IN RE: Anisa Escobar (2026)

Submitted—June 18, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (James Malone, J.), dated February 7, 2025.  The order denied the mother's objections to an order of the same court (Kathryn L. Coward, S.M.) dated November 13, 2024, which, after a hearing, inter alia, denied those branches of the mother's petition which were for certain reimbursements and a recalculation of a prior child support payment.

ORDERED that the order dated February 7, 2025, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The parties are divorced and have two children in common.  In an order of support dated April 4, 2024, a Support Magistrate directed the father to pay 66% of the children's direct college expenses, which the Support Magistrate defined as tuition plus room and board up to a SUNY cap.  The Support Magistrate denied the mother's request for reimbursement for moneys she alleged that she spent for books and supplies, noting that she provided no documentation or receipts of these expenses.  In July 2024, the mother filed a modification petition seeking, inter alia, certain reimbursements.  Following a hearing, in an order dated November 13, 2024 (hereinafter the November 2024 order), the Support Magistrate, among other things, denied those branches of the mother's petition which sought a recalculation of a prior support payment as well as reimbursement for a college textbook, a laptop computer, and the cost of a process server.  The mother filed objections to the November 2024 order, contending that the Support Magistrate erred in denying those branches of her petition.  In an order dated February 7, 2025, the Family Court denied the mother's objections.  The mother appeals.

“Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240(1–b)(c)(7), the court may direct a parent to contribute to a child's education, even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement of the parties, as long as the court's discretion is not improvidently exercised in that regard” (Chan v. Chan, 267 A.D.2d 413, 414;  see Matter of Messiana v. Pena, 195 AD3d 849, 849–850).  “In determining whether to award educational expenses, the court must consider the circumstances of the case, the circumstances of the respective parties, the best interests of the children, and the requirements of justice” (Manno v. Manno, 196 A.D.2d 488, 491;  see Abayomi v. Guevara, 215 AD3d 720, 721).

Here, the Family Court properly denied the mother's objections to the November 2024 order.  The order of support dated April 4, 2024, only directed the father to pay 66% of the tuition of the children's tuition plus room and board up to a SUNY cap.  Therefore, the mother's request for reimbursement for indirect expenses was properly denied (see Matter of Apjohn v. Lubinski, 114 AD3d 1061, 1064;  cf.  Matter of Hong Li v. Chen, 248 AD3d 1037, 1039;  Matter of Healey v. Healey, 190 A.D.2d 965, 966–969).

Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court properly denied her objection to so much of the November 2024 order as denied her request to recalculate the allocation of a prior support payment, as this issue was determined in a prior proceeding (see Matter of Solomon v. Solomon, 231 AD3d 733, 734;  Matter of Svoboda v. Coraci, 83 AD3d 949, 949–950).

The mother's remaining contention is without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., FORD, LANDICINO and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court