Leticia Carolina De Los Santos, Plaintiff, v. BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC JFK MILLENIUM PARTNERS LLC JFK KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (2026)

The papers listed by NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 9-14, 19, and 23-28 were read on the motion of the Defendant Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the "Port Authority") for an Order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) and (a)(7), dismissing the complaint against it and against defendant John F. Kennedy International Airport ("JFK Airport").

I. Background

Plaintiff Leticia Carolina De Los Santos ("Plaintiff") commenced this personal injury action by filing a summons and complaint on August 1, 2025, asserting claims against four defendants: (1) the Port Authority, (2) British Airways PLC, (3) JFK Millenium Partners, LLC, and (4) JFK Airport (see Doc. No. 2; the "Complaint").

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that on June 25, 2024, she was caused to slip and fall at Terminal 7 of John F. Kennedy International Airport as a result of the defendants' negligence which caused her to sustain multiple injuries.

The Port Authority now moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) and (a)(7). The Port Authority contends that the Complaint must be dismissed against it because Plaintiff failed to commence this action within one year of the accrual of the action as required by statute. With respect to JFK Airport, the Port Authority contends that dismissal is warranted because JFK Airport is not a separate suable entity from the Port Authority.

Because McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7107 (L 1950, ch 301, § 7), "unambiguously allows an action against the Port Authority only upon the condition" that the action be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues, this action, commenced against the Port Authority—on August 1, 2025—more than one year after the accident on June 25, 2024, cannot be maintained (Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc. v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 NY2d 375, 379 [1999] [emphasis added] [internal citation and quotations omitted]). Furthermore, because JFK Airport is not a separate legal entity but merely a facility operated by the Port Authority, this action may not be maintained against it (see Beaie v Term. One Group Assn., L.P., 2025 NY Misc LEXIS 32890 [Sup Ct, Queens County Oct. 8, 2025]; Johnson v Port Auth. of NY & New Jersey, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 27379, 2010 WL 1223580 [ED NY, Mar. 23, 2010]).

II. Discussion

A. Dismissal of the Complaint Against the Port Authority

This motion involves an analysis "of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7107 (L 1950, ch 301, § 7), which sets forth conditions precedent for commencing an action against the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey" (Espinal v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 213 AD3d 101, 102 [2d Dept 2023]).

"The Port Authority is a public entity jointly created by a 1921 compact between New York and New Jersey to oversee and operate critical centers of commerce and trade, as well as transportation hubs such as ports, airports, bridges, and tunnels" (Matter of In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 17 NY3d 428, 432-33 [2011]). "Bistate entities . . . typically are creations of three discrete sovereigns: two States and the Federal Government" (Hess v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 US 30, 40 [1994]). In 1921 "Congress, pursuant to the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause,¹ consented to [the] compact between the [Port] Authority's parent States" (Hess, 513 US at 35).

"In 1950 and 1951 New York and New Jersey respectively enacted legislation that consent[ed] to suits, actions or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise ... against the [Port Authority]" (Feeney v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F2d 628, 632 [2d Cir 1989], aff'd, 495 US 299 [1990] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). "Prior to the enactment of this concurrent legislation, effective June 13, 1951, the Port Authority, as a direct governmental agency of New York and New Jersey, was absolutely immune from suit" (Luciano v Fanberg Realty Co., 102 AD2d 94, 95 [1st Dept 1984]). The New York legislation, in relevant part, provides that " 'the said two states consent to liability on the part of the [P]ort [A]uthority in such suits, actions or proceedings for tortious acts committed by it and its agents to the same extent as though it were a private corporation' " (Espinal v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 213 AD3d 101, 103 [2d Dept 2023], quoting McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7106 [L 1950, ch 301, § 6]). The legislation, however, also provides that the Port Authority "waive[s] immunity and consent[s] to be sued only in the event that certain jurisdictional conditions precedent are performed" (Savino v Demiglia, 133 AD2d 389, 390 [2d Dept 1987] [emphasis added]). "Among these conditions precedent is that the action be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued" (Savino, 133 AD2d at 390). McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7107 provides that:

"The foregoing consent is granted upon the condition that any suit, action or proceeding prosecuted or maintained under this act shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, and upon the further condition that in the case of any suit, action or proceeding for the recovery or payment of money, prosecuted or maintained under this act, a notice of claim shall have been served upon the port authority by or on behalf of the plaintiff or plaintiffs at least sixty days before such suit, action or proceeding is commenced. The provisions of this section shall not apply to claims arising out of provisions of any workmen's compensation law of either state."

