SOUTHERN AUTO FINANCE COMPANY LLC v. MIHAELA (2026)

The following numbered papers were used on this motion: NYSCEF Document Numbers 1-8.

Upon the foregoing papers, and having heard oral argument, the within motion is determined as follows.

In an action initiated on November 17, 2025, Plaintiff Southern Auto Finance Company (SAFCO or Plaintiff) seeks to recover possession of, and damages related to, Defendant Mihalcea Monalisa Mihaela's (Mihaela) alleged wrongful transfer of title of a used 2021 Ram 1500 pickup truck to Defendant Lasha Mikeladze (Mikeladze) that fraudulently removed SAFCO's priority secured lien. The action also names the New York Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) as a Defendant, because of its alleged facilitation of the title transfer. Plaintiff SAFCO alleges that on or about August 25, 2024, Mihaela executed a Retail Installment Sales Contract in connection with the truck's purchase from Toyota of Hollywood. On or about September 27, 2024, Mihaela allegedly applied to the New York DMV to transfer title to Mikeladze. Plaintiff contends that Mihaela knowingly submitted a fraudulent satisfaction of SAFCO's security lien in order to effectuate the title transfer to Mikeladze. As a result, Plaintiff wishes to recover possession of the vehicle and requests that the Court enter judgment against Mihaela and Mikeladze, individually, jointly, and severally, for declaratory relief, temporary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages in an amount to be determined after a trial on the issues, together with awarding SAFCO its costs, attorneys' fees and any other and further relief the Court deems just and proper. (See NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1.)

On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff moved to extend the deadline for service of the summons and complaint on Defendants by 90 days from the date of the Court's order (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6). Plaintiff claimed that it made diligent efforts to effectuate service on Defendants, but was unsuccessful due to difficulty locating defendants, evasion, and/or incorrect addresses. Exhibits A and B of the notice of motion contain multiple verified returns of non-service for each of the individual Defendants (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6 at 5-10).

Defendant New York State DMV has submitted correspondence on NYSCEF, stating that DMV has no particular stake in the underlying dispute and does not take a position on the merits of the complaint but rather leaves the resolution of this matter to the sound discretion of the Court (see NYSCEF Doc No. 3).

In support of its motion to extend the deadline, Plaintiff cited CPLR 306-b which states: “If service is not made upon a defendant within the time provided in this section, the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service.” Plaintiff claimed that an extension is warranted on the grounds of both “good cause” based on Plaintiff's diligent efforts to effectuate service and “interest of justice,” considering the merits of the action, lack of prejudice to defendants, and the preference for resolving cases on the merits (NYSCEF Doc No. 6 at 3-4).

The Court notes that Plaintiff's attorney affirmation did not include the language required by CPLR 2106 (a) in full. In recent years, CPLR 2106 was amended to allow for the submission of unsworn affirmations in lieu of notarized affidavits, but these affirmations require specific language in order to be admissible in court. Pursuant to CPLR 2106 (a), last amended effective November 21, 2025, an affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

I affirm this ––– day of –––––, –––––, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, except as to matters alleged on information and belief and as to those matters I believe it to be true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.

The First Department has upheld this standard, rejecting an affirmation in Matter of Grandsard v Hutchinson (227 AD3d 491 [1st Dept], affg for reasons stated by Sup Ct, 2024 WL 1957086 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]) which was made merely “under the penalty of perjury.” In Grandsard, the Supreme Court cited Paez v Board of Elections (2023 NY Slip Op 31438[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2023]), holding that an affirmation lacking the language that CPLR 2106 now required failed to demonstrate an appreciation for the gravity of the factual account related and was ultimately not a verification at all. Similarly, the Supreme Court in R.F. v L.K. (82 Misc 3d 1221[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50358[U] [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2024]) held that because the defendant's affirmation did not include the required language, it was “not in admissible form and cannot be relied upon as proof of facts set forth therein.”

Thus, in the absence of the specific language required by CPLR 2106 (a), moving Plaintiff's affirmation in support of motion is not in admissible form and cannot be relied upon as proof of the facts set forth therein. This is especially so because the affirmation lacks an actual signature of counsel. Rather there appears an “/s/ Ramona V. Singh, Esq.” in italicized Times New Roman font. Since the affirmation was improperly verified and lacks an actual signature, the relief sought — extending the deadline for service of the summons and complaint upon Defendants — cannot be granted. There is no prima facie case in support of the requested relief.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

Plaintiff Southern Auto Finance Company's motion seeking an extension of the deadline to serve the summons and complaint to Defendants Mihalcea Monalisa Mihaela and Lasha Mikeladze is DENIED. The motion is deemed moot with regard to Defendant New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

Aaron D. Maslow, J.* FN* This Court acknowledges the assistance of Gila Kuzniar, judicial intern and junior at Yeshiva University's Stern College for Women, in the preparation of this decision.