The People of the State of New York v. Milton Hamlin, Defendant. (2026)

The Defendant is charged by indictment with one count of Attempted Assault in the First Degree as a Hate Crime (PL §§ 110/120.10[1] and 485.05[1][a]) and related charges. The Defendant moves this Court to (i) invalidate the People's July 2, 2024 certificate of compliance (the People's COC), and deem all subsequent supplemental certificates of compliance (SCOCs) and statements of readiness illusory and invalid pursuant to CPL §§ 245.20 and 245.50; and (ii) dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30(1)(a), 245.20, 245.50, and 210.20(1)(g).¹

For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's motion is DENIED. The Court finds that the People's COC was valid, the statements of readiness were effective, and seventy-five (75) days are charged to the People.

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

The Defendant asserts that the People's COC is invalid, and the People failed to demonstrate due diligence to meet their automatic discovery obligations because, he contends, several items were either disclosed after the People filed their COC or have not been disclosed to date. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that the People belatedly disclosed, or never disclosed, the following items:

1. Complainant's application to the New York State Office of Victim Services (OVS) dated September 30, 2024;

2. OVS letter to complainant dated June 27, 2025; and

3. Metadata for photographs previously disclosed.

The Defendant further argues that because the People's COC is invalid, the People's statements of readiness must be deemed invalid as well.

Timing and Procedure

CPL Article 245, which went into effect on January 1, 2020, and was recently amended (L 2025, c 56, part LL), sets forth the procedure for discovery in all criminal cases, including the time periods in which the "the prosecution shall perform its initial discovery obligations." CPL § 245.10(l)(a); see People v. Luna, 83 Misc 3d 62, 65 (App. Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10 Jud. Dists. 2024). When, as is the case here, the defendant is in custody, the People are required to perform their initial discovery obligations as soon as practicable but not later than twenty (20) days after the defendant's arraignment. See CPL § 245.10(l)(a)(i). However, where the discoverable materials are "exceptionally voluminous" or, "despite diligent, good faith efforts, are otherwise not in the actual possession of the prosecution," this 35-day limit can be stayed up to 30 days without a motion. CPL § 245.10(l)(a); see also CPL § 245.10(l)(a)(iv)(B) (permitting the People to make a CPL § 245.70[2] motion to further extend the time period for the same reasons). Pursuant to CPL Article 245, the People's "automatic discovery" obligations as defined in CPL § 245.20 must be satisfied before they can announce their readiness for trial. See CPL § 245.50(3); 30.30(5).

To facilitate the People's ability to obtain the discovery from the police, Article 245 imposes upon the People an obligation to "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to place within his or her possession or control all material and information pertinent to the defendant and the offense or offenses charged." CPL § 245.55(1). Furthermore, the law requires New York state and local law enforcement agencies to provide the People with copies of their records and files upon request:

Absent a court order or a requirement that defense counsel obtain a security clearance mandated by law or authorized government regulation, upon request by the prosecution, each New York state and local law enforcement agency shall make available to the prosecution a complete copy of its complete records and files related to the investigation of the case or the prosecution of the defendant for compliance with this article.

CPL § 245.55(2) (emphasis added).

Once the People have performed their automatic discovery obligations, they must serve and file a COC. CPL § 245.50(1). The COC must state that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery" the People "disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery. It shall also identify the items provided." Id.; see People v. Torres, 205 AD3d 524 (1st Dept 2022); People v. Drayton, 231 AD3d 1057 (2d Dept 2024). Further, the COC must identify the items that the People know they are required to disclose but have been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence. Absent an individualized finding of special circumstances, only after filing a valid COC can the People announce their readiness for trial and stop the speedy trial clock. CPL § 245.50(3); see also CPL § 30.30(5); People v. Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158 (2d Dept 2024). Once the People have filed their COC, the defense has up to 30 days to perform their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20(4). CPL § 245.10(2).

Moreover, under CPL § 245.60, both the People and the defendant have a continuing duty to disclose. Specifically:

If either the prosecution or the defendant subsequently learns of additional material or information which it would have been under a duty to disclose pursuant to any provisions of this article, had it known of it at the time of a previous discovery obligation or discovery order, it shall expeditiously notify the other party and disclose the additional material and information as required for initial discovery under this article.

CPL § 245.60.

If such additional material is discovered, the People must file a supplemental COC. In their supplemental COC, the People are required to:

detail the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance. The filing of a supplemental certificate of compliance shall not impact the validity of the original certificate of compliance if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence pursuant to section 245.20 of this article, or if the additional discovery did not exist at the time of the filing of the original certificate of compliance.

