The People of the State of New York v. VICTOR ROSADO (2026)

Summary of the Court's Decision:

1. Defendant Rosado voluntarily and intentionally abandoned the recovered firearm and magazine, thus the defendants, alleged to be acting in concert, have no standing to contest the subsequent seizure of the firearm and magazine.

2. Where there was no evidence of any police coercion and Defendant Haughton was administered a fresh set of Miranda warnings, a period of thirteen minutes between Defendant Haughton's invocation of his right to remain silent and the administration of new Miranda warnings was a significant period of time to elapse in order for questioning to resume. Under such circumstances, Defendant Haughton's statements were voluntary and therefore admissible.

OPINION OF THE COURT

The defendants are charged with two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law §§ 265.03 [1] [b], [3]) and other related charges in connection with a loaded firearm allegedly thrown out from a vehicle in which Defendant Haughton was the driver and Defendant Rosado was the front passenger. Both defendants moved to suppress the recovered loaded firearm and attached extended magazine as the fruits of an unlawful stop and seizure. Defendant Haughton also moved to suppress his statements made at the 113th Precinct on the grounds that the police did not "scrupulously honor" his right to remain silent pursuant to Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96 (1975).

On September 10, 2025, January 21, 2026, and May 28, 2026, the Court conducted a Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing as to Defendant Andrew Haughton and a Mapp/Dunaway hearing as to Defendant Victor Rosado. Police Officer Matthew Hurwitz of the 113th Precinct and Lieutenant Thomas Sorrentino of Queens South Narcotics  ¹ testified on behalf of the People. A photograph of the recovered firearm and magazine was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 1 and Defendant Haughton's video interview was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 2. The defendants did not present any witnesses, however, Lieutenant Sorrentino's body worn camera video was admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit A.

The Court finds the witnesses to be credible based upon their demeanor and appearance during their testimony at the hearing. The Court thus makes the following findings of relevant fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On November 26, 2024, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer Hurwitz and Lieutenant Sorrentino were conducting patrol in an unmarked police vehicle within the vicinity of Hollis Avenue and Francis Lewis Boulevard in Queens County. The officers were dressed in modified uniform — an outer vest carrier with "NYPD" in big bold letters and their name, shield and command. Officer Hurwitz was driving the police vehicle, and Lieutenant Sorrentino was in the front passenger seat.

The officers were traveling eastbound on Hollis Avenue when Officer Hurwitz observed a white Nissan Rogue traveling westbound on Hollis Avenue approaching the intersection of Francis Lewis Boulevard. The police vehicle was approximately five or six car lengths from the subject vehicle in light traffic. Officer Hurwitz observed the subject vehicle drive around a vehicle that was stopped in front of the red light at the intersection, drive into the opposite lane of traffic, and drive through the red light. The subject vehicle had no headlights or taillights on. Officer Hurwitz testified that although the police vehicle was facing the subject vehicle, he determined that the subject vehicle drove through a red light because he was able to see the light illuminating from the traffic signal at night. Officer Hurwitz testified that the area was well lit due to the streetlights, headlights of the police vehicle, and the lights from the surrounding business, even though it was dark outside. When the subject vehicle drove past the officers, Officer Hurwitz observed the driver of the vehicle but was unable to discern whether there were any other occupants in the vehicle due to the dark window tints.

Upon seeing the subject vehicle drive through the red light and continue traveling westbound, Officer Hurwitz made a U-turn and began to travel behind the subject vehicle, approximately four to five car lengths away. Officer Hurwitz observed a Florida license plate affixed to the subject vehicle. Approximately two blocks later, the subject vehicle pulled into a parking spot at 203rd Street.

Officer Hurwitz drove past the subject vehicle at a slow rate of speed for approximately one block, keeping the subject vehicle in his line of sight from his rearview mirror. Officer Hurwitz observed the driver's door of the subject vehicle open and a male wearing a black sweatshirt exit and walk onto the sidewalk. Officer Hurwitz then saw the driver's door close and the subject vehicle pull out of the parking spot. The subject vehicle made a left turn onto 203rd Street. Officer Hurwitz made a U-turn to follow the vehicle. Officer Hurwitz lost sight of the subject vehicle as he was making the U-turn but observed the subject vehicle again approximately fifteen to twenty seconds later while traveling southbound on 203rd Street.

