FAZAL RAHMAN v. STEVEN VITIELLO INSURANCE AGENCY INC STEVEN VITIELLO HUDSON INSURANCE AGENCY (2026)

The following papers numbered 1 — 3 were read and considered1 in connection with Defendant's Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2) for an Order granting summary judgment to Defendant ALLSTATE INSURANCE SERVICES, INC [ALLSTATE], dismissing the Complaint, together with such other and further relief thus Court deems proper:

PAPERS NUMBERS

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2)/Statement of Material Facts/ Memorandum of Law in Support/Affirmation in Support of Todd J. Manister, Esq./Defendant's Exhibits A-B 1

Affirmation of Wayne M. Rubin, Esq. in Opposition 2

Affirmation of Todd J. Manister Esq. in Reply/Defendant's Exhibit A 3

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

To briefly recount the facts  ¹ , Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that they purchased an automobile liability insurance policy in 2012 from Defendant ALLSTATE with the insurance limits of $250,000/$500,000 in liability coverage and $100,000/$300,000 in supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM/UM) coverage, and an umbrella policy which provided the insured limits of $5 million in excess liability coverage and $25,000 in excess SUM/UM coverage.

Plaintiff SHAMA RAHMAN was struck by a vehicle while crossing West 29th Street in New York City and sustained serious injuries. The motorist tendered a total of $25,000 to the Plaintiff, SHAMA RAHMAN, and ALLSTATE paid Plaintiff SHAMA RHAMAN $25,000 pursuant to the subject insurance policy, but the Plaintiffs claimed they suffered damages in excess of all available insurance.

The Decision and Order on Motion Seq. No. 1 granting VITELLO's and VITELLO INSURANCE AGENCY's  ² motion to dismiss was filed on November 11, 2025. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 21. Defendant ALLSTATE's instant Notice of Motion and corresponding Affirmation, Exhibits, and Memorandum of Law in Support were submitted March 13, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 26-31. An Affirmation in Opposition by Plaintiffs was submitted April 23, 2026, and Defendant ALLSTATE's reply was filed the same day. See NYSCEF Doc No. 36-37.

ARGUMENTS

A prior Decision and Order was issued by the Honorable Hal B. Greenwald, J.S.C. (retired) as to Defendants STEVEN P. VITIELLO INSURANCE AGENCY and STEVEN P. VITIELLO's pre-answer motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a)(7). See NYSCEF Doc. No. 21. In that Decision, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach of contract, finding it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Greenwald concluded that the six (6) year statute of limitations began to run in 2021 and there was no contact between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant regarding the policy from 2012 to 2023. Plaintiffs also failed to present any evidence that an exception to the statute of limitations was applicable.

For the second cause of action alleging negligence, Judge Greenwald dismissed the Plaintiffs' action as to the VITIELLO Defendants. The Court referred primarily to Murphy v. Kuhn, more specifically that "insurance agents have no duty to advise, guide, or direct a client to obtain additional coverage" in the absence of a special relationship. See Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266, 270 [1997]. The Plaintiffs did not establish that such a special relationship existed, as the Plaintiff never inquired or openly discussed the possibility of increasing their policies with Defendants STEVEN P. VITIELLO INSURANCE AGENCY and STEVEN P. VITIELLO. See id. The Defendants therefore did not owe the Plaintiffs any duty that could be breached by allegedly failing to advise the Plaintiffs on the possibility of increasing the SUM/UM liability limits of their automobile policy.

Defendant ALLSTATE, in the instant motion, argues that the Decision and Order on Motion Seq. No. 1 has become the law of the case. Therefore, ALLSTATE contends that the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract is similarly barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, ALLSTATE also argues that it did not have any duty to educate or advise the Plaintiffs on a specific level of coverage. ALLSTATE refers to the policy  ³ that informs customers to contact Defendant itself or an agent of Defendant to retain the current coverage or make any coverage adjustments. On the second negligence claim, the Defendant argues that the negligence claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim, and similarly, that ALLSTATE has no legal duty to advise customers of additional SUM/UM or excess umbrella coverage.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that a distinction exists between the duties of the insurance company, ALLSTATE, and the insurance broker, VITELLO Defendants, namely that ALLSTATE had a continuing duty to advise the Plaintiffs that they could purchase additional SUM/UM coverage each time they renewed their policy, as set out in the Complaint. See NYSCEF Doc. 1. Specifically, the Plaintiffs refers to Insurance Law § 3420[f][2][B] and claims the subject policy does not offer this statutory notice in the October 30, 2023 policy.

In reply, the Defendant ALLSTATE argues that that the statutory notice of available SUM pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420[f][2][B] was already provided and refers to the policy endorsement in NYSCEF Doc. No. 29 and 37. Defendant ALLSTATE reasserts that Plaintiffs did not take the initiative to request additional SUM coverage, and argue that the Plaintiffs do not successfully raise any issue of fact or law that allows their claims to survive summary judgment.