CPL § 245.50(1-a); see CPL § 245.50(1).

In addition, CPL Article 245 provides the court with mechanisms to address and streamline any disputes about discovery. First, the court can order the parties to "diligently confer to attempt to reach an accommodation as to any dispute concerning discovery prior to seeking a ruling from the court." CPL § 245.35(1). Second, the court can order a discovery compliance conference prior to trial with the parties and the court. CPL § 245.35(2). Lastly, any challenge to the validity of a COC must be filed "within thirty-five [35] days of the service of the certificate" and must

be accompanied by an affirmation by the moving party that, after the filing of the opposing party's certificate of compliance, such moving party timely conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the opposing party regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the opposing party or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached.

CPL § 245.50(4). The thirty-five (35) day deadline may be extended upon request of the Defendant, prior to the expiration of the thirty-five (35) day period, "for good cause shown." Id. Where the COC was filed before the amendments to CPL Article 245, the amendment provides that the time period "shall run from the effective date of this act," in other words, August 7, 2025, and "shall apply to all criminal actions pending on such date." See L 2025, c 56, part LL, § 8. If, however, there is a "material change in circumstances," CPL Article 245 permits the Defendant to challenge a COC after the expiration of the thirty-five (35) day deadline. Id. A material change in circumstances could be "the belated disclosure of discoverable material . . . or, where the party entitled to disclosure could not, with due diligence, have known the specific and particularized matters forming the basis of the challenge prior to the expiration of such period." Id.

Automatic Discovery

CPL § 245.20(1) sets forth twenty-one (21) categories of material subject to automatic disclosure, but the People's disclosure obligations are not limited to these categories. See CPL § 245.20(1)(v); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 208-209 (2023); People v. Walker, 228 AD3d 1318 (4th Dept 2024); People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153, 1155 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021) (CPL § 245.20[1] provides a "non-exhaustive list of the items the People must automatically disclose to the defendant"); People v. Pennant, 73 Misc 3d 753 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County 2021). There is a "presumption in favor of disclosure" when interpreting what to disclose as automatic discovery under CPL § 245.20(1). CPL § 245.20(7); see People v. Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50692(U) (App. Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2023); People v. Bonifacio, 179 AD3d 977, 978 (2d Dep 2020); People v. Rugerio-Rivera, 77 Misc 3d 1230(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50069(U) (Crim. Ct., Queens County 2023); see also People v. Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50859(U) (Crim. Ct., Queens County 2022); People v. Diaz, 75 Misc 3d 314 (Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022); People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d 433 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d 371 (Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2021); People v. Kelly, 71 Misc 3d 1202(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50264(U) (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50380(U) (Sup. Ct., Queens County 2021); People v. Altug, 70 Misc 3d 1218(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50145(U) (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021).

When the defendant claims that the COC is missing discoverable items, the court must determine whether the People "exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1); see also CPL § 245.20(2) (the "prosecutor shall make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of" discovery materials outside of their possession); CPL § 245.50(3) (court may deem prosecution ready where mandatory discovery has been lost or destroyed or is otherwise unavailable "despite diligent and good faith efforts, reasonable under the circumstances"). In assessing the People's reasonable efforts and due diligence, the court must engage in a case-specific analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in that matter. Bay at 212. In Bay, the Court of Appeals explained:

An analysis of whether the People made reasonable efforts sufficient to satisfy CPL article 245 is fundamentally case-specific, as with any question of reasonableness, and will turn on the circumstances presented. There is no rule of "strict liability"; that is, the statute does not require or anticipate a "perfect prosecutor." On the other hand, the plain terms of the statute make clear that while good faith is required, it is not sufficient standing alone and cannot cure a lack of diligence.

Id. at 212 (internal citations omitted); People v. Lee, --- N.Y.S. 3d ---, 2026 NY Slip Op 03125, *2 (1st Dep't 2026) ("[t]he analysis calls for a holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require this Court to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery") (internal citations omitted).

The recent amendments to CPL Article 245 codify and expand upon the diligence assessment articulated in Bay. See CPL § 245.50(5). When assessing due diligence, "the court shall look at the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245], rather than assess [their] efforts item by item." Id. That is, "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors" set forth in CPL § 245.50(5)(a) and "no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b). The relevant factors provided therein include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) the efforts made by the People to comply with the statutory requirements;

(2) the volume of the discovery provided and outstanding;

(3) the complexity of the case;

(4) whether the People knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed;

(5) the explanation for any discovery lapse;

(6) the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery;

(7) whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;

(8) whether the omission was corrected;

(9) whether the People self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention;

(10) whether the People's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

See CPL § 245.50(5)(a). In Bay, the Court further explained that although "due diligence" is not defined in CPL Article 245, "it is a familiar and flexible standard that requires the People 'to make reasonable efforts' to comply with statutory directives." Bay at 211 (citing People v. Bolden, 81 NY2d 146, 155 [1993]; see People v. Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 80-81 [1995]). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone - a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.' " Bay at 211-212 (internal citations omitted).