Officer Hurwitz made a left turn, traveling eastbound on 112th Avenue. Officer Hurwitz observed the subject vehicle parked on the southeast corner of 203rd Street and 112th Avenue. A male wearing a black sweatshirt was standing on the left side of the street. As the police vehicle approached, the male got into the driver's side of the subject vehicle. Officer Hurwitz then activated his emergency lights. Officer Hurwitz testified that he activated the lights due to the traffic infractions committed by the subject vehicle, specifically running through the red light at Hollis Avenue and Francis Lewis Boulevard, driving into oncoming traffic, and driving with no headlights on at night. Officer Hurwitz testified that it was a few minutes from the time he first saw the subject vehicle to when he activated his lights.

Once the police vehicle's lights were activated, the subject vehicle pulled out from where it was parked and fled, driving in excess of 50 mph in a 25-mph speed limit zone. Both Officer Hurwitz and Lieutenant Sorrentino testified that at this time, NYPD policy permitted police vehicles to pursue vehicles that had committed traffic infractions.² Officer Hurwitz followed and was a few car lengths away from the subject vehicle. At one point, the subject vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction of a one-way street. The subject vehicle also ran through multiple red lights, causing multiple vehicles to swerve out of the way to avoid colliding. Officer Hurwitz testified he was approximately five to ten car lengths from the subject vehicle, and he had the subject vehicle in his line of sight until they entered the Cross Island Parkway when they lost sight of the vehicle. At that point, Lieutenant Sorrentino radioed for assistance, which caused the 105th Precinct to shut down the Cross Island Parkway. The subject vehicle was stopped at the Cross Island Parkway.

Upon the stop, Officer Hurwitz approached the driver's side of the vehicle with his gun drawn. Multiple officers from the 105th Precinct were also present on the scene. The windows were closed, and the officers were unable to discern who was in the vehicle. The officers yelled at the occupants to show their hands and get out of the car. Officer Hurwitz broke the front driver's window and grabbed the driver while another officer opened the door. Officer Hurwitz observed the same male wearing the black sweatshirt that he had seen earlier. Officer Hurwitz testified that he broke the window for safety purposes — the subject vehicle had just fled a car stop, the door was locked, and he wanted to remove the occupants as fast and safely as possible. The driver, later learned to be Defendant Haughton, was placed into handcuffs without issue.

While Officer Hurwitz approached the driver's side of the vehicle, Lieutenant Sorrentino approached the passenger's side of the vehicle with his gun and flashlight drawn. Lieutenant Sorrentino observed an arm extend out of the front passenger window and the arm throwing a black object into the grass area on the side of the highway. Lieutenant Sorrentino testified that the area was well lit due to the streetlights and headlights of the cars in the area. However, he was unable to discern what exactly the object was. The other occupants were pulled out of the vehicle — Defendant Rosado, who had been seated in the front passenger seat, and Jada Durant,³ who had been seated in the back seat of the vehicle — and were placed under arrest. Lieutenant Sorrentino then went to the grass area and recovered a loaded black Glock firearm with an attached extended magazine. The firearm was located approximately 20 feet away from the vehicle. Lieutenant Sorrentino testified that it was seconds from when he saw the object being thrown from the vehicle and the defendants being placed in handcuffs. Officer Hurwitz vouchered the firearm.

The defendants were transported to the 113th Precinct and placed into holding cells. Prior to being interviewed, Defendant Haughton asked to make a phone call, which he was permitted to do. Officer Hurwitz testified that he did not ask Defendant Haughton any questions during the arrest processing.

At the precinct, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Defendant Haughton was interviewed by Detective Corey. Officer Hurwitz was present for the interview and sat in the corner of the interview room behind Detective Corey. Defendant Haughton was provided water and then read his Miranda rights by Detective Corey. Defendant Haughton orally acknowledged his rights. However, when asked whether he was willing to answer questions, Defendant Haughton stated, "No" (People's Exhibit 2). Detective Corey and Officer Hurwitz then left the room.

