Vanessa Rawlins, Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC (2026)

This action arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 9, 2019, on Belmont Avenue at or near its intersection with Hinsdale Street in Kings County, New York. Vanessa Rawlins ("Plaintiff") claimed she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband, Anderson Newlin Rawlins, which was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Defendant Soe Myint ("Myint"), who was logged into Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.'s ("Uber") rideshare platform via its app. Plaintiff commenced this action against Myint and Uber, alleging that the latter was vicariously liable for Myint's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Uber denied the allegations of the complaint, including that an employment relationship existed between it and Myint. Following a court order dated November 7, 2022, granting Plaintiff summary judgment on liability with respect to Myint, the sole remaining issue for trial was whether Uber was vicariously liable for Myint's negligence.

The evidence concerning Uber's business operations came in the form of extensive testimony from Benjamin Carroll, who worked as a senior manager of corporate business operations on the U.S. and Canada city operations team at Uber around the time of the subject motor vehicle accident. He now worked on the global intelligence operations team. The principal document admitted into evidence was Uber's Technology Services Agreement which Myint had signed as a condition of using Uber's app. Also, Myint's licensing documents were admitted into evidence.

On the second day of the trial, June 17, 2026, at the close of Plaintiff's proof, Uber moved pursuant to CPLR 4401 for a directed verdict, contending that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that an employment relationship existed between Uber and the driver, Myint. In particular, Uber argued that Myint exercised complete discretion over "who, what, when, where, why and how" he operated his vehicle, that Uber did not control how he drove or completed rides, that either party could terminate the Technology Services Agreement at any time, that Uber merely acted as a payment intermediary, and that the evidence established Myint's independent contractor status. Further, Uber maintained that the undisputed evidence showed that Myint owned his own vehicle, was issued a Form 1099 rather than a W-2, was free to determine when and where he worked, and was not supervised by Uber. Accordingly, Uber averred that there were no factual issues for the jury regarding Uber's control over the method and manner of Myint's work.

Plaintiff, in opposition, contended that the evidence presented at trial established a prima facie case from which a rational jury could conclude that an employment relationship existed. Plaintiff argued that the Technology Services Agreement was drafted exclusively by Uber and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and that Uber retained the unilateral authority to terminate drivers based upon customer ratings, established the fares charged to riders, collected payments directly from riders before remitting a portion to drivers, and controlled the types of vehicles that could be used on its platform. Plaintiff further claimed that these facts, together with the evidence concerning Uber's oversight of drivers, were sufficient to permit a jury to find that Uber exercised the requisite control over the means and manner of the driver's work, thereby creating a question of fact for the jury.

It is well settled that a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 should be granted only where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and affording that party every favorable inference, there is no rational process by which the jury could find in that party's favor (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553 [1997]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 NY2d 493 [1978]; Blum v Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 NY 241 [1944]). The Court's function on such a motion is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of credibility, but rather to determine whether, upon any rational view of the evidence, the nonmoving party has established a prima facie case warranting submission of the matter to the jury (see Szczerbiak, 90 NY2d at 556; Cohen, 45 NY2d at 499). If there exists any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead rational jurors to the conclusion reached by the nonmoving party, judgment as a matter of law must be denied (see Cohen, 45 NY2d at 499).

As recognized by the parties and the applicable case law, the critical inquiry in determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is the degree of control exercised by the purported employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results (see Bynog v Cipriani Group, Inc., 1 NY3d 193, 198 [2003]; Matter of Empire State Towing & Recovery Assn., Inc. (Commissioner of Labor), 15 NY3d 433, 437 [2010]). "[N]o single factor is determinative . . ." (Matter of Lowry (Uber Tech., Inc.—Commissioner of Labor), 189 AD3d 1863, 1863 [3d Dept 2020] [substantial evidence supported Workers' Compensation Board's finding that Uber exercised sufficient control over the drivers to establish an employment relationship]).

Contrary to Uber's assertion that the evidence permitted only one conclusion, Plaintiff presented legally sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Uber exercised the requisite degree of control not merely over the results of the driver's work, but over the means by which that work was performed, thereby supporting a finding of an employment relationship.