The People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure:

(1) exercise due diligence (see supra); and

(2) make reasonable inquiries (Bay at 213; see People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986], citing People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

Importantly, the court shall not invalidate a COC where the People have exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the required disclosure materials specified in CPL § 245.20. CPL § 245.50(6).

Complainant's application to OVS dated September 30, 2024

The Defendant alleges that the People did not timely disclose the complainant's OVS application dated September 30, 2024.² Initially, the Court notes that OVS is an entirely independent non-law-enforcement agency, and their records are not in the prosecution's possession, custody, or control. See CPL § 245.20(1); People v. Berkley, 157 AD2d 463, 466 (1st Dep't 1990) ("the People had no control over [Victim Services Agency] or the material in its possession"); People v. Askin, 68 Misc 3d 372, 383 (County Court, Nassau County 2020) (OVS not under the control of the People). When the People obtained the OVS application, they promptly disclosed it to the Defense prior to the February 25, 2026 court appearance. In fact, the Defense subsequently obtained the OVS application via subpoena duces tecum. See CPL § 245.20(2) ("the prosecutor shall not be required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum material or information which the defendant may thereby obtain").

OVS letter to complainant dated June 27, 2025

The Defendant additionally alleges that the People failed to disclose an OVS letter to the complainant dated June 27, 2025.³ However, at the April 24, 2026 court appearance, the People represented that they had not seen that document prior to the Defense providing it as part of the instant motion. The letter was sent to the complainant by OVS, and a copy of the letter was not provided to the District Attorney's Office. Thus, this letter was not in the People's possession (constructive or actual), custody, or control. See CPL § 245.20(1). Significantly, the Defendant obtained the document via subpoena duces tecum. See CPL § 245.20(2).

Metadata for photographs previously disclosed

On May 2, 2025, the People disclosed to the Defense multiple photographs (i) taken by an eyewitness to the incident, of the complainant's injuries and the Defendant; and (ii) taken by the assigned detective, of the Defendant's MetroCard and jacket.⁴ On July 17, 2025, at a scheduled court appearance, the Defendant contended that the photographs were missing their metadata, and the People offered to confer with Defense Counsel to resolve the issue.⁵ It appears that the parties did not discuss the metadata issue again until shortly before the February 25, 2026 trial date. In February 2026, the People disclosed additional discovery materials, and at that time, the Defendant renewed his request for the metadata of the previously disclosed photographs. The People promptly investigated the issue and provided the Defendant with the original photographs with metadata.

In the instant motion, the Defendant accuses the People of "stripping," or intentionally deleting the metadata from the photographs, characterizing it as "Metadata Manipulation and Concealment of Additional Evidence," while providing no evidence whatsoever of intentional deletion.⁶ At the April 24, 2026 court appearance, the People explained that the missing metadata had been inadvertently removed from the photographs when the assigned ADA saved the photographs and renamed them, and that he promptly disclosed the metadata shortly after the Defendant renewed his request in February 2026. Moreover, the assigned ADA represented that he "sent [Defense Counsel] screenshots of the metadata as it was on my phone so he can see both the metadata that was coming through, the metadata that I had, and I offered to have him come and inspect my phone if he was not satisfied with that." Transcript April 24, 2026 at pp. 5-6. Despite the Defendant's claim of bad faith on the People's part, Defense Counsel declined to inspect the People's phone.

The Defendant contends that the belated disclosure or non-disclosure of the above items mandates the invalidation of the People's COC. The Court disagrees.

Applying the controlling legal standards to the instant matter, the Court finds that the People exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in fulfilling their discovery obligations. As stated supra, a court's analysis of due diligence is not a line-item inquiry; rather, it is a holistic analysis of the certifying party's efforts to comply with the statute compared against the magnitude of the discovery error. Bay at 212; Lee, 2026 NY Slip Op 03125 at *2. Here, the People provided the vast majority of the discovery — over 280 items — before certifying compliance on July 2, 2024. Specifically, by the time the People filed the People's COC, they had provided extensive discovery including, but not limited to: Criminal Court paperwork, NYPD arrest paperwork, activity logs, body-worn camera (BWC) footage for eleven (11) police officers, MTA PD activity logs and BWC footage for four (4) police officers, 911 call records, Sprint Report, Radio Run, dozens of EMCS files, dozens of law enforcement disclosures for testifying officers, lab reports, arrest photographs, complainant's injury photographs, photo array, property clerk invoices, medical records for the complainant, fingerprints, records connected with Defendant's Kings County case, screenshots of messages with detective, surveillance videos, CLEAR Report, social media work-up records, dozens of WASU records, and the expert's curriculum vitae.

