Jiaci Liu, Plaintiff, v. SLAA GREATER NY INTERGROUP INC (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 were read on this motion to DISMISS.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 were read on this motion to DISMISS.

Upon the foregoing documents, defendants' respective motions to dismiss this action are granted.

In this action, plaintiff asserts claims for violation of General Business Law ("GLB") §§ 349 and 350 and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that in March 2024 her former romantic partner began attending "sex and/or love addiction" meetings organized by defendant Greater NY Intergroup, Inc. ("Intergroup") and reading publications by defendant The Augustine Fellowship SLAA Fellowship-Wide Services Inc (the "Augustine Fellowship") promoting "no contact" recovery from sex addiction (NYSCEF Doc No. 9, complaint at ¶¶7, 223—226). Three months later, plaintiff's former partner told her that he had "sex and/or love addiction," for which she was a trigger, and that other Intergroup members and the Augustine Fellowship's literature recommended that he go "no contact"—i.e., cut off all communication with her (id. at 234). He then cut off all interaction with her (id. at ¶¶233—242). Plaintiff asserts, in the course of her 126-page complaint, that the Augustine Fellowship's publications are deceptive because they "present[ ] unrecognized psychological concepts as real medical diseases, promote[ ] recovery and self-diagnosis without scientific substantiation, redefine[ ] recognized medical terminology, and promote[ ] "No Contact" without disclosing foreseeable risks" (NYSCEF Doc No. 16, Intergroup memo of law at p. 3). Plaintiff further alleges that she experienced severe emotional distress as a result of her former partner's actions, and sought psychotherapy and psychiatric treatment, at which time she was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (NYSCEF Doc No. 9, complaint at ¶¶ 239—245).

In motion sequence 001, Intergroup moves to dismiss this action, arguing that it is barred by Civil Rights Law § 80-a and that plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish her standing to bring claims under the General Business Law or otherwise satisfying the elements of her four claims. In motion sequence 002, defendant the Augustine Fellowship moves for the same relief on substantially the same grounds. These motions are consolidated for disposition.

DISCUSSION

Defendants' motions are granted. As a threshold matter, the Court agrees with Intergroup that this action, fundamentally, seeks to recover for the alienation of plaintiff's former partner's affections—the root of plaintiff's asserted emotional distress is her former partner's decision to exclude her from his life. Such a claim is prohibited by Civil Rights Law § 80-a (see Sahid v Chambers, 237 AD2d 175, 175 [1st Dept 1997] [allegations that defendant psychiatrists "conspired with his ex-wife to 'brainwash' the children against him so as to deprive him of his right to visitation" asserted impermissible claim for alienation of affection]). The fact that plaintiff does not characterize this action as one for alienation of affection does not avoid this statutory prohibition (Sahid at 175 ["Despite an effort to frame this accusation in terms of intentional and negligent interference with visitation rights, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and unjust enrichment, the pleading alleges nothing more than alienation of affections"]).

Even ignoring the foregoing, this action would be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), as plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing the necessary elements of any of her four causes of action. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, where the facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). The Court must "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory . . . the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (id. at 87-88). "Dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" (Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 175 [2021] [internal citations and quotations omitted]).

GBL §§ 349 and 350

Plaintiff's claims under the General Business Law are dismissed. Fundamentally, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege an injury sufficient to give her standing to bring such claims. The emotional distress she suffered after her former partner's decision to exclude her from his life is a derivative injury that cannot support a GBL 349 claim (see City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 NY3d 616 [2009] [plaintiff New York City's alleged loss of tax revenues when consumers purchased cigarettes over the internet in reliance on defendant's misrepresentations that online purchase was tax free was injury derived from harm suffered by defendant's customers and insufficient to confer standing for claim under General Business Law]). Plaintiff also fails to allege that defendants engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct as required under GBL §§ 349 and 350.

GBL § 349 prohibits "Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state," and permits "any person who has been injured by reason of any deceptive act or deceptive practice made unlawful by this section" to "bring an action [ ] to enjoin such deceptive act or deceptive practice" and "recover such person's actual damages " (GBL § 349[a], [h]). To state a claim for a violation of this statute, plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant's conduct was consumer-oriented; (2) the defendant's act or practice was deceptive or misleading in a material way; and (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the deception (Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 176 [2021] [internal citations omitted]).

