IN RE: the Application of J.G. Wentworth Orginations (2026)

The following numbered papers were used on this petition: NY St Ct Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 1-19.

Upon the foregoing papers, having conducted a hearing and heard oral argument, all on the record, and due deliberation having been had, the within petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights is determined as follows.

Introduction

In the within special proceeding, petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC ("J.G. Wentworth") has applied, pursuant to the Structured Settlement Protection Act (hereinafter "SSPA"), General Obligations Law § 5-1701 et seq., for the approval of the transfer of 180 life-contingent payments of $2,427.26 each, increasing at 3% annually, beginning on March 12, 2040 and ending on February 12, 2055, due Taliqua Johnson ("Ms. Johnson"), under a structured settlement agreement. This special proceeding was commenced by J.G. Wentworth, having been brought on by way of an order to show cause, in which Ms. Johnson, Brighthouse Life Insurance Company, and Brighthouse Life Insurance Company were named as respondents.¹ J.G. Wentworth's petition states that in exchange for Ms. Johnson assigning her rights to the aforesaid settlement proceeds, J.G. Wentworth would pay her $55,402.00.

Legal Background

Prior to approval or denial of an application to transfer future proceeds from a structured settlement, it is the duty of the court to analyze the details surrounding the request.

"Enacted in 2002, the purpose of the SSPA, as reflected in the legislative materials, was to establish 'procedural safeguards for those who sell settlements that are awarded as a result of litigation,' due to a recognition that '[m]any of the people who receive such settlements are being compensated for very serious, debilitating injuries, and have been unfairly taken advantage of in the past by the businesses that purchase their settlements' " (Pinnacle Capital, LLC v O'Bleanis, 214 AD3d 913, 915 [2d Dept 2023], quoting Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537 at 5).

"Structured settlements serve strong public policy objectives in that they afford long-term financial protection for injury victims and their families. They protect against loss or premature dissipation of lump sum recoveries. They avoid the shift of responsibility for victims' care to public assistance programs. [¶] In the past several years there has been an explosion of efforts by unregulated entities, known as 'factoring companies,' to separate recipients of structured settlement payments from those payment streams. The subsequent factoring of structured settlement payments undermines the public policy objectives of structured settlements. They deprive injury victims and their families of the long-term financial security their settlements are designed to provide. The transfer can involve discounts corresponding to over 50% interest per year." (Letter from Life Ins. Council of NY, Inc., Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.)

Yet, "The sale of structured settlements can serve the interest of a victim who has been awarded compensation for injuries or other damages, particularly if the victim has immediate needs that must be met. However, such persons may be particularly vulnerable to the overbearing sales tactics of structured settlement purchasers. The mandated judicial review of all such sales, coupled with the required disclosures of amounts that will be realized from the sale and the discount rate, should help ensure that the best interests of the payee[ ], and his or her family, are served." (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.)

"Any purported transfer entered into after July 1, 2002 without court approval is unenforceable, and payees may not waive their rights under the Act" (Matter of Law First Fin., LLC v Jamestown Life Ins. Co., 72 Misc 3d 1207[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50672[U] [Sup Ct, Erie County 2021], citing General Obligations Law §§ 5-1706, 5-1708 [a]).

"[L]egislative history makes clear that to avoid the victimization so prevalent in the industry, the courts are intended to examine the various statutory criteria and determine whether the proposed sale will truly serve the 'best interest' of the payee" (Matter of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v Martinez, 11 Misc 3d 892, 895 [Sup Ct, NY County 2006]; see also General Obligations Law § 5-1706 [b]).

"Clearly, the New York State Legislature in enacting SSPA and in empowering the courts with the discretion to determine whether the terms of a proposed transfer of future payments are fair and reasonable did not intend for the courts to be mere rubber stamps" (Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d 446, 461 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2003]). When the original 2002 legislation enacting the SSPA was amended in 2004 to clarify that hardship was not a prerequisite for approving a sale of structured settlement proceeds, the Attorney General wrote that "we do note that there has been a very positive trend among members of the Judiciary to be sparing in approval of such sales, as was intended where the original legislation was drafted. Therefore, while hardship may not be required as a specific finding should this bill be approved, there is in our view, no reason for judges to refrain from weighing that factor, along with any other consideration they deem relevant in determining the 'best interest' criterion." (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2004, ch 480.)

Accordingly, in the present decision, the Court looks first to the statutory requirements of the SSPA, followed by an analysis of Ms. Johnson's best interest.