After filing their COC, the People continued to seek out discoverable material during the pendency of the case. As the People received additional materials, including certain WASU materials and OCME records, they promptly disclosed those materials to the Defense. Of particular significance to the instant motion, when the People obtained additional photos from the eyewitness and assigned detective, the People promptly disclosed the same to the Defense. Even though the Defense failed to confer regarding discovery until February 2026, the People continued to speak with their witnesses and provide discoverable material when it came to their attention. When the Defense did attempt to confer in February 2026, the People promptly responded and remedied their omissions.

With respect to the OVS application and letter, the Court finds that OVS is an independent state agency, not in the prosecution's "direction or control." CPL § 245.20(1); see People v. Berkley, 157 AD2d at 466; People v. Askin, 68 Misc 3d at 383. As such, until and unless OVS records were in the People's "possession, custody or control," the People were under no obligation to disclose them. Id. Indeed, the People had never seen the OVS letter that the Defendant obtained via subpoena duces tecum. And the People promptly disclosed the application upon receipt from OVS.

Thus, the only disputed item remaining is the metadata for previously disclosed photographs. As the People explain, the belated disclosure of this metadata was an inadvertent oversight. In light of the voluminous discovery provided, the metadata for previously undisclosed photographs is insignificant. Indeed, the Court cannot discern, and the Defendant has not articulated any prejudice from the belated disclosure of this material.

In conclusion, when considering the People's efforts to comply with the statute, the volume of the disclosures made, and the minor or duplicative value of the belated disclosures, along with the other statutory factors, the People have "established that they exercised due diligence." Lee, 2026 NY Slip Op. 03125, *2. While " 'discoverable material fell through the cracks,' in the overall scope of discovery, 'these delayed disclosures are merely the result of a prosecutor who, having exercised due diligence, missed a few discoverable items.' " Id. (citing People v. Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138, 150 [3d Dep't 2025]). Accordingly, the Court finds the People's COC valid and denies the Defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC.

SPEEDY TRIAL

To be successful on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a delay in excess of the applicable speedy trial time limit. People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986). Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the People to establish that certain periods within that time should be excluded. People v. Barden, 27 NY3d 550 (2016); People v. Santana, 80 NY2d 92, 105 (1992); People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Generally, the burden is on the People to establish their entitlement to exclude any pre-readiness delays from the calculation under a CPL 30.30 motion and the burden is on a defendant to prove that any post-readiness delays that directly implicate the People's ability to proceed with trial are chargeable to the People, unless the People failed to satisfy their burden to ensure that the record is sufficiently clear as to who is chargeable for an adjournment (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210, 215-216 [1992]).

People v. Robinson, 67 AD3d 1042, 1044 (3d Dept 2009), lv. denied 13 NY3d 910 (2009). The People are considered to be ready for trial when they communicate their actual readiness in open court or file a certificate of actual readiness with the court and serve a copy on the defendant's attorney. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985).

Here, the top count charged in this case is Attempted Assault in the First Degree as a Hate Crime, in violation of PL §§ 110/120.10(1) and 485.05(1)(a), a class B felony. Accordingly, the People are required to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action, less any excludable time. CPL § 30.30(1)(a). In this case, the People filed a felony complaint in Criminal Court on March 6, 2024, thereby commencing the criminal action. CPL § 1.20(17) (a "criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court."). Here, the six-month period equates to one hundred and eighty-four (184) days.

In the instant motion, filed on April 24, 2026, the Defendant asserts that "[a]s of this filing, more than 215 chargeable days have elapsed" thus exceeding the statutorily permissible period. Defendant's Motion at ¶ 86. However, the Defendant provides no further detail explaining what adjournments he believes are chargeable to the People, or what adjournments constitute the two-hundred and fifteen (215) total days he alleges are chargeable. On April 24, 2026, the Court afforded the People an opportunity to respond in writing to the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The People declined to submit a written response. Also on April 24, 2026, the Court heard extensive argument regarding the allegedly outstanding discovery materials that formed the basis for the Defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC, subsequent SCOCs, and statements of readiness.

