Village of Sloatsburg, Plaintiff, v. LLC (2026)

The following papers, numbered 1-8, were considered in connection with Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an Order enjoining, restraining and staying Defendant RAMAPO FIELD, LLC from continuing to utilize the 50-foot wide strip of land in the Village of Sloatsburg as a road, in violation of a decision by the Village of Sloatsburg Zoning Board, dated April 2, 2026, and the Code of the Village of Sloatsburg, pending a hearing to consider the Plaintiff's underlying action seeking a permanent injunction, and for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just, proper and equitable:

PAPERS NUMBERED

Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No 1)/Affirmation of Richard Ellsworth, Esq./ Exhibits 1-8/Affidavit of Carlos Diaz/Affirmation of Richard Ellsworth, Esq. Pursuant to NYCRR 202.8(D) and (E) 1

Letter to Judge Fried dated June 18, 2026 from Paul Adler, Esq. 2

Letter to Judge Collins dated June 22, 2026 from Richard M. Ellsworth, Esq. 3

Affirmation of Albert J. Pirro, Esq. in Opposition/Exhibits A-F 4

Affirmation of Richard M. Ellsworth, Esq. in Reply/Exhibit A 5

Letter to Judge Collins dated July 21, 2026 from William V. Coleman, Esq. 6

Letter to Judge Collins dated July 22, 2026 from Richard M. Ellsworth, Esq. 7

Letter to Judge Collins dated July 22, 2026 from William V. Coleman, Esq. 8

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiffs SABELLE FRASCA and CURT FRASCA's Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an order (a) disqualifying Plaintiffs' counsel, Stephen M. Honan, Esq. and his firm FEERICK NUGENT MACCARTNEY, PLLC, from further representation of Plaintiffs in this action due to it being a violation of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct on the grounds that Mr. Honan is a necessary witness on disputed issues of fact that are central to Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, and his continued role would impermissibly intertwine advocacy with testimony, (b) staying all proceedings in this action pending the determination of this motion; and (c) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

In this action by plaintiff Village of Sloatsburg (hereinafter the "Village") against defendant Ramapo Field, LLC (hereinafter "Ramapo Field") seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction enjoining Ramapo Field from utilizing a fifty-foot-wide strip of land located within the Village (the "Sloatsburg Strip" or the "Strip") as a roadway for commercial vehicles, the Village moves by order to show cause for a preliminary injunction enjoining Ramapo Field from: (i) utilizing the Strip as a roadway; and (ii) allowing commercial trucks and other large commercial vehicles and equipment to traverse the Strip into the Town of Ramapo. Ramapo Field opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Village's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Ramapo Field owns two parcels relevant to this dispute: (i) an approximately forty-eight- acre parcel located in the Town of Ramapo, adjoining the boundary of the Village (the "Ramapo Parcel"), and (ii) the Sloatsburg Strip, a crooked, fifty-foot-wide strip of land located entirely within the Village that bisects property owned by John J. Baratta and adjoins the Town of Ramapo boundary. By Decision, Order and Judgment dated January 2, 2025, in a prior action between Ramapo Field and Baratta and others (Index No. 033423/2021), this Court (Fried, J.), after trial, determined that Ramapo Field owns the Strip in fee simple, but that the Strip is encumbered by express easement rights held by Baratta and certain other neighboring landowners, rendering Ramapo Field's fee interest servient to those easements (hereinafter the "Fried Decision").

Following the Fried Decision, the Village's then Building Inspector issued Notices of Violation against Ramapo Field alleging that its use of the Strip as a roadway for commercial trucks and equipment violated the Village's Industrial Park ("IP") zoning provisions, which do not enumerate a standalone roadway as a permitted, special, or accessory use, and further alleging that the resulting truck traffic caused noise, dust, and vibration in violation of the Village Code (the "Code Violations"). Ramapo Field administratively appealed the Code Violations to the Village Zoning Board of Appeals (the "ZBA").

