HAMDAN v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants New York City Transit Authority and Melissa Trim Baker appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heela D. Capell, J.), dated March 28, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority, City of New York, and Melissa Trim Baker which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants New York City Transit Authority and Melissa Trim Baker.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter NYCTA) and Melissa Trim Baker to recover damages for personal injuries that the plaintiff alleged he sustained when a van owned by NYCTA and operated by Baker struck his vehicle as he was opening the driver's side door.  NYCTA, Baker, and the defendant City of New York (hereinafter collectively the defendants) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, contending that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.  The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against NYCTA and Baker.

“A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident” (Laborde v Creative Closet & Design, Inc., 240 AD3d 678, 678 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  There may be more than one proximate cause of an accident and that is generally for the trier of fact to determine (see Qureshi v. Gleason, 231 AD3d 878, 879).  The issue of proximate cause may be resolved as a matter of law “where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 by opening the door on the side of his vehicle adjacent to moving traffic when it was not reasonably safe to do so, which was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Baker v. Michaels Elec. Supply Corp, 241 AD3d 768, 769;  Do Soon Gil v. Frisina, 223 AD3d 878, 878–879).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether Baker was negligent and whether his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident (see Baker v. Michaels Elec. Supply Corp, 241 AD3d at 769–770;  Tucubal v. National Express Tr. Corp., 209 AD3d 788, 790).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against NYCTA and Baker.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach NYCTA's and Baker's remaining contention.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and HOM, JJ., concur.