On April 27, 2026, the Court emailed the parties and indicated that while the Court was able to determine the Defendant's motion challenging the People's COC, the Court was unable to determine the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 without a further submission from the People. The Court directed the People to submit a written response to the Defendant's CPL § 30.30 motion by May 12, 2026, and indicated the Defendant's reply to the People's response would be due on May 19, 2026. On May 12, 2026, the People filed their response to the Defendant's CPL § 30.30 motion, including eleven official transcripts for court proceedings, as well as medical documentation for a police witness. On May 19, 2026, the Defendant requested an extension until May 22, 2026 to file his reply; the Court inquired whether Defense Counsel needed more than a three-day extension, but did not receive a response. The Court granted the Defendant's request for an extension until May 22, 2026. The Defendant did not file a reply, nor request a further extension on May 22, 2026. Instead, in the morning of the next court appearance on June 8, 2026, Defense Counsel emailed the Court requesting a one-week extension due to a time-sensitive filing on a different case set for trial in July.

On June 8, 2026, the parties appeared and the Defendant requested a one-week extension to file his reply. The Court denied the Defendant's request as he had already been granted an extension to May 22, 2026, and he failed to request a further extension in the more than two-week period between the May 22, 2026 reply due date and the June 8, 2026 court appearance.

Speedy Trial Calculation

March 6, 2024 to March 8, 2024: On March 6, 2024, the People filed a felony complaint against the Defendant, and the Defendant was arraigned on the accusatory instrument. The filing of the accusatory instrument started the six-month speedy trial clock. The case was adjourned to March 8, 2024, pursuant to CPL § 180.80. This adjournment period is chargeable to the People. [two (2) total days charged]

March 8, 2024 to April 8, 2024: On March 8, 2024, the case had been indicted and was adjourned to April 8, 2024, for Supreme Court arraignment. This entire thirty-one (31) day period is chargeable to the People. [thirty-three (33) total days charged]

April 8, 2024 to June 24, 2024: On April 8, 2024, the Defendant was arraigned on the indictment, and the court set a motion schedule. The matter was adjourned to June 24, 2024 for decision on the Defendant's omnibus motion. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [thirty-three (33) total days charged]

June 24, 2024 to July 8, 2024: On June 24, 2024, the court issued its decision on the Defendant's omnibus motions, and the case was adjourned to July 8, 2024, for the People to file their certificate of compliance. On July 2, 2024, the People filed their COC and certificate of readiness. Because the Court has found the People's July 2, 2024 COC valid, the accompanying certificate of readiness stopped the speedy trial clock on that date. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). Thus, a total of eight (8) days of this adjournment period are chargeable. [forty-one (41) total days charged]

July 8, 2024 to August 12, 2024: On July 8, 2024, the People requested that the case be adjourned for hearings and trial. However, the Defendant requested a motion schedule to challenge the People's COC. The case was adjourned to August 12, 2024, for the Defendant to file his motion. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [forty-one (41) total days charged]

August 12, 2024 to September 9, 2024: On August 12, 2024, the Defendant had not yet filed his motion to invalidate the People's COC, and he requested a two-week extension to file the motion. The court granted this extension and set a new motion schedule with the Defense motion due on August 26, 2024, and the People's response due on September 9, 2024. The case was adjourned to October 7, 2024, for the court's decision on the Defendant's motion. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [forty-one (41) total days charged]

October 7, 2024 to January 6, 2025: On October 7, 2024, the Defense had again failed to file its motion, so the court set a new motion schedule. The matter was adjourned to January 6, 2025 for the court's decision on the Defendant's motion. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [forty-one (41) total days charged]

January 6, 2025 to February 3, 2025: On January 6, 2025, the Defendant had still not filed his motion to invalidate the People's COC, and the Defendant requested yet another motion schedule to file this motion. The court granted this request, and directed the Defendant to file his motion by January 10, 2025, and the People to respond by January 24, 2025. The case was adjourned to February 3, 2025 for the court's decision on the Defendant's motion. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [forty-one (41) total days charged]

February 3, 2025 to March 5, 2025: On February 3, 2025, the Defendant had still not filed a motion and instead withdrew his request for an opportunity to file motions. Because the People had previously certified their readiness, the case was adjourned to March 5, 2025 for hearings and trial. As this appearance was scheduled for the court's decision on the Defendant's motion, the entire adjournment period is excludable as a reasonable period to comply with the court's decision on pre-trial motions. See People v. Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dep't 1982). This holds true despite the Defendant's withdrawal of his motion because the People had no way of knowing the Defendant would do so on the decision date. [forty-one (41) total days charged]

