IN RE: Hallie BUIE (2020)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding to obtain letters of administration for the estate of Hallie Buie, Linda Buie and Teresa Buie appeal from a decree of the Surrogate's Court, Kings County (Margarita López Torres, S.), dated May 1, 2017.  The decree, upon an order of the same court dated February 16, 2017, denying the motion of Linda Buie and Teresa Buie, in effect, for leave to vacate their default in appearing and to extend their time to answer the petition and directing that limited letters of administration be issued to the petitioner upon her duly qualifying therefor, directed that limited letters of administration be issued to the petitioner.

ORDERED that the decree is affirmed, with costs payable by Linda Buie and Teresa Buie personally.

This appeal involves the estate of Hallie Buie (hereinafter the decedent), who died intestate on October 17, 2004.  The decedent was survived by five children, including the petitioner, Deborah Buie. On or about July 20, 2016, the petitioner commenced this proceeding to obtain letters of administration for the decedent's estate.  According to the petition, at the time of her death, the decedent owned a single-family house in Brooklyn, as well as an adjacent vacant lot.  The petition was served on certain parties, including Linda Buie and Teresa Buie (hereinafter together the appellants), who are two of the decedent's children.

The appellants did not answer the petition or appear on the return date of the petition.  The appellants moved, in effect, for leave to vacate their default in appearing and to extend their time to answer the petition.  The Surrogate's Court denied their motion, and subsequently issued a decree directing that limited letters of administration be issued to the petitioner.

“To extend the time to answer the [petition] and/or avoid the entry of a default judgment, a [respondent] who has failed to appear or answer the [petition] must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious [objection] to the [petition]” (Rodie v. Sahai, 175 A.D.3d 1449, 106 N.Y.S.3d 609;  see CPLR 3012[d];  Yuxi Li v. Caruso, 161 A.D.3d 1132, 1133, 77 N.Y.S.3d 685;  Gershman v. Ahmad, 131 A.D.3d 1104, 1105, 16 N.Y.S.3d 836).  Here, the appellants failed to set forth a reasonable excuse for their default (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Slavinski, 78 A.D.3d 1167, 1167–1168, 912 N.Y.S.2d 285;  Dorrer v. Berry, 37 A.D.3d 519, 520, 830 N.Y.S.2d 277).

Moreover, the appellants failed to set forth a potentially meritorious objection to the petition.  Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Surrogate's Court had jurisdiction over the petition, as it involved matters relating to the affairs of the decedent, including the disposition of the subject real property (see SCPA 201[1], [3];  1901, 1902, 1907;  EPTL 11–1.1[b][5];  Matter of Piccione, 57 N.Y.2d 278, 288, 456 N.Y.S.2d 669, 442 N.E.2d 1180;  Matter of Billings, 241 A.D.2d 452, 453, 663 N.Y.S.2d 976;  see also Matter of Southwick, 127 A.D.2d 662, 511 N.Y.S.2d 888).

Accordingly, the Surrogate's Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellants' motion (see CPLR 3012[d];  Kennedy v. City of New York, 114 A.D.3d 831, 980 N.Y.S.2d 779).

MASTRO, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, MALTESE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.