Before the ZBA rendered its determination, Ramapo Field commenced a hybrid proceeding and action pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78 and for declaratory relief against the Village and others, by order to show cause dated March 25, 2026, seeking, among other things, annulment of the anticipated ZBA determination, a declaration concerning the proper construction of the Village Code, constitutional relief, a stay pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preserving Ramapo Field's continued use of the Strip pending judicial review (Ramapo Field LLC v Village of Sloatsburg, et al., Index No. 032198/2026) (hereinafter the "2026 Ramapo Field Action"). At a virtual hearing on March 26, 2026, this Court (Fried, J.) denied Ramapo Field's application for a temporary restraining order in that action. Ramapo Field thereafter amended its complaint in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action on May 16, 2026, adding parties and an additional cause of action.

On March 19, 2026, the ZBA conducted a hearing and determined that the Code Violations were valid. The ZBA issued its written decision on April 1, 2026, and filed it with the Village Zoning Board Clerk on April 2, 2026 (the "ZBA Decision"). The validity of the ZBA Decision — that is, whether the Village Code permits or prohibits Ramapo Field's use of the Strip as access to the Ramapo Parcel — is squarely at issue in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action, which remains pending and undetermined.

On June 18, 2026, the Village commenced this separate plenary action seeking a permanent injunction against Ramapo Field's continued use of the Strip and simultaneously moved by order to show cause for interim injunctive relief pending determination of this action. In support, the Village submits the affirmation of its counsel, Richard M. Ellsworth, Esq., and the affidavit of current Building Inspector Carlos Diaz, who avers that Ramapo Field has continued to allow commercial trucks and equipment to traverse the Strip, generating noise, dust, and vibration. The Village argues that it enjoys a reduced burden on this motion pursuant to Village Law § 7-714, that the ZBA Decision establishes its likelihood of success on the merits, and that the balance of equities favors the Village and its residents.

Ramapo Field opposes the motion through the affirmation of Albert J. Pirro, Jr., Esq., which incorporates by reference the record submitted by Ramapo Field in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action. Ramapo Field argues, among other things, that: (i) the Strip constitutes the sole means of vehicular ingress and egress to the otherwise landlocked Ramapo Parcel; (ii) the relief the Village seeks would not preserve but would instead destroy a use that has existed for decades, effectively awarding the Village the ultimate relief sought in its complaint before the merits — including the merits of the ZBA Decision's validity, presently sub judice in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action — have been adjudicated; (iii) the Diaz affidavit is conclusory and establishes only the continuation of longstanding, historical use, not any new or imminent harm; and (iv) neighboring landowners possessing express easements over the Strip continue to use it for similar commercial purposes without Village interference, raising substantial questions of selective enforcement.

II. Standard Governing Preliminary Injunctive Relief

A municipality seeking to enjoin a violation of its own local law need not satisfy the traditional three-part test applicable to private litigants See cf. Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]. Rather, "on an application for a preliminary injunction, a municipality must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its case and that the balancing of the equities weighs in its favor" — a two-part standard requiring no independent showing of irreparable harm. See County of Westchester v United Water New Rochelle, Inc., 32 AD3d 979, 980 [2d Dept 2006]; accord Matter of Vil. of Chestnut Ridge v Roffino, 306 AD2d 522 [2d Dept 2003] [applying the same standard to zoning enforcement under Village Law § 7-714].

The Court accordingly evaluates the Village's motion under this two-prong standard — (A) likelihood of success on the merits, and (B) the balance of the equities — addressing the comparative hardship to Ramapo Field, which would otherwise inform an irreparable-harm analysis, as part of the equities prong below. Even under this permissive standard, a preliminary injunction remains an extraordinary remedy, and the movant's right to relief must be clearly established; the failure to demonstrate either required element requires denial of the motion. See Berkoski v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Southampton, 67 AD3d 840, 844 [2d Dept 2009].