For approximately thirteen minutes, Defendant Haughton was left alone in the room, with the exception of Officer Hurwitz briefly returning to give the defendant a cigarette and lighter. Detective Corey and Officer Hurwitz then returned to the room. Defendant Haughton requested a lighter, which Officer Hurwitz retrieved. Detective Corey then read the defendant his Miranda rights again. Defendant Haughton orally acknowledged his rights and agreed to answer the detective's questions. During the interview, Defendant Haughton stated that he had bought the gun two weeks prior and it belonged to him. Upon being shown a photograph of the gun (People's Exhibit 1), Detective Corey asked, "So this is the gun that you had?" and Defendant Haughton replied, "Yeah." Defendant Haughton said that he paid approximately $1,000 for the gun.

The interview was memorialized on video as People's Exhibit 2. Defendant Haughton was not handcuffed at any point during the interview. No firearms were drawn during the interview, and no promises or threats were made to Defendant Haughton. Officer Hurwitz testified that Defendant Haughton did not appear to be under the influence of marijuana or any other substance during the interview. Officer Hurwitz testified that he did not detect any odor of marijuana on Defendant Haughton's clothes or the areas in which he occupied. When asked about a delay in Defendant Haughton's speech, Officer Hurwitz testified that Defendant Haughton appeared to be nervous, specifically that he wouldn't make eye contact with either him or Detective Corey.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence

At a suppression hearing, the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct (see People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d 640, 652 [1976]; People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]; People v James, 72 AD3d 844, 844 [2d Dept 2010]). The defendant, however, bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of police conduct (see People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d at 652; People v Thomas, 291 AD2d 462, 463 [2d Dept 2002]).

The Court finds the stop of the subject vehicle to be lawful. Officer Hurwitz testified that he observed the vehicle, in which Defendant Haughton was the driver and Defendant Rosado was the front passenger, commit several traffic infractions, including driving through a red light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (1), driving into oncoming traffic in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1127 (a), and driving with no headlights in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (2) (a) (1). Thus, there was a valid basis to stop the subject vehicle, irrespective of the fact that the officers did not stop the subject vehicle immediately upon observing the traffic infractions (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]).

The subject vehicle subsequently fled the officers, who had activated their lights and attempted to conduct a stop. The officers were permitted to give chase to the subject vehicle. Upon observing his reckless driving while fleeing the officers, the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant Haughton (People v Coss, 189 AD3d 1759, 1762 [3d Dept 2020], citing People v Frazier, 33 AD3d 934, 935 [2d Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 880 [2007]). Under the circumstances, in order to ensure their safety, the officers were justified in ordering the defendants out of the vehicle with guns drawn, breaking the driver's window, and placing the defendants in handcuffs upon their removal from the vehicle (People v David, 248 AD3d 813, 815-816 [2d Dept 2026]).

Upon approaching the stopped subject vehicle, Lieutenant Sorrentino observed the front passenger, Defendant Rosado, throw a black object into the grass area on the side of the highway. Shortly thereafter, the lieutenant recovered a loaded black firearm with an extended magazine attached to the firearm from the same grass area. The hearing record establishes that Defendant Rosado voluntarily and intentionally abandoned the firearm (People v Jackson, 158 AD2d 545 [2d Dept 1990], appeal denied 76 NY2d 737 [1990]; People v Wood, 125 AD2d 823, 825 [3d Dept 1986]; see People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404 [1979]). Since the Court has found the stop to be lawful, Defendant Rosado's abandonment of the firearm was not the product of an unlawful police pursuit (People v Fletcher, 248 AD3d 1136, 1136-1137 [2d Dept 2026]; People v Rogers, 92 AD3d 903, 904 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 967 [2012]; People v Stephenson, 89 AD3d 872, 873 [2d Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 962 [2012]). The defendants, alleged to be acting in concert, therefore have no standing to contest the subsequent seizure of the firearm and magazine (People v Fletcher, 248 AD3d at 1136-1137; People v White, 153 AD3d 1369, 1370 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1065 [2017]), and there was probable cause to arrest Defendant Rosado for unlawful possession of a firearm.

