PEOPLE v. STONE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Larry J. Schwartz, J.), rendered January 3, 2020, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, he validly waived his right to counsel.  “ ‘A court must determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is made competently, intelligently, and voluntarily before allowing that defendant to represent himself or herself’ ” (People v Petty, 246 AD3d 831, 832, quoting People v Hall, 244 AD3d 753, 754).  “ ‘To ascertain whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a court must undertake a searching inquiry designed to insur[e] that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” (People v Stroud, 144 AD3d 1056, 1057 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Crampe, 17 NY3d 469, 481).  “The court's inquiry ‘must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication’ ” (People v Hall, 244 AD3d at 755, quoting People v Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520).  “A defendant's mental capacity may be taken into account in determining whether to permit the defendant to proceed pro se ‘although the trial court need not conduct a formal competency hearing prior to adjudicating a self-representation request’ ” (People v James, 200 AD3d 711, 712–713, quoting People v Stone, 22 NY3d 520, 527).

Here, the record reflects that, in response to the defendant's request to proceed pro se, the County Court engaged in a searching inquiry and adequately informed the defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, drew the defendant's attention to the many challenges that he would face if he proceeded pro se, and apprised the defendant of the benefits and the singular importance of representation by counsel in the adversarial system of adjudication (see People v Crampe, 17 NY3d at 481;  People v Vilsaint, 247 AD3d 797, 798;  People v Petty, 246 AD3d at 832).  The defendant also had the benefit of standby counsel during the colloquy and steadfastly maintained his desire to proceed pro se throughout the proceeding (see People v Vilsaint, 247 AD3d at 798;  People v Smith, 187 AD3d 944, 944).  Moreover, the record as a whole reflects that the court had no reason to believe that the defendant suffered from a mental illness that affected his ability to waive counsel and proceed pro se (see People v Stone, 22 NY3d at 528–529;  People v Paulin, 140 AD3d 985, 987).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Li, 34 NY3d 357, 363;  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

IANNACCI, J.P., DOWLING, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.