The Court does not credit Intergroup's argument that defendants' conduct is not consumer- oriented because the Augustine Fellowship's materials at issue are sold "primarily to members or adherents [of their twelve-step program] rather than broad public markets" (NYSCEF Doc No. 16, Intergroup memo of law at p. 8). GBL § 349 does not "impose a requirement that consumer- oriented conduct be directed to all members of the public" (Plavin v Group Health Inc., 35 NY3d 1, 13 [2020]) and the fact that purchases are made by a subset of consumers does not establish that conduct is not consumer oriented (see Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 178 [2021] ["The fact that persons and businesses working in the legal field purchase the Tanbook to assist in their professional endeavors does not mean that the defendant's conduct was not consumer oriented"]).

Ultimately, however, plaintiff has not pled that defendants acted in a manner that was materially misleading or deceptive. "A defendant's actions are materially misleading when they are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances" (Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 178 [2021] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). Plaintiff does not allege that defendants mischaracterized the nature or philosophy of their 12-step program (see Bader v Siegel, 238 AD2d 272, 272 [1st Dept 1997] [GBL 349 claim by students enrolled in defendant's self- improvement course, "The Conversation" dismissed where there was "no allegation that the course content, i.e., the strategies for attaining a certain lifestyle, was not taught or was other than as represented"]) and to the extent she believes that the views about sex and love addiction espoused in these meetings and publications have no foundation in science or medicine, the substance of defendants' speech on these subjects "is not purely commercial, and, thus, it is protected from false advertising and deceptive practices claims" (Lacoff v Buena Vista Pub., Inc., 183 Misc 2d 600, 606 [Sup Ct, NY County 2000]).

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under GBL § 350. That statute prohibits "false advertising in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state" (GBL § 350). To state a claim under this statute, "[a] plaintiff must demonstrate that the advertisement (1) had an impact on consumers at large, (2) was deceptive or misleading in a material way, and (3) resulted in injury (Andre Strishak & Assoc., P.C. v Hewlett Packard Co., 300 AD2d 608, 609 [2d Dept 2002] [internal citations omitted]). "[T]he test is whether the advertisement is "likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances" (id. [internal citations and quotations omitted]). As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants' materials outlining the program's philosophy were misleading or that she suffered anything other than a derivative injury.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To do so, plaintiff was required to allege: "(i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress" (Chanko v Am. Broadcasting Companies Inc., 27 NY3d 46, 56 [2016] [internal citations omitted]). "Extreme and outrageous conduct" must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community' (id. [internal citations and quotations omitted]). This is a very high bar (see Brown v Riverside Church in City of New York, 231 AD3d 104, 113 [1st Dept 2024] [allegations that defendant knowingly permitted its employee, a known child molester, to coach its youth basketball team and turned a blind eye to employee repeatedly subjecting plaintiff to inappropriate sexual contact set out extreme and outrageous conduct]) and one that plaintiff has failed to meet. Plaintiff's allegations that the information in defendants' program and material is incorrect does not satisfy this standard (see Parker v Trustees of the Spence School. Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 33474[U], 6 [Sup Ct, NY County 2020] [allegations that administrators at plaintiff's school falsely told school assembly that plaintiff's social media post had paired " 'slave and slave owners' and 'Jews and Hitler' together to create oppressed-oppressor associations and suggested dressing up as those pairings for Halloween" did not set out extreme and outrageous conduct], affd in part as mod, revd in part sub nom. Parker v Trustees of Spence School, Inc., 205 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2022]).

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is also dismissed. "A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress [...] must be premised upon the breach of a duty owed to plaintiff which either unreasonably endangers the plaintiff's physical safety or causes the plaintiff to fear for his or her own safety" (Bernstein v E. 51st St. Dev. Co., LLC, 78 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2010] [internal citations omitted]). There is no allegation that defendants owed any duty to plaintiff, nor that their actions in any way endangered plaintiff's physical safety.¹

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss this action are granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Greater NY Intergroup, Inc. shall, within ten days of the date of this decision and order, serve a copy of same with notice of entry on plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that service upon the Clerk shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website); and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATE 7/11/2026

HON. JUDY H. KIM, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Given the fundamental infirmities with plaintiff's complaint, the Court does not reach the remainder of defendants' arguments, including Intergroup's argument that material published in connection with its twelve-step recovery program is religious literature protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (see Matter of Syquia v Bd. of Educ. of Harpursville Cent. School Dist., 80 NY2d 531, 535 [1992] ["Under established principles of judicial restraint, however, courts should not address constitutional issues when a decision can be reached on other grounds"]).

Judy H. Kim, J.