March 5, 2025 to March 18, 2025: On March 5, 2025, the case was on for hearings and trial. The People answered not ready and requested March 18, 2025. The case was adjourned to March 18, 2025, for hearings and trial. This thirteen (13) day period is chargeable to the People. [fifty-four (54) total days charged]

March 18, 2025 to April 8, 2025: On March 18, 2025, the case was on for hearings and trial. The People made a record that they were unable to proceed because the arresting officer Detective Lysette Feliciano-Tengco was unavailable due to an ongoing medical issue that was discovered while she was being treated for a broken foot suffered in the line of duty. The People requested an excludable adjournment pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(g) as an exceptional circumstance. The People explained that the Detective's health condition caused her to miss four months of work, but that she was scheduled to return on April 3, 2025. As such, the People requested an adjournment to April 8, 2025. At that time, the court declined to rule on the excludability of the adjournment and the case was adjourned to April 8, 2025 for hearings and trial. This adjournment is excludable as an extraordinary circumstance pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(g) as a necessary witness for hearings was unavailable due to a medical condition. The People have submitted records from the NYPD Medical Division establishing that Detective Feliciano Tengco was out sick during this period.⁷ See People v. Hicks, 235 AD3d 417, 417 (1st Dep't 2025) (39-day adjournment period was excludable because a "necessary police witness" was "medically unavailable" due to a broken ankle). [fifty-four (54) total days charged]⁸

April 8, 2025 to May 6, 2025: On April 8, 2025, the matter was on for hearings and trial. The People answered not ready because they were engaged in a different trial. The People requested an adjourn date of April 29, 2025 for hearings and trial, and the Defendant requested May 6, 2025. The court adjourned the case to May 6, 2025 for hearing and trial. For this adjournment, only the period between April 8, 2025 and April 29, 2025 is chargeable to the People because they answered not ready on April 8, 2025 and requested an adjournment until April 29, 2025. People v. Bailey, 221 AD2d 296 (1st Dep't 1995). The additional time after April 29, 2025 is not chargeable to the People as it was a Defense request. Id. Thus, only twenty-one (21) days are chargeable during this adjournment period. [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

May 6, 2025 to May 27, 2025: On May 6, 2025, the case was on for hearings and trial and the People stated ready. Also, on that day, the People filed a supplemental certificate of compliance, a restatement of readiness, and an updated Rosario list. The Defendant answered not ready as the assigned Defense Counsel was not present and his colleague who was covering the case requested the matter be adjourned to May 27, 2025 for control. As a result, at the request of the Defense, the matter was adjourned to May 27, 2025 to pick a hearing and trial date. Because the People answered ready on this date, and the matter was adjourned at the Defendant's request, this entire adjournment period is excludable. See People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985); CPL § 30.30(4)(b). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

May 27, 2025 to July 17, 2025: On May 27, 2025, the case was on the calendar to pick a hearing and trial date. The People indicated that they could propose good dates based on witness availability. However, Defense Counsel informed the court that he intended to file a motion to invalidate the People's COC and requested a motion schedule. The court set a motion schedule with the Defendant's motion due on June 2, 2025, the People's response due on June 16, 2025, the Defendant's reply due on June 25, 2025, and an adjourn date of July 17, 2025 for the court's decision. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's motion practice, the entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

July 17, 2025, to August 6, 2025: On July 17, 2025, the case was on for the court's decision on the Defendant's motion. However, the Defendant had not yet filed his motion.⁹ The Defense requested additional time to file their motion, but the court declined to grant that request. On that date, the People filed and served a SCOC, a restatement of readiness, and an updated Rosario list. The court adjourned the matter to August 6, 2025, for control, with the understanding that if the Defendant did not file a motion, on that date, the case would be adjourned for hearings and trial. As the matter was on for the court's decision on July 17, 2025, the People were not obligated to be ready. Even so, the People stated ready, thereby stopping the speedy trial clock. Accordingly, this entire adjournment period is excludable. See People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

August 6, 2025 to October 2, 2025: On August 6, 2025, the matter was on for control purposes. Prior to the appearance, Defense Counsel filed a motion challenging the People's COC and all supplemental certificates of compliance; the People objected to the Defendant's motion as untimely. The court permitted the motion to be filed, set the remainder of a motion schedule, and adjourned the case until October 2, 2025 for decision on the Defendant's motion. Accordingly, this entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a); see People v. Johnson 93 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