Based on the foregoing, the defendants' motions to suppress the firearm and magazine are denied.

Motion to Suppress Defendant Haughton's Statements

It is uncontested that when Defendant Haughton was first administered Miranda warnings, the defendant invoked his right to remain silent, clearly stating "no" when asked whether he would be willing to answer questions. In Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held,

"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked."

The fact that a defendant once invokes his right to remain silent, however, does not completely foreclose the possibility of further questioning by the police (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 104 [1975] [Miranda did not "create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by an police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent"]). The admissibility of statements obtained after an unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent depends on whether the defendant's " 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored' " (id.). In Michigan v Mosley, the Court found the defendant's statements to be admissible because "the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation" (id. at 106).

Here, the defendant was administered a fresh set of Miranda warnings. Thus, the question before the Court is limited to whether a period of thirteen minutes from Defendant Haughton's invocation of silence constitutes "a significant period of time" for questioning to resume. In Mosley, the period of time was more than two hours. A review of relevant cases in which a defendant invoked their right to cut off questioning and subsequent questioning was found to be proper reveals that a period of anywhere from a half hour to "many hours" is considered to be "significant" (see People v Gary, 31 NY2d 68 [1972] [one hour]; People v Santos, 248 AD2d 649 [2d Dept 1998] [four hours], appeal denied 92 NY2d 860 [1998]; People v Moore, 168 AD2d 463 [2d Dept 1990] ["some hours later"], appeal denied 77 NY2d 880 [1991]; People v Denson, 114 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2014], affirmed by 26 NY3d 179 [2015] ["hours later"]; People v Logan, 19 AD3d 939 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 830 [2005] [more than one half hour later]; People v Curry, 287 AD2d 252 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 680 [2001] ["many hours later"]; People v Schojan, 272 AD2d 932 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 871 [2000] [an hour and a half later]).

However, in People v Cicciarelli, 145 AD2d 938 (1988), the Fourth Department found that suppression of the defendant's statement was properly denied where only seventeen minutes elapsed between the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent and the administration of fresh Miranda warnings. In Cicciarelli, the defendant, after being administered Miranda warnings, invoked his right to remain silent (id. at 938). The officer questioning the defendant immediately ceased his questioning and no further contact was made until approximately seventeen minutes later when another officer, who had not been advised of the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent, took over the case and administered a new set of Miranda warnings (id.). The defendant acknowledged that he understood and waived his rights and gave an exculpatory statement to the police (id. at 939). Under such circumstances, the Court found that the defendant's statement was voluntary and his rights were scrupulously honored (id.).

The Court finds the instant matter to be analogous to the facts of Cicciarelli. Prior to his initial interrogation, Defendant Haughton was administered Miranda warnings, including the right to remain silent. He orally acknowledged that he understood his rights and indicated that he did not wish to answer any questions. Detective Corey immediately ceased the interview and left the room. The detective did not try to resume the questioning or in any way persuade Defendant Haughton to reconsider his position. Thereafter, Defendant Haughton was left alone in the interview room for approximately thirteen minutes, with the exception of Officer Hurwitz briefly coming in and out to give the defendant a cigarette and lighter. When Detective Corey returned to the room, he read Defendant Haughton his Miranda rights again. Defendant Haughton orally acknowledged his rights and this time agreed to answer the detective's questions.

