IN RE: Brian PULLIAM (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Schick, J.), entered February 22, 2021 in Sullivan County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner is currently serving a prison sentence of 25 years to life upon his 1996 conviction of murder in the second degree.  He appeared before respondent seeking to be released to parole supervision for the first time in October 2019.  Following the hearing, respondent determined that release would not be appropriate at that time and held petitioner for an additional 24 months, and that determination was upheld on administrative appeal.  Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul that determination.  Supreme Court dismissed the petition and petitioner appeals.

We affirm.  “It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as respondent complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i” (Matter of Jones v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted];  see Matter of Payne v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1577, 1577, 104 N.Y.S.3d 383 [2019]).  Further, “[respondent] was not required to give equal weight to — or expressly discuss — each of the statutory factors” (Matter of Espinal v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 1817, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 [2019];  see Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428 [2020]).  Contrary to petitioner's claim, the record reflects that respondent considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching its determination, including the serious nature of petitioner's crime, his otherwise clean criminal record, his favorable prison disciplinary history, his program and educational accomplishments, his work assignments, his postrelease plans and his low score on the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (see Matter of Pedraza v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 1194, 1194, 86 N.Y.S.3d 666 [2018];  Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 [2017]).  Moreover, respondent's concern that granting parole would deprecate the seriousness of the crime is supported by petitioner's limited remorse and insight into his crime (see Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477–478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000];  Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 1309, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 [2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 901, 2017 WL 1093730 [2017]).  Although petitioner expressed remorse at the parole hearing, he stated that six months prior to the hearing he was not even sure that he had committed the crime and he did not offer an explanation as to why he did it.  In view of the foregoing, we do not find that respondent's decision evinces “irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) and it will not be disturbed (see Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d at 1479, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726).  Petitioner's remaining contentions, including his argument that he did not receive a fair hearing, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Aarons, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.