Kimberly Collins, appellant, v. Avalonbay Communities, Inc., respondent. (2026)

Argued—January 12, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

G/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Gary M. Carlton, J.), dated October 22, 2024.  The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In September 2020, the plaintiff was entering her apartment building, which was owned by the defendant, when a self-closing front door allegedly closed too quickly and struck her in the back, causing her to fall forward to the floor and sustain injuries.  The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendant, alleging that it was negligent in, among other things, maintaining the door.  The defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending, inter alia, that the door was not in a dangerous or defective condition at the time of the accident.  By order dated October 22, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

A property owner has a duty to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition (see Kellman v. 45 Tiemann Assoc., 87 N.Y.2d 871, 872;  Octobre v. Soiefer, 240 AD3d 503, 505).  In order “[f]or a landowner to be liable in tort to a plaintiff injured as a result of an allegedly defective or dangerous condition on the premises, the plaintiff must establish that a defective or dangerous condition existed and that the landowner either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence in time to remedy it before the plaintiff's injury” (Donnelly v. St. Agnes Cathedral Sch., 106 AD3d 773, 773;  see Kornreich v. Honeyman, 241 AD3d 664, 665).

In a premises liability case, a defendant landowner moving for summary judgment can demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing, prima facie, that it did not create the allegedly dangerous or defective condition or have actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to have discovered and remedied it (see Giahn v. Yakubov, 235 AD3d 955, 956;  Fields v. New York City Hous. Auth., 186 AD3d 1330, 1330–1331).  “[W]hether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question of fact for the jury” (Trincere v. County of Suffolk, 90 N.Y.2d 976, 977 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Rene v. Livingston Gardens, Inc., 241 AD3d 1487, 1488).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Sougstad v. Capuano, 215 AD3d 776, 776;  Boulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 AD3d 709, 709), the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that no dangerous or defective condition existed with respect to the door at the time of the accident (see Saunders v. Nostrand 1543, LLC, 230 AD3d 1261, 1263;  Cabanas v. Qiu Yu Zou, 215 AD3d 726, 728).  Further, based on the defendant's submissions, which included, among other things, a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it lacked actual notice of the condition alleged.

Accordingly, since the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853).

LASALLE, P.J., VOUTSINAS, LOVE and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court