Compliance with Procedural Requirements

The SSPA contains various requirements. The Court finds that the following requirements were complied with by Petitioner in the papers submitted:

• At least ten days before the structured settlement transferor  ² signs a transfer agreement, the transferee must provide a disclosure statement to the transferor, setting forth nine informational matters (see General Obligations Law § 5-1703). NYSCEF Doc No. 4 contains the disclosure statement provided to Ms. Johnson.

• The special proceeding seeking approval of the transfer shall be commenced by order to show cause in the Supreme Court of the county where the transferor resides or where the structured settlement was approved (see General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [a], [b]). The structured settlement agreement was approved in Supreme Court, Kings County, so commencement of this special proceeding via order to show cause in Supreme Court, Kings County, by J.G. Wentworth, is proper.

• A copy of the order to show cause and petition must be served on all interested parties at least twenty days before the time at which the petition is noticed to be heard (see id. § 5-1705 [c]). This was effectuated (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13, 15-16).

• The transferor has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing (see General Obligations Law § 5-1706 [c]). Ms. Johnson acknowledged receipt of the advice and waived her right to seek independent professional advice (see NYSCEF Doc No. 5).

• A petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall include a copy of the transfer agreement, a copy of the disclosure statement and proof of notice of that statement pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-1703, and a listing of each of the payee's dependents, together with each dependent's age (see General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [d] [i], [ii], [iii]). These were all complied with (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1, 3-4, 7-8).

• The transferor is required to attend the court hearing on the petition, unless attendance is excused for good cause (see id. § 5-1705 [e]). Ms. Johnson attended the hearing.

General Obligations Law § 5-1705 (d) (iv) requires that a petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights include a statement setting forth whether there have been any previous transfers or applications for transfer of the structured settlement payment rights and giving details of all such transfers or applications for transfer. J.G. Wentworth's petition included the following:

23. On or about September 16, 2013, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 12190/2013, was granted by Order of the Honorable Ellen M. Spodek, J.S.C.

24. On or about July 15, 2014, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 5230/2014, was granted by Order of the Honorable Ellen M. Spodek, J.S.C.

25. On or about November 25, 2014, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 13932/2014, was granted by Order of the Honorable Ellen M. Spodek, J.S.C.

26. On or about April 14, 2015, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 2053/2015, was granted by Order of the Honorable Ellen M. Spodek, J.S.C.

27. On or about July 15, 2015, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 6527/2015, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

28. On or about December 23, 2015, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 12200/2015, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

29. On or about November 28, 2016, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 6079/2016, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

30. On or about October 24, 2018, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Brighthouse annuity under index number 2038/2018, was granted by Order of the Honorable Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.S.C.

31. On or about [January] 28, 2019, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Brighthouse annuity under index number 3036/2018, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

32. On or about April 29, 2019, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Brighthouse annuity under index number 826/2019, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

33. On or about August 1, 2019, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Brighthouse annuity under index number 1578/2019, was granted by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

34. On or about October 21, 2021, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Brighthouse annuity under index number 519568/2021, was granted by Order of the Honorable Karen B. Rothenberg, J.S.C.

35. On or about January 24, 2024, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments involving her Variable annuity under index number 531313/2023, was denied by Order of the Honorable Peter Sweeney, J.S.C.

36. On or about June 21[,] 2024, Payee's application to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, to transfer her rights to certain structured settlement payments under index number 515247/2024, was withdrawn and discontinued. (NYSCEF Doc No. 1 ¶¶ 23-36.)

Additionally, J.G. Wentworth filed court orders from past transfers (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 9, 17). However, J.G. Wentworth was not completely accurate. A NYSCEF search of Ms. Johnson's name revealed that four previous attempts to transfer were made in addition to those disclosed to the Court (Sup Ct, Kings County Index Nos. 505995/2021, 515475/2020, 515658/2016, and 522227/2020). Moreover, J.G. Wentworth's petition misstated that Index No. 12190/2013 was granted by Order of Honorable Ellen M. Spodek, J.S.C. The entered order under such Index No. states that it was granted by Hon. Peter P. Sweeney, J.S.C. Furthermore, J.G. Wentworth's petition is devoid of information about such transfers or attempted transfers besides identifying the court, county, and special proceeding index number, justice's name, and outcome. Although the entered orders provided the purchase price of transferred or attempted-to-be transferred structured settlement proceeds, not all orders provided the discount rate or total amount of structured settlement proceeds transferred or attempted to be transferred, instead only stating the amount of the monthly structured settlement payments, annual increase, and date range of such payments.