Thus, "[i]n a single enactment, the State not only consented to suits against Port Authority but also expressly incorporated within the act a requirement of timely suit as an integral part of its waiver of sovereign immunity. Where a statute both creates a cause of action and attaches a time limit to its commencement, the time is an ingredient of the cause" (Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc. v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 NY2d 375, 379 [1999] [internal citations and quotations omitted] [emphasis added]). Indeed, the "legislative intent to condition the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the Port Authority on timely suit could not be more clear" (Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc., 93 NY2d at 379). The statute "unambiguously allows an action against the Port Authority only upon the condition" that the action be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues (Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc., 93 NY2d at 379). This statutory time restriction for commencement of a suit "conditions the existence of a right of action, thereby creating a substantive limitation on the right"Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc., 93 NY2d at 378).

In short, as relevant here, "[a] condition precedent to suit against the Port Authority is that the action be commenced within one year of the accrual of the cause of action" (McKenzie v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 201 AD3d 572, 572 [1st Dept 2022]). Since this condition is jurisdictional it "must be strictly construed" (Lyons v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 228 AD2d 250, 251 [1st Dept 1996]). Failure to satisfy the condition precedent "results in a withdrawal of consent and compels the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction" (Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 137 AD2d 795, 796 [2d Dept 1988]; see also DaCruz v Towmasters of New Jersey, Inc., 22 AD3d 629, 630 [2d Dept 2005] [dismissing complaint against the Port Authority pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(2) because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the "condition precedent" to commence the action within one year of accrual]; McKenzie, 201 AD3d at 572 ["dismissal of the complaint as against the Port Authority for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is required, since plaintiff's accident occurred on March 1, 2019, but he did not commence this action until May 29, 2020"]; Ofulue v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 307 AD2d 258, 259 [2d Dept 2003] ["plaintiff failed to satisfy the condition precedent to bringing an action against the Port Authority as required by section 7107, and therefore, the Supreme Court had no subject matter jurisdiction"]; Giannone v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 127 AD2d 818, 819 [2d Dept 1987] [the conditions of section 7107 are "mandatory and jurisdictional" and the failure to satisfy the conditions "results in a withdrawal of consent and compels the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"]; Lyons, 228 AD2d at 251 ["Compliance with the condition precedent in the statute of giving sixty days notice is mandatory and jurisdictional. The failure to satisfy this condition will result in withdrawal of defendant's consent to suit and compels the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"]).

Here, although Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on June 25, 2024, when she slipped and fell at Terminal 7 at JFK Airport, she did not commence this action until August 1, 2025. Since the Plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory condition precedent to commence the action within one year of accrual, this Court lacks jurisdiction of the claims against the Port Authority compelling their dismissal.

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff puts forth several arguments seeking to overcome the late commencement of this action. The arguments are unavailing.

First, there is no "accrual ambiguity" (Doc. No. 23 ¶¶ 16-17). "Generally, tort claims accrue upon an injury being sustained, not upon the defendant's wrongful act or the plaintiff's discovery of the injury" (City Store Gates Mfg. Corp. v Empire Rolling Steel Gates Corp., 113 AD3d 718, 719 [2d Dept 2014]). There is no reason to deviate from the general rule here (see Espinal, 213 AD3d 101 [cause of action against Port Authority accrued on May 7, 2019 when the "plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot at LaGuardia Airport"]; McKenzie, 201 AD3d 572 [1st Dept 2022] [cause of action against Port Authority accrued on March 1, 2019 when "plaintiff's accident occurred"]). Accordingly, here, Plaintiff's claim accrued on the date of the slip and fall accident—June 25, 2024—not from when Plaintiff learned, allegedly, in August 2025, that she would need "right shoulder" surgery as a result of the fall (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 16). Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that she sustained injury on the date of the accident as she provides emergency room medical records from June 25, 2024 (Doc. No. 11, pp. 9-11), and further, to be sure, the Notice of Claim dated July 23, 2024 identifies a "right shoulder" injury, in addition to a list of numerous other injuries (Doc. No. 11, p. 3).

