IN RE: Carmen DELEON (2023)

DECISION & ORDER

In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the maternal grandmother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Michelle I. Schauer, J.), dated January 28, 2022.  The order, after a hearing, denied the maternal grandmother's petitions pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) for grandparent visitation with the subject children and dismissed the proceedings.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner (hereinafter the grandmother) is the biological maternal grandmother of the subject children, who were all placed in foster care.  The parental rights of the children's parents were terminated in proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b.  The grandmother subsequently filed petitions pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) seeking grandparent visitation with the children.  After a hearing, the Family Court determined that the grandmother lacked standing and that, in any event, visitation was not in the children's best interests, denied the petitions, and dismissed the proceedings.  The grandmother appeals.

A biological grandparent may seek visitation with children even after parental rights have been terminated or the children have been freed for adoption (see People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 326, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049;  Matter of Weiss v. Orange County Dept. of Social Servs., 142 A.D.3d 505, 505–506, 35 N.Y.S.3d 726).  “ ‘When a grandparent seeks visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), the court must make a two-part inquiry’ ” (Matter of McAvoy v. McAvoy, 155 A.D.3d 867, 868, 63 N.Y.S.3d 703, quoting Matter of Gray v. Varone, 101 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 956 N.Y.S.2d 573;  see Matter of Sands v. Sands, 174 A.D.3d 628, 629, 101 N.Y.S.3d 877).  “ ‘First, [the court] must find standing based on death or equitable circumstances,’ ” and “ ‘[i]f [the court] concludes that the grandparents have established the right to be heard, then it must determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild’ ” (Matter of E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150, 157, 831 N.Y.S.2d 96, 863 N.E.2d 100, quoting Matter of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 181, 573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 577 N.E.2d 27;  see Matter of Marchant v. Marchant, 185 A.D.3d 1035, 1036, 128 N.Y.S.3d 656).

“In considering whether a grandparent has standing to petition for visitation based upon circumstances showing that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, an essential part of the inquiry is the nature and extent of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, among other factors” (Matter of Lipton v. Lipton, 98 A.D.3d 621, 621, 949 N.Y.S.2d 501 [alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Sands v. Sands, 174 A.D.3d at 629, 101 N.Y.S.3d 877;  Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d 1070, 1070, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674).

The Family Court's determination that the grandmother lacked standing is supported by the record.  Under the circumstances of this case, equitable considerations did not warrant judicial intervention for the visitation she sought (see Matter of Marchant v. Marchant, 185 A.D.3d at 1036, 128 N.Y.S.3d 656;  Matter of McAvoy v. McAvoy, 155 A.D.3d at 868, 63 N.Y.S.3d 703;  Matter of Seasia D. [Kareem W.], 75 A.D.3d 548, 552, 905 N.Y.S.2d 643).  In any event, visitation would not be in the best interests of the children (see Matter of Marchant v. Marchant, 185 A.D.3d at 1036, 128 N.Y.S.3d 656).

Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied the petitions and dismissed the proceedings.

IANNACCI, J.P., MILLER, CHRISTOPHER and WAN, JJ., concur.