Although these deficiencies might be deemed minimal, nonetheless the petition did not contain all that is required to apprise the Court of "whether there have been any previous transfers or applications for transfer of the structured settlement payment rights and giving details of all such transfers or applications for transfer" (General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [d] [iv] [emphasis added]). In a prior case, this Court held as follows:

A petitioner under SSPA must provide complete disclosure regarding all previous attempted transfers, be they court-approved or not, and this Court concludes as a matter of law that at a minimum the following details concerning them must be provided:

• Date of agreement

• Purchaser

• Amount of structured settlement proceeds transferred or attempted to be transferred

• Purchase price of transferred or attempted-to-be-transferred structured settlement proceeds

• Discount rate and other financial details, as set forth in General Obligations Law § 5-1703

• Reason for payee's sale of structured settlement proceeds

• Caption, court, county, and index number of special proceeding

• Justice's name

• Outcome of special proceeding and the court's reasoning

• If transfer was approved by the court, how the funds received by the payee were used

Providing this information would comport with the legislative purpose in enacting the SSPA initially in 2002, as well as in amending it in 2010 to require that details of previous transfers and applications be set forth. The sponsor of the 2010 amendatory provisions wrote: "These changes . . . will insure that the court . . . is properly informed about the history of the structured settlement and can make inquiries of the payee to ensure compliance with the statute (Letter from Hon. Helene E. Weinstein, June 25, 2010, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). Another proponent wrote: "The additional information . . . will provide the court with the tools necessary to properly protect the plaintiff and society, who may bear the costs of an insolvent injured plaintiff, as it renders its decisions (Mem NY Consumer Protection Board in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). (Matter of Sapphire Valley Group, LLC v Prudential Assigned Settlement Servs. Corp., 78 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50343[U], *6-7 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]).

Significantly, the petition herein did not set forth with respect to the previous transfers or applications for transfer the dates of the agreements, the amounts transferred or attempted to be transferred, the purchase prices, the discounted rates and other financial details, the stated reasons for seeking the transfers, the courts' reasoning, and how proceeds from transfers were used. This weighs heavily on this Court.

Background of Factors to Consider

Ms. Johnson is willing and anxious to transfer the payments in question. However, according to one court, "the structured settlement payee's willingness to transfer the settlement proceeds has no bearing on this Court's determination of whether the transfer is fair and reasonable" (Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (Allstate Life Ins. Co. of NY — Kwant), 61 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51730[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2018]; see Matter of Settlement Funding of NY, 195 Misc 2d 721, 724 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 2003]). While a transferee's desires can be taken into account, a court reviewing a proposed transfer of structured settlement proceeds must assess it objectively.

Accordingly, this Court must focus on the circumstances and details surrounding the transfer. When determining the best interest of the payee, courts have held that there exist both numerical and personal elements that should be considered. "Two distinct substantive inquiries are required of the court before transfer of a structured settlement can be approved[,] one assessing whether the proposed transfer is in the best interest of the payee and the other assessing whether the transaction is fair and reasonable" (Matter of Barr v Hartford Life Ins. Co. (4 Misc 3d 1021[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50980[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2004] [emphasis added]). Furthermore, "[w]hile considering the best interest of the payee, the court must also determine whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount are fair and reasonable" (Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (Allstate Life Ins. Co. of NY — Kwant), 2018 NY Slip Op 51730[U], *1).

Fairness and Reasonableness of the Transaction

Looking first to the numerical elements of an agreement of the type under review, it has been noted that "there has been little agreement as to what constitutes a proper discount rate or what amount of fees and costs are allowable. Courts have also reached different conclusions with regard to the fairness and reasonableness of the fees and costs associated with the transaction [citations omitted]" (Matter of Am. Farms, LLC v John Hancock Assignment Co., 61 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51349[U], *3-4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2018]). "Although what constitutes a fair and reasonable transaction is also left undefined in the statute, two factors are specifically identified for consideration: the fees and expenses and the discount rate" (Matter of Barr v Hartford Life Ins. Co., 2004 NY Slip Op 50980[U], *1). The reasonableness of the fees and expenses is not in question here as J.G. Wentworth has averred that it does not intend to seek any fees or expenses resulting from the instant transaction (see NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at PDF 3).