October 2, 2025 to October 29, 2025: On October 2, 2025, the case was on for decision; prior to the calendar call, the Defense filed its reply, which was due on September 10, 2025 according to the motion schedule set by the court. The court denied the Defendant's motion and found the People's COC and SCOCs valid. The court then adjourned the case to October 29, 2025 for hearings and trial. This entire adjournment period is excludable as a reasonable period for the People to prepare for hearings and trial after the court issued its decision on the Defendant's motion. See People v. Moolenaar, 262 AD2d 60 (1st Dep't 1999); People v. Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dep't 1982). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

October 29, 2025 to November 19, 2025: On October 29, 2025, the case was on for hearings and trial, and the People answered ready for both. The Defendant answered not ready due to a "do not engage" letter for early November. The Defense requested bifurcation of the hearings and trial, and the People consented to bifurcation for a limited period of time. The case was adjourned to November 19, 2025 for hearings only. Because the People were ready for hearings and trial on October 29, 2025, and the matter was adjourned at the Defense's request, this entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(b); see People v. Benajmin, 292 AD2d 191 (1st Dep't 2002); People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

November 19, 2025 to December 10, 2025: On November 19, 2025, the matter was on for hearings and the People answered ready. The Defendant answered not ready and cited ongoing "disputes" related to discovery. The court deemed the People ready and adjourned the case to December 10, 2025 for hearings. Because the People stated ready on November 19, 2025 and the matter was adjourned at the Defense's request, this entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(b); see People v. Benajmin, 292 AD2d 191 (1st Dep't 2002); People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

December 10, 2025 to January 28, 2026: On December 10, 2025, the case was on the calendar for hearings. The People answered ready, but the Defense sought a delay. On that day, notwithstanding the Defense's objection, the court sent out the case for hearings. Due to Defense Counsel's scheduling conflict, the matter was adjourned to December 11, 2025 for hearings in a trial part. On December 11, 2025, the People answered ready for hearings and the hearings commenced. The court (Ward, J.) conducted the hearings on December 11, 2025 and December 15, 2025.¹⁰ At the conclusion of testimony, the Defense requested a motion schedule, and the case was adjourned to January 26, 2026 for the court's decision on the hearing motions. This entire period is excludable. The People answered ready for hearings on December 10, 2025 and December 11, 2025, and the hearings were conducted on December 11, 2025 and December, 15, 2025. See People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). After the hearing testimony concluded on December 15, 2025, the Defense requested a motion schedule, and the matter was adjourned to January 26, 2026 for decision; this adjournment is excludable pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(a). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

January 26, 2026 to January 28, 2026: On January 26, 2026, the case was administratively adjourned to January 28, 2026, because of a severe snowstorm and resulting court closure. This adjournment is excludable; the Defendant's motion was still pending as the court had not yet issued its decision. CPL § 30.30(4)(a). Additionally, the administrative adjournment necessitated by the court's closure due to severe weather constitutes a factor beyond the People's control; thus, this period is not chargeable to the People. See People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184 (2024) (in post-readiness context, delays attributable to court and outside the People's control are not chargeable to the People). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

January 28, 2026 to February 25, 2026: On January 28, 2026, the court issued a written decision on the Defendant's hearing motions and denied suppression of the statements, tangible items, and identification. The court then adjourned the case to February 25, 2026, for trial. This adjournment is excludable as a reasonable period for the People to prepare for trial after the court's decision. See People v. Hayes, 291 AD2d 334, 334-35 (1st Dep't 2002) ("49-day adjournment to prepare for trial after motions . . . was reasonable"); People v. Douglas, 156 AD2d 173 (1st Dep't 1989); People v. Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dep't 1982). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

February 25, 2026 to March 26, 2026: On February 25, 2026, the case was on for trial. The People answered ready for trial, and filed a supplemental certificate of compliance, a restatement of readiness, and an updated Rosario list. The Defendant answered not ready and requested an adjournment. This Court adjourned the matter to March 26, 2026 for trial. Because the People answered ready, and the Defense requested an adjournment, this entire period is excludable. See People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985); CPL § 30.30(4)(b). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

March 26, 2026 to April 24, 2026: On March 26, 2026, the parties appeared for trial. The People answered ready for trial and filed a supplemental certificate of compliance and a restatement of readiness. Defense Counsel appeared and answered not ready and indicated he needed time to review records recently obtained via subpoena. The Court adjourned the case to April 24, 2026 for trial and provided both parties with "do not engage" orders. This entire adjournment period is excludable because the People were ready for trial, and the adjournment was the result of a Defense request. See People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985); CPL § 30.30(4)(b). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