III. Discussion

A. The Village Has Not Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Village's theory of likelihood of success rests entirely upon the correctness of the ZBA Decision — that is, upon the premise that the ZBA properly determined that use of the Strip as a roadway for commercial vehicles is neither a permitted, special, nor accessory use under Village Code § 402-22, and that the Code Violations were therefore validly issued.

That premise, however, is not an established fact. It is the very question presented for judicial review in the earlier-commenced 2026 Ramapo Field Action, in which Ramapo Field seeks annulment of the ZBA Decision pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78, together with related declaratory, constitutional, and injunctive relief, and in which that action remains pending and undetermined before this Court.

A municipal zoning board's determination is entitled to deference and will be sustained where it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence. See Matter of Pomponio v DeChance, 216 AD3d 1165, 1165 [2d Dept 2023]. Deference, however, is not a substitute for judicial review; it describes the standard by which that review is ultimately conducted. Where, as here, the lawfulness of the very administrative determination underlying a movant's claim of entitlement to relief is the subject of a separate, earlier-filed, and still-pending proceeding challenging that determination on multiple independent grounds, this Court cannot say, on this record and at this procedural juncture, that the Village has clearly and convincingly established a likelihood that it will ultimately prevail. To hold otherwise would require this Court to prejudge, in the context of a preliminary injunction motion in a later-filed companion action, the precise legal question that is committed to resolution in the pending Article 78 proceeding, with the attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications concerning the same ZBA Decision, the same Strip, and the same parties.

That the challenge to the ZBA Decision is a substantial one, and not a makeweight, is confirmed by Ramapo Field's papers in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action, which Ramapo Field has annexed to and incorporated in its opposition here. Among other things, Ramapo Field contends that a private roadway used for ingress and egress is not a "use" subject to regulation under a municipality's zoning code at all, as distinct from regulation under the Vehicle and Traffic Law; that any ambiguity in a zoning ordinance silent as to roadway use must be construed against the municipality; that the ZBA's determination was required to be, but was not, preceded by environmental review under SEQRA; that enforcement of the Village's interpretation against Ramapo Field's only means of access to the landlocked Ramapo Parcel effects an unconstitutional taking; and that neighboring users of the Strip are identically situated comparators whose unimpeded use underscores a claim of selective enforcement.

The Court expresses no view on the ultimate merit of any of these contentions, which are committed to resolution in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action. Their existence, however — raised in a represented, substantiated submission rather than as bare assertion — demonstrates that the validity of the ZBA Decision presents genuine and substantial questions rather than a foregone conclusion, and it is that same validity on which the Village's entire likelihood-of-success showing in this action depends.

The Village's repeated invocation of the ZBA Decision as conclusive proof of its likelihood of success is, in this procedural posture, circular: the Village asks the Court to assume the correctness of the very administrative determination whose lawfulness remains to be adjudicated in the coordinate proceeding Ramapo Field timely commenced to challenge it. Until that proceeding is resolved, the Village's likelihood of success on the merits of this action cannot be regarded as clearly established, and the Village's motion may be denied on this ground alone. See Berkoski, 67 AD3d at 844.

B. The Balance of the Equities Does Not Favor the Village

Because the Village, as a municipality seeking to enforce its own zoning code, need not independently establish irreparable harm to itself (County of Westchester, 32 AD3d at 980; Roffino, 306 AD2d 522), the equities inquiry here turns on the comparative hardship each party would face from the grant or denial of interim relief — including the risk of harm to Ramapo Field that would, under the ordinary three-part test, be analyzed as irreparable injury. That comparison does not favor the Village.

