Sotiris Nicalaou, appellant, v. Ernest E. Ranalli, et al., respondents. (2026)

Submitted—January 16, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

W/

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Rhonda E. Fischer, J.), entered October 11, 2024.  The order granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants, Ernest R. Ranalli and Ranalli Law Group, PLLC, Ranalli's law firm, represented the plaintiff, Sotiris Nicalaou, during a portion of the pendency of an action to foreclose a residential mortgage that was commenced in 2013 against Nicalaou, among others (hereinafter the mortgage foreclosure action).  A judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered against Nicalaou in the mortgage foreclosure action on June 27, 2017, and the subject property was sold at a foreclosure auction on December 4, 2018.  On January 19, 2024, Nicalaou commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for legal malpractice arising out of the representation they provided to him in connection with the mortgage foreclosure action.  The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the action was time-barred.  In an order entered October 11, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion.  Nicalaou appeals.

“ ‘On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired’ ” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Leopold & Assoc., PLLC, 238 AD3d 1195, 1196 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cruz v. Guaba, 226 AD3d 964, 965).  “ ‘If the defendant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations has been tolled, an exception to the limitations period is applicable, or the plaintiff actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period’ ” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Webster v. Sherman, 165 AD3d 738, 741;  see Roubeni v. Dechert, LLP, 159 AD3d 934, 935).  “The continuous representation doctrine serves to toll the statute of limitations and render timely an otherwise time-barred cause of action for legal malpractice, but ‘only where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim’ ” (King Tower Realty Corp. v. G & G Funding Corp., 163 AD3d 541, 543, quoting McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 306;  see Joseph v. Fensterman, 204 AD3d 766, 769).  “For the continuous representation doctrine to apply, ‘there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependant relationship between the client and the attorney which often includes an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice’ ” (Potenza v. Giaimo, 165 AD3d 1186, 1187, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 506–507).

“ ‘An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed’ ” (Joseph v. Fensterman, 204 AD3d at 769 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Schrull v. Weis, 166 AD3d 829, 831;  see CPLR 214[6] ).  “ ‘A legal malpractice claim accrues when all the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court’ ” (King Tower Realty Corp. v. G & G Funding Corp., 163 AD3d at 543 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d at 301;  see Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, 138 AD3d 1085, 1086).  Here, the defendants satisfied their initial burden by demonstrating that the cause of action alleging legal malpractice accrued, at the latest, in December 2018, and that the instant action was commenced in January 2024, more than three years later (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Leopold & Associates, PLLC, 238 AD3d at 1196;  King Tower Realty Corp. v. G & G Funding Corp., 163 AD3d at 543).

In opposition, Nicalaou failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine or any other legal basis applied to toll the statute of limitations period for enough time to render the cause of action alleging legal malpractice timely (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Leopold & Assoc., PLLC, 238 AD3d at 1196).  Nicalaou's submissions failed to demonstrate that any damages were incurred after the subject property was sold at a foreclosure auction on December 4, 2018, or that the defendants performed any legal services for Nicalaou with respect to the mortgage foreclosure action after the sale (see id.;  King Tower Realty Corp. v G & G Funding Corp., 163 AD3d at 544;  Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, 138 AD3d at 1087).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

The defendants' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

DILLON, J.P., DOWLING, LANDICINO and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court