April 24, 2026 to May 12, 2026: On April 24, 2026, the Defendant's case was on for trial and the People answered ready. However, the day prior, the Defendant filed the instant motion. The Court heard arguments from the parties relating to the Defendant's motion and indicated it would issue a decision off-calendar. The Court then adjourned the case to May 12, 2026 for trial. While the People were afforded an opportunity to respond in writing to the Defendant's motion, the People declined to do so. However, on April 27, 2026, the Court informed the parties that while it had sufficient information to determine the Defendant's motion to invalidate the COC, the Court required the People to submit a written response to the Defendant's CPL § 30.30 motion in order to rule on that motion. The Court directed the People to file their response by May 12, 2026, and set a Defense reply date of May 19, 2026. As a result, the Court informed the parties that the May 12, 2026 appearance would be changed from a trial date to an appearance for the purpose of scheduling a decision date. This adjournment is excludable as the Defendant's motion was under consideration by the Court this entire period. CPL § 30.30(4)(a). Additionally, on April 24, 2026, the People answered ready for trial, thereby stopping the speedy trial clock. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

May 12, 2026 to June 8, 2026: On May 12, 2026, the People filed and served their response and the matter was adjourned to June 8, 2026 for decision. On May 19, 2026, Defense Counsel requested an extension until May 22, 2026 to file his reply; the Court granted that extension. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's pre-trial motions, this entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

June 8, 2026 to June 22, 2026: On June 8, 2026, the matter was scheduled for the Court's decision on the Defendant's motion. On that day, Defense Counsel requested a one-week extension to file his reply. The Court denied the Defendant's request as he had already been granted an extension to May 22, 2026, and he failed to request a further extension in the more than two-week period between the May 22, 2026 reply due date and the June 8, 2026 court appearance. The People requested that the case be adjourned for trial to June 22, 2026. The matter was adjourned to June 22, 2026 for decision and trial. As this adjournment was occasioned by the Defendant's pre-trial motions, this entire period is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a). [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

June 22, 2026 to September 15, 2026: On June 22, 2026, the parties appeared and the Court issued its oral decision denying the Defendant's instant motion and finding a total of seventy-five (75) days chargeable to date. The Court indicated that it would issue a written decision off-calendar. Also on this date, the People answered ready for trial and the Defendant answered not ready. The matter was adjourned to September 15, 2026 for trial. This adjournment is excludable as a reasonable period for the People to prepare for trial after the court's decision. See People v. Hayes, 291 AD2d at 334-35. Additionally, the People answered ready on this date, thereby stopping the speedy trial clock. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). For these reasons, this entire adjournment is excludable. [seventy-five (75) total days charged]

Thus, the Court finds that there are seventy-five (75) total chargeable days to date.

Since less than one hundred and eighty-four (184) days are charged, the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is DENIED. CPL § 30.30(1)(a).

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

DATE: July 13, 2026

New York, NY

JULIETA V. LOZANO

Acting Justice of the Supreme Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Defendant filed and served his motion on April 23, 2026. On April 24, 2026, during the court appearance, the Defendant filed and served a revised version of his motion, correcting certain errors he had discovered upon review.

2.   This document did not exist until more than two months after the People's COC was filed.

3.   This document did not exist until almost one year after the People's COC was filed.

4.   The belated disclosure of these photographs was raised in the Defendant's prior motion to invalidate the People's COC. On October 27, 2025, Judge Melissa Lewis issued a decision denying the Defendant's motion, specifically finding that (i) the eyewitness's photographs were not in the People's possession or control, that the photographs were duplicative of other disclosed materials, and that the People promptly disclosed the photographs when they received them; and (ii) the assigned detective's photographs were duplicative of other disclosed materials, and that the People promptly disclosed the photographs when they received them.

5.   The minutes for this proceeding reflect a July 17, 2026 date, but that is obviously incorrect as July 17, 2026 is a date in the future.

6.   Indeed, the Defense accuses the prosecution of the "intentional action of deleting evidence" based on the mere fact that the photographs' metadata was missing. Defendant's Motion at ¶ 58.

7.   The People did not seek to exclude the period of March 5, 2025 to March 18, 2025 under CPL § 30.30(4)(g) because they were unaware of the Detective's medical condition and unavailability when they answered not ready on March 5, 2025.

8.   The Court notes that even if this twenty-one (21) day period were chargeable to the People, the Defendant's motion would still be denied, as a total of only ninety-six (96) days would be chargeable to the People.

9.   On May 27, 2025, Defense Counsel represented that he was in the process of preparing his motion and would file it on May 30, 2025.

10.   While the People were ready to continue the hearings on Friday, December 12, 2025, the Defense was unavailable to proceed on that date.

Julieta V. Lozano, J.