C. B., etc., et al., appellants, v. Lisa M. Neal, defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al., respondents. (2026)

Argued—January 20, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

M/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Robert S. Ondrovic, J.), dated October 1, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Americas, Inc., and Honda Development and Manufacturing of America, LLC, which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging strict products liability.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Americas, Inc., and Honda Development and Manufacturing of America, LLC, which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging strict products liability is denied.

The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Co., Ltd., Honda R & D Americas, Inc., and Honda Development and Manufacturing of America, LLC (hereinafter collectively the Honda defendants), and another defendant, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries the plaintiff C.B. (hereinafter the infant plaintiff) allegedly sustained when a vehicle in which she was a passenger was involved in a front-end collision.  The plaintiffs alleged that upon impact, the rear passenger side curtain airbag deployed, which caused the rear passenger side window to shatter and injure the infant plaintiff.  The complaint asserted, among other things, causes of action against the Honda defendants sounding in strict products liability premised on design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn.  The Honda defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated October 1, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the Honda defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging strict products liability.  The plaintiffs appeal.

“A party injured as a result of a defective product may seek damages against the product manufacturer or others in the chain of distribution if the defect was a substantial factor in causing the injury” (LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d 798, 798;  see Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38, 41).  “A product may be defective when it contains a manufacturing flaw, is defectively designed or is not accompanied by adequate warnings for the use of the product” (Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d at 41 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d at 798).  “A products liability case can be proven without evidence of any particular defect by presenting circumstantial evidence excluding all causes of the accident not attributable to the defendant's product, thereby giving rise to an inference that the accident could only have occurred due to some defect in the product” (Alberto v. Nassau Sling Co., 11 AD3d 571, 572;  see LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d at 798–799).

“A defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing a design defect cause of action must establish, prima facie, that the subject product was reasonably safe for its intended use or that the plaintiff's actions constituted the sole proximate cause of his or her injuries” (LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d at 799;  see Yun Tung Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 17 NY3d 29, 33–34).  Here, the Honda defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the causes of action alleging strict products liability as were premised on an alleged design defect.  In support of their motion, the Honda defendants failed to submit evidence establishing that there was no flaw in the design of the vehicle with respect to the airbag and window glass, or that the infant plaintiff's actions constituted the sole proximate cause of her injuries (see LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d at 799;  cf.  Rabon–Willimack v. Robert Mondavi Corp., 73 AD3d 1007, 1008–1009).  The Honda defendants were not entitled to an award of summary judgment in their favor based solely on the alleged deficiencies in the plaintiffs' proof (see Porter v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 224 A.D.2d 674, 674).

The Honda defendants' submissions were likewise insufficient to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the causes of action alleging strict products liability as were premised on an alleged manufacturing defect (see id.) and failure to warn (see LaScala v. QVC, 201 AD3d at 800).

Since the Honda defendants failed to meet their initial burden, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging strict products liability regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853).

The plaintiffs' remaining contention is without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court