LAW/ANALYSIS

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case and to warrant a court to direct judgment in its favor, as a matter of law. See Civil Practice Law and Rules 3212(b); See also Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., et al, 100 NY2d 72 [2003], citing Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]. If the moving defendant fails to meet this initial burden of setting forth evidentiary facts sufficient to establish an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the motion must be denied without considering the sufficiency of the opposing papers. See Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18 [2d Dept. 2011].

However, once the defendant successfully establishes their prima facie burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact. See Romana v NYRAC, Inc., 245 AD2d 498 [1997]; See also O'Lear v Boy Scouts of Am., 33 AD3d 685 [2006]; Vesligaj v PMT Forklift Corp., 222 AD2d 431 [1995]. Summary judgment will be granted only if there is no triable issue of fact and issue finding, rather than issue determination, is the key to summary judgment, and the papers on the motion should be scrutinized in the light most favorable to the party opposing the relief. See Judice v DeAngelo, 272 AD2d 583 [2d Dept 2000].

Regarding the first cause of action for breach of contract against Defendant ALLSTATE, the Defendant refers to the holding in the previous Decision and Order to argue that the Plaintiffs' claims against ALLSTATE are time-barred by the same six (6) year statute of limitations. See New York Bus Operators Compensation Trust v American Home Assurance Co., 241 AD3d 563, 566 [2d Dept 2025]. There is no reason why the logic this Court employed in its previous Decision and Order is not applicable to Defendant ALLSTATE since the Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same contract at issue with the VITIELLO Defendants. Here, the Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute of limitations does not apply to Defendant ALLSTATE. As such, the first cause of action for breach of contract as to Defendant ALLSTATE is time-barred and is dismissed.

Turning to the second cause of action for negligence, Defendant ALLSTATE refers to the "law of the case," meaning the Court's previous opinion in which the Court ruled that the VITELLO Defendants, as the insurance agents, did not develop a special relationship with the Plaintiffs. Consequently, there was no unique duty owed to the Plaintiffs that the VITELLO Defendants breached by not informing the Plaintiffs of additional coverage. See Murphy, 90 NY2d at 270.

However, the Court finds that Defendant ALLSTATE and Plaintiffs have a different relationship - which is between the insurer and the insured, not an agent and the insured - and the controlling case law used in this Court's prior decision is not directly on point as to the instant relationship. Therefore, the Court is not precluded by the "law of the case" doctrine from considering whether additional or separate duties exist between the insured and the insurer. See RPG Consulting v Zormeti, 82 AD3d 739, 740 [2d Dept. 2011]; ("The doctrine applies only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in [a] prior decision, and to the same questions presented in the same case." [internal quotations omitted] Gilligan v Reers, 255 AD2d 486 [2d Dept. 1998]).

Plaintiffs assert that Insurance Law § 3420[f][2][A], creates a separate duty. Under Insurance Law § 3420[f][2][A], a SUM insurer is required to send an annual notification of availability of SUM coverage, but this annual notice "may be more simplified than the notice it must send to the customer when he or she first purchases SUM coverage. The annual notice must include: (1) 'a concise statement that supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is available (2) "an explanation of such coverage"; and (3) "the coverage limits that can be purchased from the insurer." See 2 New Appleman New York Insurance Law § 28.08 (2026).

Defendant ALLSTATE refers to the Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Endorsement in the Plaintiffs' policy as proof that Plaintiffs were provided with the required statutory notice. The definitions, availability and amount notices required by § 3420[f][2][A] are amply present in the endorsement and the declaration pages of the Plaintiffs' policy. The Court notes that Defendant ALLSTATE is not required to advertise or advise the Plaintiffs of the possibility of purchasing additional SUM coverage, and the statute does not impose that duty on an insurer; such a view of the statute would be a misinterpretation of § 3420[f][2][A].

Plaintiffs' insurance policy clearly delineates that the Plaintiffs had the responsibility to contact an agent if they desired additional SUM coverage, not vice-a-versa. As such, Defendant ALLSTATE has established its prima facie case for summary judgment and upon the shifting of the burden, the Plaintiffs have failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact.

In arriving at this decision, the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant ALLSTATE's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq.No. 2) is granted in its entirety and the matter is dismissed as to Defendant ALLSTATE. The foregoing is the Court's Decision and Order as to Motion Seq. No. 2.

Dated: July 9, 2026

New City, New York

Hon. John P. Collins, Jr., J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For a more detailed account of facts and procedural history leading up to this motion, refer to the Decision and Order of Motion Seq. No. 1.

2.   Collectively referred to as the VITELLO Defendants in this opinion.

3.   The Court notes that the Plaintiffs' insurance policy (submitted as Defendant's Exhibit B) refers to Fazal Rahman, and a "Sana Rahman," who is not a party to this case. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 29. The Court is assuming this is a typographical error and that the policy means to refer to Shama Rahman.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.