The Court is not persuaded that Uber's enforcement of the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC") regulations necessarily compels a finding that Myint was an independent contractor, an argument advanced by Uber. Uber maintained that many of the requirements imposed upon drivers merely reflected compliance with applicable law. However, the fact that a business operates within a regulatory framework does not, by itself, preclude a finding that it exercises control over its workers. Employers across numerous industries remain subject to governmental regulations while simultaneously exercising control over the manner and means by which their employees perform their work. Here, although certain vehicle, licensing, and insurance requirements may have originated with the TLC, Plaintiff presented evidence that Uber incorporated those requirements into its contractual relationship with drivers and retained the authority to enforce compliance as a condition of access to its platform. Indeed, Plaintiff evidenced that beyond compliance with TLC regulations, Uber independently imposed requirements governing participation on its platform, including determining vehicle classifications such as UberX, UberXL, Uber Black, and Uber SUV, which dictated the categories of rides a driver was eligible to accept.

Plaintiff introduced evidence from which a jury could conclude that Uber independently exercised control over its drivers. The evidence established that Uber drafted the Technology Services Agreement and required drivers to accept its terms as a condition of accessing the platform. There was no evidence that drivers meaningfully negotiated the agreement. Moreover, Uber retained the contractual authority to deactivate drivers based upon customer ratings, thereby reserving the right to terminate a driver's access to the platform. A jury could reasonably view that authority not merely as a termination provision, but as evidence of control over the manner in which drivers performed rides, because the rating system evaluated how the driver drove and interacted with riders. Uber also retained the ability to cut off a driver's access to the app for nonuse, even if reinstatement was available upon request. Regardless of how frequently that authority was exercised, the retention of such authority constitutes evidence of Uber's right to control the relationship.

Plaintiff further presented evidence from which a jury could infer that Uber exercised substantial control over the economic aspects of the work. The evidence demonstrated that Uber established the presumptive fare charged to riders, collected payment directly from riders, deducted its own portion of the fare, and remitted the remaining amount to the driver. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that riders were billed directly by Uber, with the credit card charges appearing in Uber's name, rather than that of the individual driver. Although Uber characterized itself as merely a payment intermediary, a rational jury could conclude that these practices reflect the operation of a business exercising control over the financial aspects of its drivers' work.

The record contained additional evidence that drivers could not transfer their access to the Uber platform to another individual; that Uber controlled the sequence in which drivers received ride requests by offering the ride first to one driver and, if declined, then to another; that Uber collected geolocation data; that Uber required drivers to maintain specified vehicle insurance; and that Uber required itself to be named as an additional insured. Although Uber characterized the insurance requirements as compliance with applicable law, the Court noted that businesses across industries are subject to governmental insurance requirements and may still be deemed employers. A jury could therefore consider that Uber required insurance not merely as a legal formality, but as a condition of platform access and in a manner that directly benefited Uber. Plaintiff also provided evidence that Uber created the default fare charged to riders, subject only to later negotiation. While none of these facts is independently dispositive, each bore upon Uber's right to control the manner in which drivers performed services through its platform.

Finally, the Court recognized that Uber likewise introduced evidence supporting independent contractor status. Specifically, the evidence showed Myint owned his own vehicle, determined when and where he worked, could simultaneously drive for competing rideshare companies, received a Form 1099 rather than a W-2, was not provided workers' compensation benefits, had no supervisor, and was free to take time off without seeking permission. Such evidence weighed in favor of Uber's position that Myint was an independent contractor. However, none of these considerations is individually controlling, nor do they eliminate the competing evidence of control presented by Plaintiff. Nor does the evidence favoring Plaintiff establish, as a matter of law, that Myint was Uber's employee.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and affording Plaintiff every favorable inference, the Court concluded that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether Uber exercised sufficient control over the manner and means by which Myint performed his work. The evidence supported competing inferences regarding the nature of the relationship between Uber and its drivers. Accordingly, because the determination of whether Soe Myint was an employee or an independent contractor presented a question of fact for the jury, Uber Technologies, Inc.'s motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for a directed verdict was DENIED.

Dated: July 13, 2026

AARON D. MASLOW

Aaron D. Maslow, J.