Kimberly Simoniette, appellant, v. Ravinder S. Sidhu, etc., et al., respondents, et al., defendants. (2026)

Argued—January 28, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

G/

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Thomas Ritchie Davis, J.), entered July 10, 2024.  The judgment, upon an order of the same court dated May 31, 2024, granting the motion of the defendants Ravinder S. Sidhu and Stephanie Azevedo for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, is in favor of those defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion of the defendants Ravinder S. Sidhu and Stephanie Azevedo for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is denied, the complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against those defendants, and the order is modified accordingly.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for medical malpractice against, among others, the defendants Ravinder S. Sidhu and Stephanie Azevedo (hereinafter together the defendants).  The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants deviated from accepted medical practice in failing to timely diagnose and treat the plaintiff's acute limb ischemia, ultimately resulting in a partial amputation of the plaintiff's left leg.  The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated May 31, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion.  Thereafter, a judgment was entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants.  The plaintiff appeals.

“The essential elements of medical malpractice are (1) a deviation or departure from accepted medical practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury” (Peynado v Woodhull Med. & Mental Health Ctr., 239 AD3d 677, 677 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Avgi v. Policha, 232 AD3d 838, 839).  “ ‘In moving for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging medical malpractice, a defendant must establish, prima facie, that there was no departure or deviation from the accepted standard of care or that such departure or deviation was not a proximate cause of any injury to the plaintiff’ ” (Rico v. New York Methodist Hosp., 242 AD3d 787, 788, quoting Williams v. Levine, 238 AD3d 960, 961).  “In opposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to the elements with respect to which the defendant has met its initial burden” (Michel v. Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 125 AD3d 945, 945–946;  see Mattocks v. Ellant, 231 AD3d 813, 815).  “Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions” (Feinberg v. Feit, 23 AD3d 517, 519;  see Avgi v. Policha, 232 AD3d at 839).

Here, in opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants departed from accepted medical care and whether such alleged departures proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.  In response to the conclusion of the defendants' experts that the plaintiff was not experiencing acute limb ischemia due to the presence of, inter alia, bilateral pedal pulses and favorable capillary refill time results, the plaintiff's emergency medicine expert concluded, among other things, that the plaintiff was exhibiting signs and symptoms that were consistent with acute limb ischemia, that the presence of bilateral pulses does not exclude early, but still limb-threatening, ischemia, and that the failure to perform additional testing prevented the defendants from determining whether the plaintiff was exhibiting other signs of acute limb ischemia (see Chillious v. Edouard, 234 AD3d 737, 740;  Vichlenski v. Schwartz, 201 AD3d 773, 774–775).  In particular, the plaintiff's emergency medicine expert opined that the plaintiff was experiencing an arterial occlusion of an artery in her leg, which was not diagnosed because there was an incomplete examination of the pulses in her lower extremities, and that the defendants relied upon a “markedly limited” venous Doppler ultrasound, failed to order an arterial Doppler ultrasound, and failed to consult a vascular surgeon.  Further, the opinions of the plaintiff's experts raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants' delay in diagnosing the plaintiff with acute limb ischemia deprived her of treatment, including further anticoagulant treatment, which decreased her chances of having a better outcome.  “Whether a diagnostic delay affected a patient's prognosis is typically an issue that should be presented to a jury” (Wiater v. Lewis, 197 AD3d 782, 784).

The defendants' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

BARROS, J.P., DOWLING, VENTURA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court