Giselle Lynch, etc., appellant, v. FSNR SNF LLC (2026)

Argued—January 12, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

A/

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), dated December 26, 2022.  The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In July 2020, the plaintiff, Giselle Lynch, individually and as administrator of the estate of Jocelyn Lynch (hereinafter the decedent), commenced this action against the defendant, FSNR SNF, LLC, a nursing home, to recover damages for medical malpractice, wrongful death, negligence, and alleged violations of the Public Health Law in connection with the medical care and treatment provided by the defendant to the decedent.  In March 2022, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.  In an order dated December 26, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“The requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice action are a deviation or departure from accepted practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury” (Wicksman v Nassau County Health Care Corp., 27 AD3d 644, 644;  see Lowell v. Flom, 195 AD3d 801, 802).  “A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact with respect to at least one of those elements” (Lowell v. Flom, 195 AD3d at 802 [citation omitted];  see Roye v. Gelberg, 172 AD3d 1260, 1261).  Where a defendant makes a prima facie showing on both elements, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the defendant's showing by raising a triable issue of fact as to both the departure element and the causation element (see Roye v. Gelberg, 172 AD3d at 1261;  Brinkley v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 120 AD3d 1287, 1289).  Further, a defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging deprivation of rights pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801–d meets its prima facie burden by submitting evidence that the alleged injuries did not arise through any action or negligence of its employees (see Moore v St. James Health Care Ctr., LLC, 141 AD3d 701, 703;  Gold v Park Ave. Extended Care Ctr. Corp., 90 AD3d 833, 834).

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint through its expert affirmation.  The defendant's expert opined, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant did not deviate or depart from accepted standards with respect to the prevention and treatment of the decedent's pressure ulcers and that the decedent's pressure ulcers were unavoidable due to her medical conditions and comorbidities (see Russell v. River Manor Corp., 216 AD3d 827, 830;  Korszun v. Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 172 AD3d 1343, 1345).  Further, with respect to the cause of action alleging a deprivation of rights pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801–d, the defendant established, prima facie, that the decedent's alleged injuries did not arise through any action or negligence of its employees because they provided all care reasonably necessary to prevent injury and the decedent's alleged injuries were unavoidable due to her comorbidities (see Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1001;  Gold v Park Ave. Extended Care Ctr. Corp., 90 AD3d at 834).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The expert affirmation proffered by the plaintiff was conclusory and speculative and failed to address the significance of the decedent's comorbidities (see Campbell v Ditmas Park Rehabilitation & Care Ctr., LLC, 225 AD3d 835, 837;  Russell v. River Manor Corp., 216 AD3d at 830).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

LASALLE, P.J., VOUTSINAS, LOVE and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court