with respect to disclosures required under this order.

• Failures to provide disclosure in accordance with CPL Article 245 are subject to the available remedies and sanctions for nondisclosures pursuant to CPL 245.80.

• Only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a violation of this order or be eligible to result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.

To Defense Counsel:

Defense counsel, having filed a notice of appearance in the above captioned case, is obligated under both the New York State and the United States Constitution to provide effective representation of defendant. Although the following list is not meant to be exhaustive, counsel shall remain cognizant of the obligation to:

a) Confer with the client about the case and keep the client informed about all significant developments in the case;

b) Timely communicate to the client any and all guilty plea offers, and provide reasonable advice about the advantages and disadvantages of such guilty plea offers and about the potential sentencing ranges that would apply in the case;

c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status, ensure that the client receives competent advice regarding the immigration consequences in the case as required under Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356 (2010);

d) Perform a reasonable investigation of both the facts and the law pertinent to the case (including as applicable, e.g., visiting the scene, interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing pertinent materials, consulting experts, inspecting exhibits, reviewing all discovery materials obtained from the prosecution, researching legal issues, etc.), or, if appropriate, make a reasonable professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter;

e) Comply with the requirements of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct regarding conflicts of interest, and when appropriate, timely notify the court of a possible conflict so that an inquiry may be undertaken or a ruling made;

f) Possess or acquire a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal substantive, procedural and evidentiary law to ensure constitutionally effective representation in the case; and

g) When the statutory requirements necessary to trigger required notice from the defense are met (e.g., a demand, intent to introduce particular evidence, etc.), comply with the statutory notice obligations for the defense as specified in CPL 250.10, 250.20, and 250.30.

LEAVE TO FILE FURTHER MOTIONS

The branch of the motion requesting leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent recognized by CPL 255.20(3).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.

April 17, 2026

GARY F. MIRET, J.S.C.

Gary F. Miret, J.