The Court finds that the difference of only a few minutes between the time period here and in Cicciarelli is not dispositive where there was no evidence of any police coercion, "either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down the defendant's resistance and make him change his mind" (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US at 105-106), and the defendant was administered fresh Miranda Warnings. In cases involving a period of time less than the 17-minute period in Cicciarelli, there were other determinative factors that led the courts to deem the defendant's statements inadmissible. In People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 376 (1978), a little more than ten minutes elapsed between when the defendant was first administered Miranda warnings by the arresting officer and interrogation resumed by the Assistant District Attorney. However, critically in Grant, upon being advised of Miranda warnings, the defendant had asserted his right to counsel, not merely his right to refuse to answer questions (id.). Not only did the arresting officer not afford the defendant an opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel, but he immediately made comments which undermined the defendant's decision to consult an attorney (id.). The Grant Court could not find that the police had "scrupulously honored" the defendant's request for counsel before resuming the interrogation (id. at 377).

In People v Broadus, 149 AD2d 602 (2d Dept 1989), appeal denied 74 NY2d 661 (1989), the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and approximately five to ten minutes elapsed before the detective began questioning him again. The detective, however, did not administer fresh Miranda warnings. The Court found that the detective "chose to ignore the defendant's express assertion that he would make no statements and repeatedly importuned him to change his mind and discuss the suspected crime" (id. at 603). The defendant's statements were therefore inadmissible (id.).

Here, Defendant Haughton's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored." The video interview (People's Exhibit 2) clearly shows that the defendant was left completely alone and uninterrupted in the room for approximately thirteen minutes, with the exception of Officer Hurwitz providing him a cigarette and lighter (cf People v Suressi, 170 AD2d 1004, 1005 [4th Dept 1991], appeal denied 77 NY2d 967 [1991] [the People failed to demonstrate that a significant period of time elapsed between the defendant's invocation of silence and administration of a fresh set of Miranda warnings, as the period was less than the "few minutes" testified to by the second officer]). Ultimately, the hearing record reflects that Defendant Haughton had sufficient time to reflect and determine whether he wished to change his mind and make a statement. The Court finds no distinction in the fact that Defendant Haughton made the statements to the same detective to whom he previously invoked his right to remain silent (see People v Santos, 248 AD2d 649; People v Moore, 168 AD2d 463; People v Curry, 287 AD2d 252). Under such circumstances, Defendant Haughton's statements were voluntary.

The Court finds no merit in Defendant Haughton's argument that his statements were involuntarily on the grounds that he was under the influence of marijuana. "A confession will only be rendered inadmissibly by intoxication where the 'state of intoxication has risen to the degree of mania' (People v Adams, 26 NY2d 129, 137 [1970]), or where it 'resulted in the sudden loss of his capacity to understand either the nature of his legal rights of the consequences that would follow from their waiver [internal citations omitted]' (People v Husbands, 171 AD2d 756 [2d Dept 1991]" (People v Frejomil, 184 AD2d 524 [2d Dept 1992], appeal denied 80 NY2d 903 [1992]). Defendant Haughton's argument that he was high during the interview is unsupported by the video interview, which reflects that the defendant appeared alert and under no signs of distress while talking freely with the detective (People's Exhibit 2). Officer Hurwitz also testified that Defendant Haughton did not appear to be under the influence of marijuana or any other substance during the interview, and that he did not detect any odor of marijuana on Defendant Haughton's clothes or the areas in which he occupied. Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Haughton was under the influence of marijuana during the interview, "there is no evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to comprehend the significance of his statement" (People v Saunders, 146 AD2d 654 [2d Dept 1989], citing People v Zito, 123 AD2d 799 [2d Dept 1986], appeal denied 69 NY2d 835 [1987]).

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Haughton's motion to suppress his statements is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. The clerk of the Court is directed to enter this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Kew Gardens, New York

Dated: June 29, 2026

MARY L. BEJARANO, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lieutenant Sorrentino testified that at the time of the incident, he was assigned to the 113th Precinct.

2.   As of February 1, 2025, NYPD officers are not permitted to pursue vehicles for traffic infractions, violations or non-violent misdemeanors ("Commissioner Tisch Announces New NYPD Vehicle Pursuit Policy," Newsroom — NYPD, Jan. 15, 2025, available at https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr004/commissioner-tisch-new-nypd-vehicle-pursuit-policy).

3.   Jada Durant was a previous co-defendant in the matter but took a plea mid-hearing.

Mary L. Bejarano, J.