Second, Plaintiff urges that timely service of the Notice of Claim within one month of the accident preserved her claim, and that, in any event, the Port Authority should be equitably estopped from enforcing the one-year statutory condition precedent. To support her claim Plaintiff cites cases that involve municipal corporations and thereby involves General Municipal Law which affords wide discretion in the filing of a late notice of claim (see Luciano v Fanberg Realty Co., 102 AD2d 94, 97 [1st Dept 1984]). The Port Authority, however, is not a municipal corporation but rather is "an agency created by the State of New York and the State of New Jersey" (Waisome v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 999 F2d 711, 713 [2d Cir 1993]). As a "bistate agency", the General Municipal Law "has no application" to the Port Authority (Luciano, 102 AD2d at 97; see also Campbell v City of New York, 4 NY3d 200, 202 [2005] [distinguishing between General Municipal Law § 50—i which is a statute of limitations to which the tolling provision of CPLR 205[a] applies and the requirement for bringing an action against the Port Authority within one year which is a condition precedent to suit which is a substantive limitation on the right to sue]). Here, the statutory conditions precedent such as the one-year accrual period and the "notice of claim requirement with respect to the State or a State agency, unlike the case of a municipal corporation, is jurisdictional" (Luciano, 102 AD2d at 97). Further, Plaintiff's allegation of being misled by the Port Authority into delaying action is wholly conclusory and without basis (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 11).

Third, the "fact that the Port Authority may not have been prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute is immaterial, since the requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly construed" (Lyons, 228 AD2d at 251]).

Finally, Plaintiff's urge that resolution of this matter should be on the merits. Plaintiff's position is unavailing as it again overlooks that the one-year statutory time restriction is an "ingredient" of the action (Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc., 93 NY2d at 379), "jurisdictional", and to be "strictly construed" (Lyons, 228 AD2d at 251]).

B. Dismissal of the Complaint Against JFK Airport

As set forth above, the "Port Authority is a bi-state agency that manages bridges, tunnels, airports, and other transportation facilities in New York and New Jersey" (Kelly v United States, 590 US 391, 394, [2020]). One such facility is JFK Airport (see Waisome v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 999 F2d 711, 713 [2d Cir 1993] ["The Port Authority is an agency created by the State of New York and the State of New Jersey for the operation, administration and protection of Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports, bridges, roads, tunnels, and other terminal facilities in New York and New Jersey"]; Intl. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v New York Port Auth., 425 F Supp 681, 683 [SD NY 1977] [The Port Authority "owns and/or operates various transportation, terminal and other commerce facilities in the bi-state Port District, including Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark airports"]).

Since JFK Airport is not a separate legal entity but merely a facility operated by the Port Authority, this action may not be maintained against it (see Beaie v Term. One Group Assn., L.P., 2025 NY Misc LEXIS 32890 [Sup Ct, Queens County Oct. 8, 2025]; Johnson v Port Auth. of NY & New Jersey, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 27379, 2010 WL 1223580 [ED NY, Mar. 23, 2010]; see also Boyd v LaGuardia Airport, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 169733, 2022 WL 4357466 [ED NY, Sept. 20, 2022] ["LaGuardia Airport is operated by the Port Authority under a lease with the City of New York . . . and therefore was improperly named as a party"]).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the Port Authority's motion is granted and the Complaint is dismissed as against the Port Authority and JFK Airport.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: July 22, 2026

Long Island City, New York

SCOTT DUNN, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Article I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."

Scott Dunn, J.