A mandatory preliminary injunction — that is, one that disturbs rather than maintains the status quo — is an extraordinary remedy granted only in unusual circumstances where the granting of the relief is essential to preserve the parties' positions pending trial, and even the Village's own submissions do not present such circumstances here. See SHS Baisley, LLC v Res Land, Inc., 18 AD3d 727, 728 [2d Dept 2005]. The Diaz affidavit, upon which the Village principally relies, establishes only that Ramapo Field continues to use the Strip for vehicular access to the Ramapo Parcel in the same manner it has historically used it — a use the record reflects predates the Code Violations, the ZBA proceedings, and both pending actions. Notably absent from the Diaz affidavit is any averment that the character, intensity, or frequency of that use has materially changed, or that any new or imminent condition warrants immediate cessation of that use before either action is decided on the merits.

Because the Ramapo Parcel is otherwise without practical vehicular access apart from the Strip, an order enjoining Ramapo Field's continued use of the Strip pending trial would not preserve existing conditions; it would terminate them, and would do so for an indeterminate period while two related actions concerning the same Strip and the same ZBA Decision remain pending. Such relief would afford the Village, in substance, the ultimate relief sought in its complaint — a permanent injunction against that use — before either this action or the pending 2026 Ramapo Field Action has been resolved on the merits.

By contrast, denial of the Village's motion preserves conditions that, on this record, have existed for a substantial period, without prejudice to the Village's ability to enforce the Code Violations and obtain the permanent relief it seeks in this action, should it ultimately prevail after the questions presently pending in the 2026 Ramapo Field Action are resolved. The consequences to Ramapo Field of an erroneously granted injunction — loss of the only practical means of access to its property for the duration of two related actions — are not so readily undone by a later judgment as the consequence to the Village of awaiting that same determination before enforcing its Code. The balance of hardships therefore does not favor the Village.

New York courts have consistently treated the loss of a property owner's sole means of vehicular access as weighing heavily against interim relief that would affect such a loss, regardless of which formal test governs the application. In Lew Beach Co. v Carlson, the Third Department affirmed a preliminary injunction preserving a plaintiff's continued use of a roadway that constituted its only means of accessing its property, reasoning that the plaintiff had established it "can only gain access to its property by use of this roadway" and would be harmed irreparably were that access cut off. See Lew Beach Co. c Carlson, 57 AD3d 1153, 1155 [3d Dept 2008]. Similarly, in Camp Bearberry, LLC v Khanna, the Third Department affirmed injunctive relief restraining a defendant from blocking a common driveway that provided a plaintiff's sole means of vehicular access and held that the enjoined party's claimed inconveniences did not establish harm from maintenance of a status quo that had existed for decades. See Camp Bearberry, LLC v Khanna, 212 AD3d 897, 899—900 [3d Dept 2023].

Those authorities, if anything, cut against the Village's application rather than in its favor. It is Ramapo Field, not the Village, that occupies the position of the plaintiffs in Lew Beach Co. and Camp Bearberry: the party whose only means of vehicular access to its property would be foreclosed by the relief requested. The Village, by contrast, has identified no comparable loss it would sustain by awaiting a determination of the 2026 Ramapo Field Action before enforcing the Code Violations — only the continuation, for a further and likely brief period, of a use that has allegedly persisted without interruption for years. The comparative hardship these authorities inform therefore weighs against, not for, the mandatory interim relief the Village seeks.

The Court further notes, without resolving the issue, that Ramapo Field has raised a substantial and unresolved question concerning whether other landowners who traverse the Strip pursuant to express easements, and who are permitted to continue such use unimpeded by the Village, are similarly situated to Ramapo Field for purposes of the equities. Whatever the ultimate merit of that contention, its existence as a live, disputed issue further counsels against a finding, at this stage, that the equities favor mandatory interim relief.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Village's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that this denial is without prejudice to renewal upon a further or different showing, including following determination of the related proceeding entitled Ramapo Field LLC v Village of Sloatsburg, et al., Index No. 032198/2026.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court as to Motion Seq. No. 1.

Dated: July 23, 2026

New City, New York

JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., J.S.C.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.