Based on J.G. Wentworth's own New York Disclosure Statement, Ms. Johnson would be selling $541,732.68 of future life-contingent payments for $55,402.00, when the discounted amount applying the IRS's 4.60% applicable federal rate would be much more, $204,083.03 (see id. ¶ 3). J.G. Wentworth disclosed that comparable annuities of the $541,732.68 to be paid could be obtained for $175,374.36 or $158,693.77 (see id. ¶ 8), i.e., if one were to purchase a similar annuity yielding $541,732.68, the purchase price would be either $175,374.36 or $158,693.77, according to two comparables. This demonstrates that it would be eminently unfair and unreasonable to pay someone $55,402.00 in exchange for 180 life-contingent monthly payments of $2,427.26 payable over the period of March 12, 2040 to February 12, 2055, totaling $541,732.68.

The Court also considers that at the hearing, Ms. Johnson testified that J.G. Wentworth did not provide information:

THE COURT: Did they give you any information?

TALIQUA JOHNSON: No, just like giving them an idea of letting them know what I need it for. Going through payments with me to see what would fit me. (NYSCEF Doc No. 19 at 18, lines 22-25.)

Best Interest of the Transferor

General Obligations Law § 5-1706 (b) provides:

No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be effective and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer has been authorized in advance in a final order of a court of competent jurisdiction based upon express findings by such court that:

. . .

(b) the transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents; and whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount, are fair and reasonable [emphasis added].

The court in Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d at 455, articulated the meaning of the phrase, "best interest of the payee," in this context as follows:

After an independent analysis of decisional law in this and other jurisdictions, and consideration of the legislative history of SSPA, this court determines that the best interest prong should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, giving specific consideration to such factors as the payee's age; mental and physical capacity; maturity level; ability to show sufficient income that is independent of the payments sought for transfer; capacity to provide for the welfare and support of the payee's dependents; the need for medical treatment; the stated purpose for the transfer; and the demonstrated ability of the payee to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer based upon truly independent legal and financial advice.

Additionally, courts must take into consideration "whether the proposed transfer of structured settlement payments, which were designed to preserve the injured person's long-term financial security, will provide needed financial rescue without jeopardizing or irreparably impairing the financial security afforded to the payee and his or her dependents by the periodic payments" (id.).

Ms. Johnson suffers from injuries sustained at birth. As a result of a settlement of a personal injury claim, she became the beneficiary of structured settlement payments. Ms. Johnson has five minor dependents. Additionally, it is apparent to this Court that she possesses sufficient mental capacity. Ms. Johnson is a 34-year-old adult. She testified that she currently has no form of income and has never been employed.

Ms. Johnson's affirmation in support states that she intends to use the $55,402.00 to be paid from J.G. Wentworth as follows: to use $30,000.00 toward moving into a larger space, one that is out of the city and in a more affordable location, including a down payment, moving costs, furniture, and appliances, and to use the remaining $25,402.00 to purchase a newer, reliable vehicle. However, Ms. Johnson testified that her needs since the affirmation was filed have changed. She now intends to use the proceeds of the sale to pay for her 11-year-old daughter's scoliosis surgery and recovery. She still intends on using some of the leftover proceeds toward housing.

Conclusion

"The interest of public policy is preserved by [structured settlements to resolve tort claims] because it ensures a compensation stream to pay for future care or needs. It serves to prevent settlement funds from being dissipated, and such injuries becoming the responsibility of the public health care system" (Mem NY Consumer Protection Board in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). "Consumers of one-time structured settlement payment services must be accountable to the court and provide a justifiable reason for amending the court[ ] order and seeking to liquidate their structured settlement into a lump sum payment" (id.).

As acknowledged above, the legislative purposes underpinning the SSPA were both societal and personal in nature. Both the public at large needed to be protected as did compensated tort victims. To approve the transfer at bar in this special proceeding, this Court would undermine the legislative priorities of avoiding tort victims from becoming public charges, preventing resourceful factoring companies from preying on them, enabling individuals who have serious needs for immediate cash to obtain it, requiring complete disclosure of transfer situations, and facilitating courts' informed consideration of transfers. (See supra at 2-3.)

The SSPA was created to allow courts to act as a shield preventing vulnerable individuals from being exploited by those more privileged in their knowledge of the intricacies of the financial system. The discretionary nature of the SSPA grants the courts the right to analyze applications substantively while simultaneously scrutinizing parties' adherence to procedural rules. This Court performs its review of the proposed transfer herein, bearing in mind the legislative goals in enacting the SSPA.

