Board of Managers of Rosedale Townhouse Condominium, respondent, v. Alia Batson, appellant, et al., defendants. (2026)

Argued—January 5, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

G/

In an action, inter alia, to foreclose a lien upon a condominium unit for nonpayment of common charges, the defendant Alia Batson appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Esposito, J.), both dated December 20, 2023.  The first order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Alia Batson and for an order of reference and denied that defendant's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, for a hearing to determine the validity of service of process upon her.  The second order, insofar as appealed from, granted the same relief to the plaintiff and referred the matter to a referee to ascertain and compute the amount due to the plaintiff.

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

On March 20, 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Alia Batson (hereinafter the defendant), among others, inter alia, to foreclose a lien for unpaid common charges filed against a residential condominium unit located in Jamaica (hereinafter the premises).  According to an affidavit of service, the defendant was served with process “personally” at the premises on April 8, 2023.

In July 2023, the plaintiff moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference.  The defendant cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her on the ground that she was not properly served with process or, alternatively, for a hearing to determine the validity of service of process upon her.  In support of her cross-motion, the defendant submitted her own affidavit denying that she was served and alleging, inter alia, that a process server “merely taped the documents on my front door.”

In an order dated December 20, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference and denied the defendant's cross-motion.  In a second order also dated December 20, 2023, the court, inter alia, granted the same relief to the plaintiff and referred the matter to a referee to ascertain and compute the amount due to the plaintiff.  The defendant appeals.

“ ‘On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment against a defendant based on the failure to answer or appear, a plaintiff must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the cause of action, and proof of the defendant's default’ ” (Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Gross, 201 AD3d 942, 944, quoting L & Z Masonry Corp. v. Mose, 167 AD3d 728, 729;  see CPLR 3215[f];  Pantanilla v. Yuson, 237 AD3d 1213, 1214).  “To defeat a facially sufficient CPLR 3215 motion, a defendant must show either that there was no default, or that [he or she] had a reasonable excuse for [the] delay and a potentially meritorious defense” (National Loan Invs., L.P. v. Bruno, 191 AD3d 999, 1001;  see Pantanilla v. Yuson, 237 AD3d at 1215;  U.S. Bank N.A. v. Crockett, 201 AD3d 767, 768).

A process server's sworn affidavit of service establishes a prima facie case as to the method of service and, therefore, gives rise to a presumption of proper service (see Caliber Home Loans, Inc. v. Silber, 173 AD3d 963, 964;  Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Alverado, 167 AD3d 987, 988).  “A mere conclusory denial of service is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service arising from the process server's affidavit.  In order to warrant a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, the denial of service must be substantiated by specific, detailed facts that contradict the affidavit of service” (Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v. Grant, 178 AD3d 997, 997–998 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted];  see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Grinkorn, 172 AD3d 1183, 1186).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the affidavit of service submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion constituted prima facie evidence of proper service on the defendant pursuant to CPLR 308(1), under which “[p]ersonal service upon a natural person” may be made “by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served” (id.;  see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Azcona, 186 AD3d 614).  The process server averred in the affidavit of service that, on April 8, 2023, at 11:33 a.m., at the address of the premises, he served the summons and verified complaint, notice of pendency, notice to tenant regarding COVID–19, and notice of electronic filing upon the defendant “by delivering thereat a true copy [thereof] to [the defendant] personally” and that he “knew said person so served to be the person mentioned and described as said defendant herein.”  The affidavit of service also provided a physical description of the defendant.

In opposition, the defendant failed to meet her burden to provide specific, detailed facts contradicting the affidavit of service.  While the defendant stated that no one with access to her unit fit the description provided by the plaintiff's process server, she did not explain how the description did not match her appearance or provide any evidence to substantiate this.  Further, while the defendant submitted a photograph purporting to show the papers taped to her door, the photograph did not have a time or date stamp and was unsupported by any other evidence that would support the defendant's contentions.  Under these circumstances, the defendant's claims were insufficiently substantiated to rebut the presumption created by the affidavit of service to either warrant a hearing or dismiss the action (see Quicksilver Capital, LLC v. Dixon Fin. Servs., LLC, 242 AD3d 916, 918–919).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference and denied the defendant's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, for a hearing to determine the validity of service of process upon her.

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court