The Court is constrained to reject the proposed transfer based on the best interest of the payee, taking into consideration the payee's age, maturity level, stated purpose for the transfer, and demonstrated ability to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer. This Court is of the view that Ms. Johnson's interests would be better served by receiving the 180 life-contingent payments of $2,427.26, increasing 3% annually, beginning on March 12, 2040 and ending on February 12, 2055.

Ms. Johnson currently has no source of income and has never been employed. She does not receive any public assistance or disability benefits. Ms. Johnson has made eighteen known attempts to sell the proceeds of her structured settlement for discounted amounts, fourteen of which have been successful. Ms. Johnson has worked with J.G. Wentworth numerous times in these attempts. She sought out J.G. Wentworth to discuss selling the subject structured settlement payments in this action. Ms. Johnson testified that she did not know the amount of her total settlement nor the total amount of the approved sales made. Furthermore, Ms. Johnson testified that she was provided with papers by J.G. Wentworth in person to sign her consent to the terms of the proposed sale, yet her affirmation in support, disclosure statement, statement of professional representation, transfer agreement, and list of dependents all display her electronic signature (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 19 at 19, line 14, through 20, line 4; 3 at 3; 4 at PDF 4; 5 at PDF 2; 7 at PDF 8; 8 at PDF 2). The Court finds these considerations (including the discrepancy in how Ms. Johnson executed the documents) relevant to its assessment of her demonstrated ability to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer. Frankly, the Court finds that Ms. Johnson lacks a complete understanding of the financial consequences of the proposed transfer of her structured settlement payments.

Ms. Johnson stated that she would use the money from the settlement to pay for her daughter's back surgery, obtain a different place to live for herself and her family, and purchase a vehicle. Ms. Johnson and her five children currently reside with Ms. Johnson's grandmother in Queens; however, Ms. Johnson testified that after her daughter's surgery, it will no longer be feasible to continue residing there. Ms. Johnson testified that the applications of prior sales of her structured settlement payments have been made for the benefit of herself and her children, including for housing and transportation.

While it is recognized that Ms. Johnson's stated reasons for the transfer are admirable, she seeks to accomplish them by selling her structured settlement proceeds at an unfair and unreasonable discount. In J.G. Wentworth's Disclosure Statement, it states that "[t]he discounted present value of the aggregate purchase payments at the federal interest rate of 4.60% is $204,083.03 . . . [which] is the calculation of the current value of the transferred structured settlement payments under federal standards for valuing annuities" (NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at PDF 3). Furthermore, according to the Disclosure Statement, "Based on price quotes from Oceanview Life and Annuity and Revol One Financial the current costs of purchasing a comparable annuity for the aggregate amount of payments to be transferred is $175,374.36 and $158,693.77 respectively (id.). The agreed upon price between J.G. Wentworth and Ms. Johnson of $55,4002.00 is significantly less than these approximations.

One of the legislative purposes of the SSPA is to promote the long-term financial stability for tort victims by preserving settlement proceeds for their future needs. Permitting a payee to sell a substantial portion of their settlement at steeply discounted rates through over a dozen applications is inconsistent with that statutory objective and undermines the protection the SSPA was intended to provide.

The Court herein concludes that the proposed sale of Ms. Johnson's structured settlement proceeds is not in her best interest.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

(1) The findings necessary for a court to approve a transfer of structured settlement payment rights pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-1706 have not been established.

(2) The application by Petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC to approve a transfer of $541,732.68 of Respondent Taliqua Johnson's future structured settlement proceeds payments from March 12, 2040 and February 12, 2055 for $55,402.00 is denied.

(3) The within special proceeding is dismissed.

(4) Within ten days of the entry of this decision, order, and judgment, Petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC shall serve a copy of it upon all respondents herein (a) by first-class mail (with a certificate of mailing being obtained) to all known residence and business addresses, (b) by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known residence and business addresses, and (c) by email to all known email addresses for them; proof of said service shall be filed on NYSCEF within ten days after service is effectuated.

(5) A copy of this decision, order, and judgment shall be annexed to any future petitions commencing proceedings in this or any other county under the Structured Settlement Protection Act seeking approval of transfers of any and all remaining payments due Respondent Taliqua Johnson pursuant to this structured settlement.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indeed, Brighthouse Life Insurance Company is listed twice as a respondent.

2.   "Payee" is the statutory term, because the transferor has been or will be paid the structured settlement payments. However, in terms of the within special proceeding seeking approval of an assignment of the payments, the "payee" is denoted as the "transferor."

Aaron D. Maslow, J.